Sustained green innovation in firms is a crucial driver of sustainable economic development. Chief executive officer (CEO) openness, as a key personality trait related to leadership effectiveness, has an important but largely overlooked impact on sustained green innovation. This study aims to explore the impact of CEO openness on sustained green innovation and its boundary conditions. Using data from Chinese A-share-listed firms between 2011 and 2023, we find that CEO openness has a significant positive impact on sustained green innovation in firms. The moderating effects reveal that both digitalization level and CEO shareholding strengthen the positive effect of CEO openness on sustained green innovation. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that this positive effect is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises, firms in non-heavily polluting industries, and those with high analyst coverage. These findings provide theoretical support for understanding the determinants of sustained green innovation through the lens of CEO personality. They also enrich the growing literature on the impact of CEO openness on corporate decision-making. Furthermore, this study recommends that firms prioritize CEO openness in selection, enhance digital infrastructure, and improve equity incentive measures to ultimately foster sustained green innovation.

Against the backdrop of global climate governance and China’s “dual carbon” goals, carbon emissions trading (CET) has become a core policy instrument for promoting low-carbon transformation. However, it remains unclear whether CET policies can effectively improve corporate carbon performance and, more importantly, through which micro-level mechanisms such effects operate within firms. To address these gaps, this study applies a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to examine the impact of CET policy on corporate carbon performance and its transmission pathways. The results show that CET policy significantly enhances corporate carbon performance. Heterogeneity analysis further reveals that this positive effect is more pronounced in regions with lower environmental governance intensity, and that the policy’s effectiveness strengthens over time. Mechanism tests indicate that financing constraints and R&D investment serve as chain mediators: CET policy alleviates financing constraints, stimulates R&D investment, and thereby improves carbon performance. Moreover, the moderating effect analysis shows that executives’ green backgrounds reinforce the policy’s effectiveness by further easing financing constraints and mitigating their negative impact on R&D investment. Overall, these findings deepen the micro-level understanding of market-based environmental regulation and provide policy implications for optimizing CET policy design, improving resource allocation efficiency, and fostering low-carbon transformation and sustainable competitive advantages for enterprises.

Against the backdrop of the increasingly salient constraints of resource scarcity and environmental pressures on global economic development, sustainable innovation emerges as an imperative strategic pathway for corporations to secure a competitive edge in the international marketplace. Corporate innovation capability serves as the critical factor for both the advancement of sustainable innovation and the maintenance of the corporate competitive edge. While the extant literature has extensively explored how internal and external governance mechanism forces shape corporate investment decision-making, the critical role of non-CEO executives in the process of corporate innovation investment decision-making remains conspicuously underexplored. This study examines the effect of bottom–up governance mechanisms within executive teams on corporate innovation investment from the perspective of non-CEO executive independence. We used a sample of A-listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2021 for empirical tests. We found a U-shaped relation between non-CEO executive independence and corporate innovation investment, and this finding still held after addressing endogeneity issues and conducting a series of robustness tests. Mechanism analysis revealed that both non-CEO executives’ decision horizon and firm agency costs positively moderate this U-shaped relationship. This U-shaped effect is pronounced in firms with lower CEO power, lower levels of corporate governance, and non-state-owned firms. Our findings provide an important basis for clarifying the internal governance mechanism of the executive teams while offering new insights for optimizing the allocation of corporate resources and promoting corporate innovation from the perspective of improving corporate governance.