Jonas Mago

Jonas Mago

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Jonas Mago

Integrated Program in Neuroscience, McGill University , Room 302, Irving Ludmer Building 1033 Pine Ave. W. Montreal, Quebec H3A 1A1

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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13 July 2022 in PsyArXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
IHines hipolito
ines hipolito
JMJonas Mago
Jonas Mago
Fernando RosasFernando Rosas
Fernando Rosas
RCRobin Carhart-Harris
Robin Carhart-Harris
Recent research has demonstrated the potential of psychedelic therapy for mental healthcare. However, the psychological experience underlying its therapeutic effects remain poorlyunderstood. This paper proposes a framework that suggests psychedelics act as destabilisers,both psychologically and neurophysiologically. Drawing on the "entropic brain" hypothesisand the "RElaxed Beliefs Under pSychedelics" (REBUS) model, this paper focuses onthe richness of psychological experience. Through a complex systems theory perspective,we suggest that psychedelics destabilize fixed points or attractors, breaking reinforced patternsof thinking and behaving. Our approach explains how psychedelic-induced increases inbrain entropy destabilize neurophysiological set-points and leads to new conceptualizationsof psychedelic psychotherapy. These insights have important implications for risk mitigationand treatment optimization in psychedelic medicine, both during the peak psychedelicexperience and during the sub-acute period of potential recovery

23 February 2021 in PsyArXiv
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Preprint
Open access
MRMaxwell James Ramstead
Maxwell James Ramstead
ASAnil Seth
Anil Seth
CHCasper Hesp
Casper Hesp
LSLars Sandved-Smith
Lars Sandved-Smith
JMJonas Mago
Jonas Mago
ACAxel Constant
Axel Constant
This paper presents a version of neurophenomenology based on generative modelling techniques developed in computational neuroscience and biology. We call this approach computational phenomenology because it applies methods originally developed in computational modelling to phenomenology. The first section presents a brief review of the project to naturalize phenomenology. The second section presents and evaluates philosophical objections to that project, and situates our project with respect to these projects. The third section reviews the generative modelling framework. The following section presents our new approach to neurophenomenology based on generative modelling. We then discuss how this application of generative modelling differs from previous attempts to use it to explain consciousness. In summary, generative modelling allows us to construct a computational model of the inferential or interpretive process that best explain this or that kind of lived experience.

25 January 2024 in PsyArXiv
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Preprint
Open access
GDGeorge Deane
George Deane
JMJonas Mago
Jonas Mago
AFAikaterini Fotopoulou
Aikaterini Fotopoulou
MSMatthew Sacchet
Matthew Sacchet
RCRobin Carhart-Harris
Robin Carhart-Harris
LSLars Sandved-Smith
Lars Sandved-Smith
This paper introduces the notion of adaptive narrative control, a conception of how subpersonal computational processes shape the contents of conscious experience to realize adaptive behavior. We unpack the implications of the theory for understanding the computational mechanisms underwriting psychopathology and improvements in subjective well-being associated with psychedelic therapy and meditation. The core idea of adaptive narrative control is that systems equipped with an ‘attention schema’ — a model of its own attentional states and how attentional states can be controlled — can come to anticipate not only the epistemic implications of certain attentional states, but also the pragmatic consequences, such as how certain attentional states potentiate certain affective responses. In anticipating affective states, the system is able to regulate affective states through ‘mental action’ — the endogenous control of attention. We argue that using mental action to bias the sampling of evidence to control the ‘narrative’ — the upshot of inference understood to correspond to the contents of conscious experience — allows the system to regulate affective and physiological states in ways that potentiate adaptive behavior. However, it is this adaptive capacity which gives rise to the computational mechanism — ‘avoidant mental action’, or equivalently ‘motivated inattention’ — which we argue is a core mechanism underlying psychopathology. We unpack this approach within the active inference framework to provide specification of the candidate mechanisms. We argue this conception can be used to account for the rigid belief formation characterizing ‘canalization’ and show how the decrements in subjective well-being come as a consequence of reduced recognition and categorisation of emotions (i.e., alexithymia or impaired emotional granularity). We argue that while avoidant mental action facilitates adaptive behavior, certain environmental conditions can lead it to resulting in decreased subjective well-being and psychopathology. Our account partially echoes a Freudian perspective on the function and effects of avoidant defense mechanisms like repression, and brings into view a novel computational conception of the dynamic unconscious— the ‘computational unconscious’. Finally, we explore how this conceptualisation can expand and refine the ‘REBUS’ model of psychedelic action and therapy, and explain some of the increments in subjective well-being associated with meditation.

19 May 2025 in The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JMJonas Mago
Jonas Mago
NFNathan Fisher
Nathan Fisher
MMMark Miller
Mark Miller

1 October 2025 in PsyArXiv
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Preprint
Open access
JMJonas Mago
Jonas Mago
SCShamil Chandaria
Shamil Chandaria
Minimal Phenomenal Experiences (MPEs) present a paradox for theories of consciousness.Defined by phenomenological simplicity, they are nonetheless accompanied by unexpectedly highneural signal diversity. Traditionally, entropy has been interpreted as a marker ofphenomenological richness, exemplified by psychedelic states. Yet MPEs such as advancedabsorptive meditation (jhāna) or 5-MeO-DMT exhibit high entropy despite radically reducedexperiential content. This tension—the entropy–content paradox—challenges the entropic brainhypothesis and calls for a refined framework. We propose that entropy does not directly index therichness of conscious content, but rather the grain of inference by which the brain resolvesvariability. Psychedelics exemplify a fine-grained regime, in which loosened constraints amplifyfluctuations into proliferating content, whereas MPEs exemplify a coarse-grained regime, in whichrigid stabilization smooths over variability into contentless awareness. Both regimes elevateentropy, but they diverge in phenomenology and perturbational signatures. Recognizing thisdissociation refines the entropic brain hypothesis and positions MPEs as decisive test cases forcomputational theories of consciousness.

11 November 2022 in PsyArXiv
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Preprint
Open access
MMMark Miller
Mark Miller
MAMahault Albarracin
Mahault Albarracin
RPRiddhi Jain Pitliya
Riddhi Jain Pitliya
AKAlex B. Kiefer
Alex B. Kiefer
JMJonas Mago
Jonas Mago
MRMaxwell James Ramstead
Maxwell James Ramstead
In this paper, we aim to conceptualize and formalize the construct of resilience using the tools of active inference, a new physics-based modeling approach apt for the description and analysis of complex adaptive systems. We intend this as a first step towards a computational model of resilient systems. We begin by offering a conceptual analysis of resilience, to clarify its meaning, as established in the literature. We examine an orthogonal, threefold distinction between meanings of the word “resilience”: (i) inertia, or the ability to resist change (ii) elasticity, or the ability to bounce back from a perturbation, and (iii) plasticity, or the ability to flexibly expand the repertoire of adaptive states. We then situate all three senses of resilience within active inference. We map resilience as inertia onto high precision beliefs, resilience as elasticity onto relaxation back to characteristic (i.e., attracting) states, and resilience as plasticity onto functional redundancy and structural degeneracy.