Sustainable supply chain operations that emphasize environmental and social welfare have drawn significant attention. Supply chain members and governments are increasingly implementing incentive strategies to promote sustainability. This paper develops a game-theoretical model of a sustainable supply chain to examine the effectiveness of cooperative advertising under different government subsidy schemes. We consider that the supply chain consists of a green manufacturer and a retailer who sells a green product through advertising. The manufacturer can share advertising costs with the retailer, a strategy known as cooperative advertising, while the government can offer either the advertising subsidy or the consumption subsidy to support sustainability. Our analytical findings uncover that cooperative advertising may not always benefit the sustainable supply chain. Without the government subsidy, cooperative advertising is beneficial to the manufacturer, consumers, and the government only when the negative effect of cooperative advertising is mild; however, it is always detrimental to the retailer. In contrast, when a government subsidy is provided, not engaging in cooperative advertising is always superior. On the other hand, we find that government subsidies are always effective in facilitating sustainable supply chain operations, with the consumption subsidy outperforming the advertising subsidy. We further extend the model to explore the scenarios under (i) the manufacturer encroachment and (ii) a marginal advertising cost. We find the major findings remain valid in two extensions. This study not only contributes to the existing literature on sustainable supply chain management, but also offers practical insights for firms and governments to design incentive mechanisms.
17 August 2022 in Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
This paper explores the decentralized, centralized and bargaining models of a supply chain involving an electricity generator and a retailer. We found that the investment cost coefficient negatively impacts the supply chain profits but positively affects price decisions. In contrast, the probability of meeting the COVID-19 emergency positively impacts the supply chain profit and negatively affects price decisions. We contribute by designing a bargaining contract for energy supply chain firms to improve profits on low investment, thereby improving their financial health and competitive advantage. The results imply that financial managers can bridge the revenue gap in COVI9 19 period.
11 February 2025 in Alexandria Engineering Journal
3D printing (3DP) has garnered significant attention from industries, prompting traditional manufacturers to adopt 3DP to sustainably facilitate increased product variety. Observing manufacturers’ two adoption strategies, ordering parts and collaboratively printing 3DP parts, in a real-world setting, we utilize a wholesale price contract and a Nash Bargaining contract to describe these two strategies and then develop a supply-chain model including a 3DP supplier (Supplier) and a traditional manufacturer (Manufacturer). Further, we employ backward induction to solve the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the model to reveal differences between these two strategies and the impact of 3DP’s improved resource efficiency. According to equilibrium outcomes, analytical results show that first, as long as the unit cost of each 3DP part is not overly high and 3DP’s resource efficiency is not extremely low, the Manufacturer is willing to implement 3DP to increase product variety. Second, a rise in the resource efficiency can create a “win-win” scenario for the Manufacturer and the Supplier. Third, supply-chain collaboration can be achieved when the Manufacturer’s and the Supplier’s bargaining powers approach equality. Interestingly, a Nash bargaining contract can incentivize the manufacturer to substitute a base product with a variety of products, a change facilitated by an increase in the retail price of this base product. The managerial implication of this research is that enhanced resource efficiency can lead to less environmental pollution in the collaboration model by resulting in the sale of lower quantities of the base product, which would otherwise consume more resources and generate greater environmental pollution.
2 April 2026 in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
This study examines the impact of the new product’s market potential on a manufacturer’s choice between the new product preannouncement (NPP) and the new product sudden announcement (NPS) strategies and their effects on a retailer’s ordering decisions. We establish a game-theoretical model to examine the impact of the new product’s market potential on a manufacturer (M)’s choice between the new product preannouncement (NPP) and the new product sudden-announcement (NPS) strategies and their effects on a retailer (R)’s ordering decisions. Based on equilibrium, we find that when market potential of new product is low, M prefers to choose the NPS strategy, otherwise, the NPP strategy is more advantageous. Second, a higher substitution rate between new and old products or lower improvement costs for the new product encourages M to adopt the NPP strategy. Third, as the market potential for new products increases, M utilizes an inverse U-shaped pricing strategy for old products to induce R’s U-shaped ordering strategy, and M’s wholesale price as well as R’s order quantity for new products linearly increases. Hence, R’s total profit presents a U shape. Finally, our findings reveal that the strategic switch from NPS to NPP is not merely a tactical choice, but a fundamental shift from relying on competitive surprise to orchestrating a controlled product transition. This shift allows the manufacturer to actively manage cannibalization, align retailer incentives, and maximize total channel profit when the new product’s market potential is sufficiently high.