Ensuring trust within the healthcare system and addressing privacy and security challenges in the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) is of paramount importance. Based on our preliminary analysis results of Masud et al.’s authentication protocol, we propose an improved solution building upon their protocol. Our improved protocol incorporates various security measures to enhance its security. To validate the effectiveness of our improved protocol, we employ a comprehensive range of heuristic and formal security analysis methods. Comparative evaluations with other relevant protocols reveal that our proposed solution achieves satisfactory operational performance in resource-constrained IoMT scenarios.
13 December 2022 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Very recently, Masud et al. (IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 9(4), pp. 2649 -2656, DOI: 10.1109/JIOT.2021.3080461, Feb.15, 2022) proposed a lightweight and anonymity-preserving user authentication scheme to establish secure communication between the doctor, the gateway and sensor nodes in IoT-based healthcare, aiming to ensure the privacy of the patients’ physiological data. In this paper, however, we carefully revisit their scheme and firstly point out that the scheme is not practically implementable in its current form, and secondly we show that it is vulnerable to session key disclosure attacks, off-line password guessing attacks and traceability attacks, under the assumption that the attacker can gain access to the sensor nodes and the doctor’s device. We also propose fixes for each of these issues or vulnerabilities.
Dynamic wireless charging emerges as a promising technology, effectively alleviating range anxiety for electric vehicles in transit. However, the communication between the system’s various components, conducted over public channels, raises concerns about vulnerability to network attacks and message manipulation. Addressing data security and privacy protection in dynamic charging systems thus becomes a critical challenge. In this article, we present an authentication protocol tailored for dynamic charging systems. This protocol ensures secure and efficient authentication between vehicles and roadside devices without the help of a trusted center. We utilize a physical unclonable function (PUF) to resist physical capture attacks and employ the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) to provide forward security protection for session keys. We validated the security of our proposed scheme through comprehensive informal analyses, and formal security analysis using the ROR model and formal analysis tool ProVerif. Furthermore, comparative assessments reveal that our scheme outperforms other relevant protocols in terms of efficiency and security.
We conduct a cryptanalysis of the Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) handover authentication protocol newly developed by Son et al., which incorporates blockchain technology for authentication purposes. Although this approach is notably efficient, our analysis reveals that the protocol is vulnerable to vehicle impersonation attacks, traceability attacks, and trusted authority (TA) circumvention attacks. To address these security vulnerabilities, we propose an enhanced protocol integrating Schnorr signature-based authentication, dynamically refreshed temporary identities, and TA-anchored credential mechanisms. We validate its security through heuristic analysis and formal verification using ProVerif. Furthermore, a comprehensive comparison with various related schemes confirms that the new protocol achieves a higher level of security while simultaneously maintaining satisfactory efficiency in both the computational and communication aspects.