The use of cloud computing has become common due to advantages such as low cost and sizing of computing resources according to demand. However, it also raises security and privacy concerns, because critical data – for example, in IoT applications – are stored and processed in the cloud. This paper proposes a software architecture that supports multiple approaches to secure data aggregation. For validation purposes, this software architecture was used in the development of applications for smart grids, computing instantaneous consumption of a region and the monthly bill of an individual consumer. The consumption data can be collected by smart meters, enabling consumers to reduce electricity costs through close monitoring. However, such data may reveal sensitive information if no privacy techniques are applied. Therefore, the proposed software architecture proved to be viable from experiments with techniques such as homomorphic encryption and hardware security extensions (Intel SGX).
Cloud computing considerably reduces the costs of deploying applications through on-demand, automated and fine-granular allocation of resources. Even in private settings, cloud computing platforms enable agile and self-service management, which means that physical resources are shared more efficiently. Cloud computing considerably reduces the costs of deploying applications through on-demand, automated and fine-granular allocation of resources. Even in private settings, cloud computing platforms enable agile and self-service management, which means that physical resources are shared more efficiently. Nevertheless, using shared infrastructures also creates more opportunities for attacks and data breaches. In this paper, we describe the SecureCloud approach. The SecureCloud project aims to enable confidentiality and integrity of data and applications running in potentially untrusted cloud environments. The project leverages technologies such as Intel SGX, OpenStack and Kubernetes to provide a cloud platform that supports secure applications. In addition, the project provides tools that help generating cloud-native, secure applications and services that can be deployed on potentially untrusted clouds. The results have been validated in a real-world smart grid scenario to enable a data workflow that is protected end-to-end: from the collection of data to the generation of high-level information such as fraud alerts.
SPIRE is an open-source project that enables the provisioning of verifiable identities to software components based on an attestation of the software properties, avoiding the leakage risks of pre-provisioned secrets. This paper presents an implementation of a SPIRE plugin that enables the attestation of AMD SEV-SNP confidential virtual machines. Our approach leverages the pluggable architecture from SPIRE and depends only on minor changes to QEMU, changes taken from its open-source community, and that should soon be merged. As a result, application providers can now use SPIRE to restrict sensitive credentials to be available only to services in environments protected from malicious hosts and cloud operators using AMD SEV-SNP technology. Our experiments show that the steps needed to create and attest the confidential VM do not prohibitively increase boot times (from 10.8 to 20.9 seconds) and that confidential VMs with encrypted disks only slightly degrade the CPU and RAM performance (about ) of unmodified applications.
The production of large amounts of sensitive data raises growing concerns on confidentiality guarantees. Considering this, it is natural that data owners have an interest in how their data are being used. In this work, we propose Data aNd Application Tracking (DNAT), a trustworthy platform for tracking the executions of applications over sensitive data in untrusted environments. For traceability purposes, we use blockchain and smart contracts, and to guarantee execution confidentiality and, especially, enforce that operations are appropriately logged in the blockchain, we use Intel SGX. Experiments show that tracking costs on Ethereum varies from 1 to 61 cents of a US dollar, depending on the operation and urgency for consolidation. The time cost of confidential execution is associated with the SGX overhead. It increases non-linearly initially but has a linear growth rate when data and application size gets much higher than the available enclave page cache (≈ 93 MB).