Lars Sandved-Smith

Mr. Lars Sandved-Smith

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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26 August 2021 in Neuroscience of Consciousness
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Journal Article
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LSLars Sandved-Smith
Lars Sandved-Smith
CHCasper Hesp
Casper Hesp
JMJérémie Mattout
Jérémie Mattout
KFKarl Friston Friston
Karl Friston Friston
ALAntoine Lutz
Antoine Lutz
MRMaxwell J D Ramstead
Maxwell J D Ramstead
Meta-awareness refers to the capacity to explicitly notice the current content of consciousness and has been identified as a key component for the successful control of cognitive states, such as the deliberate direction of attention. This paper proposes a formal model of meta-awareness and attentional control using hierarchical active inference. To do so, we cast mental action as policy selection over higher-level cognitive states and add a further hierarchical level to model meta-awareness states that modulate the expected confidence (precision) in the mapping between observations and hidden cognitive states. We simulate the example of mind-wandering and its regulation during a task involving sustained selective attention on a perceptual object. This provides a computational case study for an inferential architecture that is apt to enable the emergence of these central components of human phenomenology, namely, the ability to access and control cognitive states. We propose that this approach can be generalized to other cognitive states, and hence, this paper provides the first steps towards the development of a computational phenomenology of mental action and more broadly of our ability to monitor and control our own cognitive states. Future steps of this work will focus on fitting the model with qualitative, behavioural, and neural data.

10 June 2025 in Neuroscience of Consciousness
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
LSLars Sandved-Smith
Lars Sandved-Smith
JBJuan Bogotá
Juan Bogotá
JHJakob Hohwy
Jakob Hohwy
JKJulian Kiverstein
Julian Kiverstein
ALAntoine Lutz
Antoine Lutz
The context for our paper comes from the neurophenomenology (NPh) research programme initiated by Francisco Varela at the end of the 1990s. Varela’s working hypothesis was that, to be successful, a consciousness research programme must progress by relating first-person phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience and their third-person counterparts in neuroscience through “mutual constraints”. Leveraging Bayesian mechanics, in particular deep parametric active inference, we demonstrate the potential for epistemically advantageous mutual constraints between phenomenological, computational, behavioural, and physiological vocabularies. Specifically, the dual information geometry of Bayesian mechanics serves to establish, under certain conditions, generative passage between lived experience and its physiological instantiation. This paper argues for the epistemological necessity of such a passage and the inclusion of trained reflective awareness in neurophenomenological empirical approaches. In particular, it showcases incremental explanatory gains for the scientist that arise from incorporating the participants’ epistemic insights, shifting the focus from the contents of experience (i.e. what a subject experiences in a given experimental set-up) to the how of experience (i.e. the activities of consciousness that allow for a meaningful world to appear to us as such in lived experience). The explanatory power of the resulting ‘meta-Bayesian’ framework, deep computational NPh, arises from the disciplined circulation between first and third-person perspectives enabled by the formalism of deep parametric active inference, where parametric depth refers to a property of generative models that can form beliefs about the parameters of their own modelling process. Hence, this computational formalism contributes to understanding consciousness by bridging phenomenological descriptions and physiological instantiations, whilst also highlighting the significance of trained first-person investigation in experimental protocols.

24 July 2024 in Entropy
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Journal Article
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CFChris Fields
Chris Fields
AGAdam Goldstein
Adam Goldstein
LSLars Sandved-Smith
Lars Sandved-Smith
When describing Active Inference Agents (AIAs), the term “energy” can have two distinct meanings. One is the energy that is utilized by the AIA (e.g., electrical energy or chemical energy). The second meaning is so-called Variational Free Energy (VFE), a statistical quantity which provides an upper bound on surprisal. In this paper, we develop an account of the former quantity—the Thermodynamic Free Energy (TFE)—and its relationship with the latter. We highlight the necessary tradeoffs between these two in a generic, quantum information-theoretic formulation, and the macroscopic consequences of those tradeoffs for the ways that organisms approach their environments. By making this tradeoff explicit, we provide a theoretical basis for the different metabolic strategies that organisms from plants to predators use to survive.


10 June 2020 in PsyArXiv
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Preprint
Open access
LSLars Sandved-Smith
Lars Sandved-Smith
CHCasper Hesp
Casper Hesp
ALAntoine Lutz
Antoine Lutz
JMJérémie Mattout
Jérémie Mattout
KFKarl Friston Friston
Karl Friston Friston
MRMaxwell James Ramstead
Maxwell James Ramstead
Metacognition refers to the capacity to access, monitor, and control aspects of one’s mental operations and is central to the human condition and experience. Disorders of metacognition are a hallmark of many psychiatric conditions and the training of metacognitive skills is central in education and in many psychotherapies. This paper provides first steps towards the development of a formal neurophenomenology of metacognition. To do so, we leverage the tools of the active inference framework, extending a previous computational model of implicit metacognition by adding a hierarchical level to model explicit (conscious) meta-awareness and the voluntary control of attention through covert action. Using the example of mind-wandering and its regulation in focused attention, we provide a computational proof of principle for an inferential architecture apt to enable the emergence of central components of metacognition: namely, the ability to access, monitor, and control cognitive states.

25 January 2024 in PsyArXiv
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Preprint
Open access
GDGeorge Deane
George Deane
JMJonas Mago
Jonas Mago
AFAikaterini Fotopoulou
Aikaterini Fotopoulou
MSMatthew Sacchet
Matthew Sacchet
RCRobin Carhart-Harris
Robin Carhart-Harris
LSLars Sandved-Smith
Lars Sandved-Smith
This paper introduces the notion of adaptive narrative control, a conception of how subpersonal computational processes shape the contents of conscious experience to realize adaptive behavior. We unpack the implications of the theory for understanding the computational mechanisms underwriting psychopathology and improvements in subjective well-being associated with psychedelic therapy and meditation. The core idea of adaptive narrative control is that systems equipped with an ‘attention schema’ — a model of its own attentional states and how attentional states can be controlled — can come to anticipate not only the epistemic implications of certain attentional states, but also the pragmatic consequences, such as how certain attentional states potentiate certain affective responses. In anticipating affective states, the system is able to regulate affective states through ‘mental action’ — the endogenous control of attention. We argue that using mental action to bias the sampling of evidence to control the ‘narrative’ — the upshot of inference understood to correspond to the contents of conscious experience — allows the system to regulate affective and physiological states in ways that potentiate adaptive behavior. However, it is this adaptive capacity which gives rise to the computational mechanism — ‘avoidant mental action’, or equivalently ‘motivated inattention’ — which we argue is a core mechanism underlying psychopathology. We unpack this approach within the active inference framework to provide specification of the candidate mechanisms. We argue this conception can be used to account for the rigid belief formation characterizing ‘canalization’ and show how the decrements in subjective well-being come as a consequence of reduced recognition and categorisation of emotions (i.e., alexithymia or impaired emotional granularity). We argue that while avoidant mental action facilitates adaptive behavior, certain environmental conditions can lead it to resulting in decreased subjective well-being and psychopathology. Our account partially echoes a Freudian perspective on the function and effects of avoidant defense mechanisms like repression, and brings into view a novel computational conception of the dynamic unconscious— the ‘computational unconscious’. Finally, we explore how this conceptualisation can expand and refine the ‘REBUS’ model of psychedelic action and therapy, and explain some of the increments in subjective well-being associated with meditation.