This article constructs a two-stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer (producing both fuel vehicles (FV) and new energy vehicles) and a retailer (selling both fuel vehicles and new energy vehicles) based on dual credit policy, considers three different power structure models, including the vertical Nash game model, the manufacturer Stackelberg game model, the retailer Stackelberg game model, and explores the operational strategy issues of new energy vehicle (NEV) enterprises under the dual credit policy. By comparing the optimal equilibrium solutions under different channel power structures, our findings indicate that (1) When the demand function is linear, the vertical Nash game model can achieve the highest system profit of the automotive supply chain, and in the manufacturer Stackelberg game model, the profit of the automaker is higher than that of the retailer, while in the retailer Stackelberg game model, the profit of the automaker is lower than that of the retailer. (2) The demand and pricing for FV and NEV in different models are determined by the range of FV and NEV production costs, credit trading prices, and the proportion of NEV credits. (3) Both the increase in the credit trading prices and the proportion of NEV credits will promote increased profits for the manufacturer and retailer. (4) The increase of the price sensitivity coefficient will reduce the demand as well as the profit of auto supply chain members.
The observation that firms are greenwashing in their advertisements to consumers has attracted regulatory false claim concerns; thus, we built a three-stage game theoretical model to explore how a firm’s efficiency in greenness information acquisition and a false claims ban (FCB) regulatory policy induce greenwashing (non-greenwashing) in the green advertising market. We solved the model with the concept of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Based on the PBEs, we obtained the following results. (1) A FCB regulatory policy is necessary to rule out any intentional greenwashing PBE. (2) In the presence of a strict FCB regulatory policy (with a large enough FCB penalty), if the precision of the firm’s observed signals is lower (or higher) than a threshold, uninformative non-greenwashing (both unintentional and uninformative non-greenwashing) PBEs arise, and the threshold increases in the FCB penalty. (3) A strict FCB regulatory policy and a high level of efficiency (regarding the firm’s greenness information acquisition) can (together) rule out greenwashing; the threshold of the efficiency of the firm’s greenness information acquisition is independent of the regulatory policy. Managerial implications are also discussed.
30 June 2017 in The Open Civil Engineering Journal
Introduction: For suspended-dome with big partial hole, two kinds of feasible plans were proposed. Method: One of the plans was to adjust suspended-dome's members, and another to build auxiliary supporting system to support the suspended-dome with columns together. These kinds of suspended-dome's main structural parameters include stiffness, member force, steel consumption, support reaction and stability, and parametric analysis is based on these parameters. Conclusion: Firstly,the scope of application was illustrated for the former plan. Then, an equivalent vertical stiffness algorithm was put forward for the latter plan. In the latter plan, limit stiffness constant was introduced to quantify the method for solving discontinuous support problem.
3D printing (3DP) has garnered significant attention from industries, prompting traditional manufacturers to adopt 3DP to sustainably facilitate increased product variety. Observing manufacturers’ two adoption strategies, ordering parts and collaboratively printing 3DP parts, in a real-world setting, we utilize a wholesale price contract and a Nash Bargaining contract to describe these two strategies and then develop a supply-chain model including a 3DP supplier (Supplier) and a traditional manufacturer (Manufacturer). Further, we employ backward induction to solve the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the model to reveal differences between these two strategies and the impact of 3DP’s improved resource efficiency. According to equilibrium outcomes, analytical results show that first, as long as the unit cost of each 3DP part is not overly high and 3DP’s resource efficiency is not extremely low, the Manufacturer is willing to implement 3DP to increase product variety. Second, a rise in the resource efficiency can create a “win-win” scenario for the Manufacturer and the Supplier. Third, supply-chain collaboration can be achieved when the Manufacturer’s and the Supplier’s bargaining powers approach equality. Interestingly, a Nash bargaining contract can incentivize the manufacturer to substitute a base product with a variety of products, a change facilitated by an increase in the retail price of this base product. The managerial implication of this research is that enhanced resource efficiency can lead to less environmental pollution in the collaboration model by resulting in the sale of lower quantities of the base product, which would otherwise consume more resources and generate greater environmental pollution.
3 March 2026 in Journal of the Operational Research Society
1. Artificial intelligence (AI) is revitalising Industry 4.0 and intelligent manufacturing. AI transforms operational and production decisions via an efficient data-driven approach that leverages t...
As sustainability becomes a vital concern for consumers, liquor firms are increasingly integrating sustainable culture into their brand promotion campaigns. This study examines two liquor firms’ competitive and cooperative promotion strategies of a sustainability culture via a game theoretical model. The analytical results are obtained as follows: (1) The correlation coefficient between sustainability culture and liquor products negatively affects the promotion level of sustainability culture under the cooperative promotion strategy, whereas its impact is non-monotonic under the competitive promotion strategy. (2) Under the cooperative promotion strategy, the initial disparity in sustainability cultures always positively affects the promotion level of the common sustainability culture. However, under the competitive promotion strategy, its impact is the opposite for a liquor firm with a weak sustainability culture and a liquor firm with a strong sustainability culture. (3) The necessary conditions for adopting a cooperative strategy for promoting a common sustainability culture are that the initial disparity in sustainability cultures between the two liquor firms is in a moderate range. Therefore, for managers in the liquor industry, careful assessment of the initial disparity in sustainability cultures is essential when formulating cooperative or competitive strategies. It is also crucial to recognize the nuanced role played by the correlation between sustainability culture and liquor products. Moreover, these findings offer a robust theoretical foundation for future research into the influence of sustainability culture on liquor supply chain ecosystems.