The post-deployment challenges in developing and upgrading blockchain smart contracts necessitate a high level of accuracy in their development and business logic. However, current methodologies for verifying the business logic of smart contracts frequently fail to address their alignment with end-user business requirements. This paper introduces a two-step language transformation process to bridge this gap. Initially, we establish a transformation rule from the Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) to Prolog, enabling the translation of business processes into a Prolog representation. This step not only validates the business process logic but also ensures it meets user specifications. Subsequently, we introduce a transformation rule from the BPMN to Go, which facilitates the transformation of the BPMN model, once validated, into a Go language smart contract. To enhance usability, we have engineered a dedicated tool that streamlines this transformation process. We present a case study involving a banking loan process to exemplify the utility of our tool in creating BPMN diagrams, conducting requirement and syntax validations, and effecting the transformation to Go smart contracts. The case study and empirical results suggest that our methodology and the accompanying tool mitigate the complexities inherent in smart contract development. They also ensure the fidelity of business logic to user demands, thereby promoting the broader adoption of blockchain smart contract technology.
A composite smart contract can execute smart contracts that may belong to other owners or companies through external calls, bringing more security challenges to blockchain applications. Traditional static verification methods are inadequate for analyzing the dynamic execution of these contracts, resulting in misjudgment and omission issues. Therefore, this paper proposes a model checking approach based on dynamic behavior that verifies the security and business logic of composite smart contracts. Utilizing automata, the method models contracts, users, attackers, and extracts properties, focusing on six types of common security vulnerabilities. A thorough case study and experimental evaluation demonstrate the method’s efficiency in identifying vulnerabilities and ensuring alignment with business requirements. The UPPAAL tool is employed for comprehensive verification, proving its effectiveness in enhancing smart contract security.
12 February 2026 in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
With the widespread adoption of cryptocurrencies, exemplified by Bitcoin, mixing services have been increasingly misused for illicit activities such as fraud, extortion, and money laundering. These services cut off the direct link between input and output addresses to conceal publicly available transaction traces on the blockchain, thereby evading regulatory investigations. In recent years, significant efforts have been made to deanonymize Bitcoin mixing services (BMS). While these efforts have yielded some achievements in service detection, they still face several challenges, such as vague theoretical definitions, coarse-grained identification capabilities, and insufficient labeling information. To address these challenges, this paper formalizes the notion of BMS with a syntax, security model, and goals, providing a universal definition for evaluating service anonymity and detection feasibility. We also propose a fine-grained detection framework for BMS, called BMS-FDET, which leverages heterogeneous Bitcoin transactional networks and multiple attention mechanisms to identify mixing transactions across different services. To improve the model's detection capabilities and compare performance, a sufficient ground-truth dataset with over 596,200 entries covering more than 15 mixing services is built from extensive data sources. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of BMS-FDET over existing methods.