György Szabó

György Szabó


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

42Years (1985-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2007 in Physics Reports
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GSGyörgy Szabó
György Szabó
GFGábor Fáth
Gábor Fáth

1 July 1998 in Physical Review E
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GSGyörgy Szabó
György Szabó
CTCsaba Tőke
Csaba Tőke
A simplified prisoner’s game is studied on a square lattice when the players interacting with their neighbors can follow two strategies: to cooperate (C) or to defect (D) unconditionally. The players updated in random sequence have a chance to adopt one of the neighboring strategies with a probability depending on the payoff difference. Using Monte Carlo simulations and dynamical cluster techniques, we study the density c of cooperators in the stationary state. This system exhibits a continuous transition between the two absorbing states when varying the value of temptation to defect. In the limits c→0 and 1 we have observed critical transitions belonging to the universality class of directed percolation.

23 August 2002 in Physical Review Letters
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GSGyörgy Szabó
György Szabó
CHChristoph Hauert
Christoph Hauert
We present a simple yet effective mechanism promoting cooperation under full anonymity by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. This natural extension leads to “rock-scissors-paper”–type cyclic dominance of the three strategies, cooperate, defect, and loner. In spatial settings with players arranged on a regular lattice, this results in interesting dynamical properties and intriguing spatiotemporal patterns. In particular, variations of the value of the public good leads to transitions between one-, two-, and three-strategy states which either are in the class of directed percolation or show interesting analogies to Ising-type models. Although volunteering is incapable of stabilizing cooperation, it efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish behavior.

31 October 2005 in Physical Review E
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GSGyörgy Szabó
György Szabó
JVJeromos Vukov
Jeromos Vukov
ASAttila Szolnoki
Attila Szolnoki
The effects of payoffs and noise on the maintenance of cooperative behavior are studied in an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with players located on the sites of different two-dimensional lattices. This system exhibits a phase transition from a mixed state of cooperators and defectors to a homogeneous one where only the defectors remain alive. Using Monte Carlo simulations and the generalized mean-field approximations we have determined the phase boundaries (critical points) separating the two phases on the plane of the temperature (noise) and temptation to choose defection. In the zero temperature limit the cooperation can be sustained only for those connectivity structures where three-site clique percolation occurs.

13 April 2005 in American Journal of Physics
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CHChristoph Hauert
Christoph Hauert
GSGyörgy Szabó
György Szabó
Evolutionary game theory is designed to capture the essentials of the characteristic interactions among individuals. Its most prominent application is the quest for the origins and evolution of cooperation. The effects of population structures on the performance of behavioral strategies became apparent only in recent years and marks the advent of an intriguing link between apparently unrelated disciplines. Evolutionary game theory in structured populations reveals critical phase transitions that fall into the universality class of directed percolation on square lattices and mean-field-type transitions on regular small world networks and random regular graphs. We employ the prisoner’s dilemma to discuss new insights gained in behavioral ecology using methods from physics.

19 November 2009 in Physical Review E
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ASAttila Szolnoki
Attila Szolnoki
Matjaz PercMatjaz Perc
Matjaz Perc
GSGyörgy Szabó
György Szabó
We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on different regular graphs as a function of the noise level underlying strategy adoptions. We focus on the effects that are brought about by different group sizes of public goods games in which individuals participate, revealing that larger groups of players may induce qualitatively different behavior when approaching the deterministic limit of strategy adoption. While by pairwise interactions an intermediate uncertainty by strategy adoptions may ensure optimal conditions for the survival of cooperators at a specific graph topology, larger groups warrant this only in the vicinity of the deterministic limit independently from the underlying graph. These discrepancies are attributed to the indirect linkage of otherwise not directly connected players, which is brought about by joint memberships within the larger groups. Thus, we show that increasing the group size may introduce an effective transition of the interaction topology, and that the latter shapes the noise dependence of the evolution of cooperation in case of pairwise interactions only.