Both IgA and IgG antibodies are known to play important roles in protection against influenza virus infection. While IgG is the major isotype induced systemically, IgA is predominant in mucosal tissues, including the upper respiratory tract. Although IgA antibodies are believed to have unique advantages in mucosal immunity, information on direct comparisons of the in vitro antiviral activities of IgA and IgG antibodies recognizing the same epitope is limited. In this study, we demonstrate differences in antiviral activities between these isotypes using monoclonal IgA and IgG antibodies obtained from hybridomas of the same origin. Polymeric IgA-producing hybridoma cells were successfully subcloned from those originally producing monoclonal antibody S139/1, a hemaggulutinin (HA)-specific IgG that was generated against an influenza A virus strain of the H3 subtype but had cross-neutralizing activities against the H1, H2, H13, and H16 subtypes. These monoclonal S139/1 IgA and IgG antibodies were assumed to recognize the same epitope and thus used to compare their antiviral activities. We found that both S139/1 IgA and IgG antibodies strongly bound to the homologous H3 virus in an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay, and there were no significant differences in their hemagglutination-inhibiting and neutralizing activities against the H3 virus. In contrast, S139/1 IgA showed remarkably higher cross-binding to and antiviral activities against H1, H2, and H13 viruses than S139/1 IgG. It was also noted that S139/1 IgA, but not IgG, drastically suppressed the extracellular release of the viruses from infected cells. Electron microscopy revealed that S139/1 IgA deposited newly produced viral particles on the cell surface, most likely by tethering the particles. These results suggest that anti-HA IgA has greater potential to prevent influenza A virus infection than IgG antibodies, likely due to increased avidity conferred by its multivalency, and that this advantage may be particularly important for heterosubtypic immunity.

Background: Although vector-borne zoonotic diseases are a major public health threat globally, they are usually neglected, especially among resource-constrained countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa. This scoping review examined the current knowledge and identified research gaps of vector-borne zoonotic pathogens in Zambia. Methods and findings: Major scientific databases (Web of Science, PubMed, Scopus, Google Scholar, CABI, Scientific Information Database (SID)) were searched for articles describing vector-borne (mosquitoes, ticks, fleas and tsetse flies) zoonotic pathogens in Zambia. Several mosquito-borne arboviruses have been reported including Yellow fever, Ntaya, Mayaro, Dengue, Zika, West Nile, Chikungunya, Sindbis, and Rift Valley fever viruses. Flea-borne zoonotic pathogens reported include Yersinia pestis and Rickettsia felis. Trypanosoma sp. was the only tsetse fly-borne pathogen identified. Further, tick-borne zoonotic pathogens reported included Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic fever virus, Rickettsia sp., Anaplasma sp., Ehrlichia sp., Borrelia sp., and Coxiella burnetii. Conclusions: This study revealed the presence of many vector-borne zoonotic pathogens circulating in vectors and animals in Zambia. Though reports of human clinical cases were limited, several serological studies provided considerable evidence of zoonotic transmission of vector-borne pathogens in humans. However, the disease burden in humans attributable to vector-borne zoonotic infections could not be ascertained from the available reports and this precludes the formulation of national policies that could help in the control and mitigation of the impact of these diseases in Zambia. Therefore, there is an urgent need to scale-up “One Health” research in emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases to enable the country to prepare for future epidemics, including pandemics.

African swine fever (ASF) is a highly contagious and deadly viral hemorrhagic disease of swine. In Zambia, ASF was first reported in 1912 in Eastern Province and is currently believed to be endemic in that province only. Strict quarantine measures implemented at the Luangwa River Bridge, the only surface outlet from Eastern Province, appeared to be successful in restricting the disease. However, in 1989, an outbreak occurred for the first time outside the endemic province. Sporadic outbreaks have since occurred almost throughout the country. These events have brought into acute focus our limited understanding of the epidemiology of ASF in Zambia. Here, we review the epidemiology of the disease in areas considered nonendemic from 1989 to 2015. Comprehensive sequence analysis conducted on genetic data of ASF viruses (ASFVs) detected in domestic pigs revealed that p72 genotypes I, II, VIII and XIV have been involved in causing ASF outbreaks in swine during the study period. With the exception of the 1989 outbreak, we found no concrete evidence of dissemination of ASFVs from Eastern Province to other parts of the country. Our analyses revealed a complex epidemiology of the disease with a possibility of sylvatic cycle involvement. Trade and/or movement of pigs and their products, both within and across international borders, appear to have been the major factor in ASFV dissemination. Since ASFVs with the potential to cause countrywide and possibly regional outbreaks, could emerge from “nonendemic regions”, the current ASF control policy in Zambia requires a dramatic shift to ensure a more sustainable pig industry.

Background: Wild ducks are the natural hosts of influenza A viruses. Duck influenza, therefore, has been believed inapparent infection with influenza A viruses, including highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) in chickens. In fact, ducks experimentally infected with an HPAIV strain, A/Hong Kong/483/1997 (H5N1) (HK483), did not show any clinical signs. Another HPAIV strain, A/whooper swan/Mongolia/3/2005 (H5N1) (MON3) isolated from a dead swan, however, caused neurological dysfunction and death in ducks. Method: To understand the mechanism whereby MON3 shows high pathogenicity in ducks, HK483, MON3, and twenty-four reassortants generated between these two H5N1 viruses were compared for their pathogenicity in domestic ducks. Results: None of the ducks infected with MON3-based single-gene reassortants bearing the PB2, NP, or NS gene segment of HK483 died, and HK483-based single-gene reassortants bearing PB2, NP, or NS genes of MON3 were not pathogenic in ducks, suggesting that multiple gene segments contribute to the pathogenicity of MON3 in ducks. All the ducks infected with the reassortant bearing PB2, PA, HA, NP, and NS gene segments of MON3 died within five days post-inoculation, as did those infected with MON3. Each of the viruses was assessed for replication in ducks three days post-inoculation. MON3 and multi-gene reassortants pathogenic in ducks were recovered from all of the tissues examined and replicated with high titers in the brains and lungs. Conclusion: The present results indicate that multigenic factors are responsible for efficient replication of MON3 in ducks. In particular, virus growth in the brain might correlate with neurological dysfunction and the disease severity.

• While African countries were relatively spared initially, when COVID-19 was first reported from China, the frequent travel links between China, Europe and Africa, meant importation of SARS-CoV-2 into Africa was inevitable. • In preparation, Zambia had applied a multisectoral national epidemic disease surveillance and response system resulting in the identification of the first case within 48 h of the individual entering the country by air travel from a trip to France. • Phylogenomic analysis showed that the detected SARS-CoV-2 belonged to lineage B.1.1., sharing the last common ancestor with SARS-CoV-2 strains recovered from South Africa. • At the African continental level, our analysis showed that B.1 and B.1.1 lineages appear to be predominant in Africa. • Whole genome sequence analysis should be part of all surveillance activities to monitor the origin and evolution of SARS-CoV-2 lineages across Africa.