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In this study, we examine whether and to what extent affiliated bankers on board may affect firms’ corporate social performance. Using a propensity score-matched sample from 2002 to 2016, we find that board directors from affiliated banks exert significantly positive influence on firms’ corporate social performance. Furthermore, board of directors from affiliated banks are negatively associated with firm investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities when firms experience financial distress. Finally, we find that the effect of affiliated bankers on board on firms’ CSR performance depends on the affiliated banks’ CSR orientation, as affiliated banker directors from banks with higher CSR orientation have a stronger influence on firms’ investments in CSR activities. The results suggest that improving firm’s CSR performance is consistent with the affiliated banks’ interests.
Iftekhar Hasan; Hui Li; Haizhi Wang; Yun Zhu. Do Affiliated Bankers on Board Enhance Corporate Social Responsibility? US Evidence. Sustainability 2021, 13, 3250 .
AMA StyleIftekhar Hasan, Hui Li, Haizhi Wang, Yun Zhu. Do Affiliated Bankers on Board Enhance Corporate Social Responsibility? US Evidence. Sustainability. 2021; 13 (6):3250.
Chicago/Turabian StyleIftekhar Hasan; Hui Li; Haizhi Wang; Yun Zhu. 2021. "Do Affiliated Bankers on Board Enhance Corporate Social Responsibility? US Evidence." Sustainability 13, no. 6: 3250.
This paper looks into various factors that contribute to the platform building of the blockchain companies. We empirically investigate over 8000 blockchain companies and show supportive evidence that due to the heterogeneity of needs for trust, privacy, transparency and integrity, industries vary in their choice for adopting permissioned versus permissionless blockchain platform, and their choice of using an airdrop offering versus conducting native ICO offering. We further show that ICO offering size, start bonus, VC backing, and social media are related to the success of ICO offering, the offer price, and post-ICO performance.
Zenu Sharma; Yun Zhu. Platform building in initial coin offering market: Empirical evidence. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 2020, 61, 101318 .
AMA StyleZenu Sharma, Yun Zhu. Platform building in initial coin offering market: Empirical evidence. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. 2020; 61 ():101318.
Chicago/Turabian StyleZenu Sharma; Yun Zhu. 2020. "Platform building in initial coin offering market: Empirical evidence." Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 61, no. : 101318.
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation is affected by the compensation of the outside directors sitting on their board, who are also CEOs of other firms. Design/methodology/approach The authors collect CEOs’ and CEO-directors’ compensation data from Execucomp. The authors then match the CEO-directors’ compensation with appointing firms’ CEO compensation and financial statements, from Execucomp and Compustat, respectively. The sample contains 7,561 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2010, with 1,213 distinct S&P 1500 firms and 1,563 distinct CEO-directors. The authors use ordinary least squared method with firm and year fixed effect in most of the analysis. Findings With both annual and excess compensation, the authors find strong evidence that CEO-directors’ compensation is related to the compensation of the CEO. Causally, when CEO-director overturns his/her excess compensation from negative to positive, the CEO is more likely to have similar upward change in the following year, while more interestingly, the opposite does not hold. These findings are persistent over time and remain robust to various additional tests. Research limitations/implications Due to the data availability, this paper investigates the S&P 1500 public firms. Originality/value It is the first work that investigates the link between board members’ external compensation and the CEO’s compensation. This sheds new light on the process of the CEO’s compensation design, in regard to both the information being utilized in the design procedure and the CEO’s influence on his/her own compensation. Second, this paper adds additional evidence to the choice of peer groups in compensation construction. Third, the authors enhance the understanding of the role of CEO-directors. The authors show that CEO-directors may be the ally of CEO, and help in justifying CEO’s compensation, especially when underpaid.
Bill Francis; Iftekhar Hasan; Yun Zhu. Benchmark on themselves: CEO-directors’ influence on the CEO compensation. Managerial Finance 2019, 45, 810 -826.
AMA StyleBill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Yun Zhu. Benchmark on themselves: CEO-directors’ influence on the CEO compensation. Managerial Finance. 2019; 45 (7):810-826.
