This paper investigates the possibilities of using an agent-based evacuation model to analyse the formation of queues at the exits of enclosed spaces and the evacuation process of people. The aim is to investigate how the density of people in a crowd affects the safe movement of people and how the width, number, and location of exits affect evacuation time. The analysis was carried out using the Pathfinder evacuation model, which provides two modes to simulate the movement of people: steering and SFPE. An enclosed space of 20 m × 30 m was investigated. First, the differences between the modes of the evacuation model to simulate the movement of people were compared. Then, the steering mode with limited door flow was set and the effect of the width, number, and location of the exits with a total width of 4 m on the evacuation time was investigated. The results of this study highlight differences in the simulation of the movement of people according to the different modes and provide valuable information for the design of safe escape routes. Proper design of escape routes can prevent an adverse situation that could arise when evacuating a large number of people.

This paper addresses the evacuation of people from multipurpose halls and introduces an innovative approach that uses a probabilistic model, specifically the Monte Carlo method, to analyse iterative evacuation processes. The aim is to explore how this modern technology can contribute to the development of effective and safe evacuation plans for mass events. The Monte Carlo method was applied to a specific example of a multipurpose hall that offers different configurations for events such as sports matches, concerts, or performances. The evacuation of people was analysed for two configurations: a hockey match with a capacity of 9500 people and a concert with a capacity of 11,000 people. In both cases, the total evacuation of people from the hall was analysed, and the evacuation time was evaluated when two parameters were changed: speed of movement and preference for door selection. The results of the simulations can provide valuable information for the design of effective safety measures in multipurpose halls and other similar multipurpose venues. This innovative approach to evacuation analysis allows for a comprehensive assessment of the evacuation process, identification of critical areas, and verification of the layout of the space.

This study examines whether a train fire near an evacuation interface in a railway tunnel can create an adverse configuration relevant to evacuation design and collective risk assessment. It focuses on twin single-track tunnels, in which the parallel tunnel serves as a safe area, and evacuation is carried out through cross-passages and boundary portals. If a fire impairs such an interface, evacuees may be forced to continue to a more distant exit. The problem is formulated as a geometric-probabilistic screening task. The model calculates the probability that, after the train has stopped, the fire lies within a tolerance zone around an evacuation interface. The probability is derived analytically using deterministic convolution and verified via Monte Carlo simulation for trains with lengths of 200 m and 400 m. This verification concerns mathematical calculation only, not the physical, smoke, operational, or evacuation assumptions. The geometric probability is linked to collective risk through representative train fire frequencies, external consequence indicators, and selected F/N criteria. With ε = 37 m and portals included as boundary evacuation interfaces of the finite tunnel domain, the adverse-configuration probabilities are similar: approximately 14.0% for the 200 m train and 14.6% for the 400 m train. The difference becomes decisive only after considering the magnitude of the consequences and the traffic intensity. Under the reference assumptions, the 400 m high-occupancy case reaches the selected Dutch criterion at about four train passages per day. A fire near an evacuation interface, therefore, cannot be treated as marginal solely because the tunnel meets the 500 m cross-passage spacing requirement. Acceptability depends on geometry, occupancy, fire frequency, the definition of consequences, traffic intensity, and the selected risk framework. The homogeneous fire-origin distribution is used only as a neutral first-order assumption; more refined spatial fire-origin models and broader comparisons across safety criteria are needed.