SPIRE is an open-source project that enables the provisioning of verifiable identities to software components based on an attestation of the software properties, avoiding the leakage risks of pre-provisioned secrets. This paper presents an implementation of a SPIRE plugin that enables the attestation of AMD SEV-SNP confidential virtual machines. Our approach leverages the pluggable architecture from SPIRE and depends only on minor changes to QEMU, changes taken from its open-source community, and that should soon be merged. As a result, application providers can now use SPIRE to restrict sensitive credentials to be available only to services in environments protected from malicious hosts and cloud operators using AMD SEV-SNP technology. Our experiments show that the steps needed to create and attest the confidential VM do not prohibitively increase boot times (from 10.8 to 20.9 seconds) and that confidential VMs with encrypted disks only slightly degrade the CPU and RAM performance (about ) of unmodified applications.
1 November 2016 in Computers and Electrical Engineering
The production of large amounts of sensitive data raises growing concerns on confidentiality guarantees. Considering this, it is natural that data owners have an interest in how their data are being used. In this work, we propose Data aNd Application Tracking (DNAT), a trustworthy platform for tracking the executions of applications over sensitive data in untrusted environments. For traceability purposes, we use blockchain and smart contracts, and to guarantee execution confidentiality and, especially, enforce that operations are appropriately logged in the blockchain, we use Intel SGX. Experiments show that tracking costs on Ethereum varies from 1 to 61 cents of a US dollar, depending on the operation and urgency for consolidation. The time cost of confidential execution is associated with the SGX overhead. It increases non-linearly initially but has a linear growth rate when data and application size gets much higher than the available enclave page cache (≈ 93 MB).
Confidential virtual machines (CVMs) are cloud providers' most recent security offer, providing confidentiality and integrity features. Although confidentiality protects the machine from the host operating system, firmware, and cloud operators, integrity protection is even more useful, enabling protection for a wider range of security issues. Unfortunately, CVM integrity verification depends on remote attestation protocols, which are not trivial for operators and differ largely among cloud providers. We propose an approach for abstracting CVM attestation that leverages an open-source standard, Cloud Native Foundation's Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone (SPIFFE). Our approach can integrate smoothly even when applications are unaware of CVMs or the SPIFFE standard. Nevertheless, our implementation inherits SPIFFE flexibility for empowering access control when applications support SPIFFE. In terms of performance, CVMs incur an additional 1.3 s to 21.9 s in boot times (it varies with the cloud environment), a marginal degradation for CPU, RAM, and IO workloads (maximum degradation of 2.6%), and low but not imperceptible degradation for database workloads (between 3.6% to 7.13%). Finally, we provide usability mechanisms and a threat analysis to help users navigate cloud providers' different CVM implementations and resulting guarantees.