Chicago/Turabian StyleBill Francis; Iftekhar Hasan; Yun Zhu. 2019. "Benchmark on themselves: CEO-directors’ influence on the CEO compensation." Managerial Finance 45, no. 7: 810-826.
This paper investigates how political influence affects firms’ financial flexibility and speed of adjustment toward target leverage ratios. We find that at the macro level, firms in environments with high political advantages, proxied by provincial affiliations with heads of state as well as political status and party rank of provincial leaders, adjust faster. At the micro level, firms that are state-owned, have CPC members as executives, or bear low exposure to changes in political uncertainty adjust faster. When interacted, the micro-level political factors have more significant impact.
Xian Gu; Iftekhar Hasan; Yun Zhu. Political influence and financial flexibility: Evidence from China. Journal of Banking & Finance 2018, 99, 142 -156.
AMA StyleXian Gu, Iftekhar Hasan, Yun Zhu. Political influence and financial flexibility: Evidence from China. Journal of Banking & Finance. 2018; 99 ():142-156.
Chicago/Turabian StyleXian Gu; Iftekhar Hasan; Yun Zhu. 2018. "Political influence and financial flexibility: Evidence from China." Journal of Banking & Finance 99, no. : 142-156.
We study how state ownership affects the post-merger performance of Chinese acquirers, and find that state owned acquirers (SOEs) experience a significantly larger long-term performance improvement following mergers compared to their non-state-owned counterparts (NSOEs). When partitioning the sample period into acquisitions made prior to and following China's split-share reform of 2005, we find that the post-merger performance improvement of SOE acquirers is largely attributed to the post reform period in which controlling shareholders converted their non-tradable shares into tradable status. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that state intervention in the form of capital market liberalization and alleviation of governance problems, combined with political connections and privileged access to financing may have a positive effect on M&A performance that outweighs the inefficiency cost of state ownership in China.
Ming Ma; Xian Sun; Maya Waisman; Yun Zhu. State ownership and market liberalization: Evidence from China's domestic M&A market. Journal of International Money and Finance 2016, 69, 205 -223.
AMA StyleMing Ma, Xian Sun, Maya Waisman, Yun Zhu. State ownership and market liberalization: Evidence from China's domestic M&A market. Journal of International Money and Finance. 2016; 69 ():205-223.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMing Ma; Xian Sun; Maya Waisman; Yun Zhu. 2016. "State ownership and market liberalization: Evidence from China's domestic M&A market." Journal of International Money and Finance 69, no. : 205-223.
The uncertainty embedded in the political environment has greatly impacts on the economy, firm level decision-making, and the cost of capital. This paper shifts the focus towards the financial contract, and specifically looks into the influence of political uncertainty on the non-pricing terms in the private debt contracts. I find, first, the political uncertainty affects the private debt market in general. Loan contracts are loaded with more stringent non-pricing terms during period of political turbulence. Second, with measurement that captures firm’s exposure to the political environment at the time of financial contract origination, I find that firms with larger political exposure have loan contract with higher possibility of collateral requirements, shorter maturities and other more stringent terms.
Yun Zhu. Political uncertainty and non-pricing terms of financial contract. Eurasian Economic Review 2015, 5, 77 -109.
AMA StyleYun Zhu. Political uncertainty and non-pricing terms of financial contract. Eurasian Economic Review. 2015; 5 (1):77-109.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYun Zhu. 2015. "Political uncertainty and non-pricing terms of financial contract." Eurasian Economic Review 5, no. 1: 77-109.
Maya Waisman; Pengfei Ye; Yun Zhu. The effect of political uncertainty on the cost of corporate debt. Journal of Financial Stability 2015, 16, 106 -117.
AMA StyleMaya Waisman, Pengfei Ye, Yun Zhu. The effect of political uncertainty on the cost of corporate debt. Journal of Financial Stability. 2015; 16 ():106-117.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMaya Waisman; Pengfei Ye; Yun Zhu. 2015. "The effect of political uncertainty on the cost of corporate debt." Journal of Financial Stability 16, no. : 106-117.