The government subsidy, collection mode, and power structure not only bring about a big challenge for the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management but also affect both the customer and the environment. This paper considers a CLSC consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the manufacturer sells the new and remanufactured products through the retailer to the customer and he obtains a low carbon subsidy allocated by the government for each unit remanufactured product. Three different collection modes, viz., manufacturer collection, retailer collection, and dual collection, can be chosen from collecting the used products. In addition, three different power structures, i.e., Manufacturer Stackelberg, Vertical Nash, and Retailer Stackelberg, are considered in this paper. Based on the game theory approach, the optimal pricing and recycling policies of the CLSC members are derived under nine different scenarios. Then, we compare the derived results to explore the impacts of the low carbon subsidy, collection mode, and power structure on the CLSC from the perspectives of the customer, the environment, the manufacturer, and the retailer. It is shown that a high low carbon subsidy will lead to heightened market demand, improved environment performance, and increased members' profits. A balanced supply chain power relationship will benefit the customer and the environment, and in contrast, an imbalanced supply chain power relationship will benefit the manufacturer and the retailer. We derive the value range of the competing intensity for which it is beneficial to build dual collection channels based on these above perspectives.

This paper analyzes the option coordination problem of a fresh agricultural product supply chain under two supply chain structures, when the production cost and the loss rate are disrupted simultaneously. This paper provides the explicit option coordination conditions for the disrupted supply chain under two supply chain structures, and then explores the effects of the disruptions and supply chain structure on the option coordination conditions. The results suggest that it is unfavorable to apply the original coordinating contracts without disruptions to coordinate the disrupted supply chain. The coordination of the disrupted supply chain can be achieved with knowledge of the distribution of demand. In two coordinating contracts for the disrupted supply chain, the exercise price is still at the original level without disruptions while the option price deviates from the original level without disruptions. Moreover, the relationships of the coordination conditions in two supply chain structures depend on the value of the profit allocation coefficient. When the profit allocation coefficient exceeds (falls behind) a certain threshold, the option price is set at a higher (lower) value in the supplier-led supply chain structure than in the distributor-led supply chain structure, while the exercise price is set at a lower (higher) value in the supplier-led supply chain structure than in the distributor-led supply chain structure. Finally, the disrupted supply chain with any supply chain structure will perform better in the modified coordinating contracts than in the original coordinating contracts without disruptions.

Purpose: This paper forms an e-commerce supply chain that include a manufacturer providing products and an online platform providing service. The reselling platform mode and the agent platform mode are considered through an exploration of the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), vertical Nash (VN), platform Stackelberg (PS) power structures. The purpose of this paper is to explore the pricing and platform service decisions under different platform selling modes and channel power structures.Design/methodology/approach: Based on the game theory models, this paper investigates the interaction between the manufacturer and the online platform under four different scenarios. The optimal solutions of four models are provided. Through comparison analyses, this paper evaluates the impacts of platform selling mode and channel power structure on the pricing and platform service decisions and the members’ profits.Findings: The manufacturer prefers the MS power structure in any platform mode. The online platform prefers the PS (MS) power structure under a low (high) service cost efficiency in the reselling platform mode, while prefers the PS and VN power structures in the agent platform mode. Moreover, the manufacturer prefers the agent (reselling) platform mode under a low (high) service cost efficiency in any power structure. The online platform prefers the reselling platform mode in the MS and PS power structures, while prefers the reselling (agent) platform mode under a low (high) service cost efficiency in the VN power structures.Originality/value: The analysis result provides important managerial implications that help the supply chain members develop a better understanding of the selection of the platform selling mode and the effect of the channel power structure in the presence of platform service.