Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly pivotal in operations such as flood rescue, wildfire surveillance, and covert military endeavors, with their integration into the Internet of Things (IoT) networks broadening the scope of services they provide. Amidst this expansion, security concerns for UAVs have come to the forefront, particularly in open communication environments where they face authentication challenges and risks of sensitive data, including location information, being exposed to unauthorized parties. To address these issues, we propose a secure and lightweight authentication scheme that combines the use of anonymity mechanisms and Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). Specifically, we employ pseudo- and temporary identities to maintain the anonymity of UAVs, while also utilizing PUF technology to strengthen the security of Ground Station Servers (GSSs) against physical threats. Rigorous validation through ProVerif and the Random Oracle (ROR) Model indicates our scheme’s superior performance over existing protocols in terms of both efficiency and security.
We conduct a cryptanalysis of the Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) handover authentication protocol newly developed by Son et al., which incorporates blockchain technology for authentication purposes. Although this approach is notably efficient, our analysis reveals that the protocol is vulnerable to vehicle impersonation attacks, traceability attacks, and trusted authority (TA) circumvention attacks. To address these security vulnerabilities, we propose an enhanced protocol integrating Schnorr signature-based authentication, dynamically refreshed temporary identities, and TA-anchored credential mechanisms. We validate its security through heuristic analysis and formal verification using ProVerif. Furthermore, a comprehensive comparison with various related schemes confirms that the new protocol achieves a higher level of security while simultaneously maintaining satisfactory efficiency in both the computational and communication aspects.