Covert channels are stealthy communication channels that enable manifold adversary and legitimate scenarios, ranging from malware communications to the exchange of confidential information by journalists and censorship circumvention. We introduce a new class of covert channels that we call history covert channels . We further present a new paradigm: covert channel amplification . All covert channels described until now need to craft seemingly legitimate flows or need to modify third-party flows, mimicking unsuspicious behavior. In contrast, history covert channels can communicate by pointing to unaltered legitimate traffic created by regular network nodes. Only a negligible fraction of the covert communication process requires the transfer of covert information by the covert channel's sender . This information can be sent through different protocols/channels. Our approach allows an amplification of the covert channel's message size, i.e., minimizing the fraction of actually transferred secret data by a covert channel's sender in relation to the overall secret data being exchanged. Further, we extend the current taxonomy for covert channels to show how history channels can be categorized. We describe multiple scenarios in which history covert channels can be realized, analyze the characteristics of these channels, and show how their configuration can be optimized.
In recent years, malware increasingly applies steganography methods to remain undetected as long as possible. Such malware is called stegomalware. Stegomalware not only covers its tracks on the infected system, but also hides its communication with adversary infrastructure. This paper reviews 106 stegomalware cases on the basis of 133 reports, including digital media (audio, video, images), text, and network steganography. For this purpose, the steganography methods used by the malware are categorized and introduced using a pattern-based approach. Our survey reveals that solely a small set of patterns are employed by known malware samples. We also analyzed the commonalities of media-, text-, and network-based stegomalware. We show that only a small variation of network protocols, media types and hiding methods are utilized by stegomalware. For this reason, research may focus on these to counter malicious activities covered by steganography.
An ongoing challenge in censorship circumvention is optimizing the stealthiness of communications, enabled by covert channels. Recently, a new variant called history covert channels has been proposed. Instead of modifying or mimicking legitimate data, such channels solely point to observed data matching secret information. This approach reduces the amount of secret data a sender explicitly must transfer and thus limits detectability. However, the only published history channel is only suitable for special scenarios due to severe limitations in terms of bandwidth. We propose a significant performance enhancement of history covert channels that allows their use in real-world scenarios through utilizing the content of online social media and online archives. Our approach, which we call OPPRESSION (Open-knowledge Compression), takes advantage of the massive amounts of textual data on the Internet that can be referenced by short pointer messages. Broadly, OPPRESSION can be considered a novel encoding strategy for censorship circumvention. We further present and evaluate our open source proof-of-concept implementation of OPPRESSION that can transfer secret data by pointing to popular online media, such as Twitter (now "X"), news websites, Wikipedia entries, and online books. The pointer itself is transmitted through existing censorship circumvention systems. Our approach minimizes the amount of traffic to be concealed in comparison to existing works, even in comparison to compression.
The proliferation of digital carriers that can be exploited to conceal arbitrary data has increased the number of techniques for implementing steganography and other forms of information hiding. As a result, the literature overlaps greatly in terms of concepts and terminology. Moreover, from a cybersecurity viewpoint, the same hiding mechanism may be perceived differently, making harder the development of a unique defensive strategy or the definition of practices to mitigate risks arising from the use of steganography. To mitigate these drawbacks, several researchers introduced approaches that aid in the unified description of steganography methods and covert channels. Understanding and combining all descriptive methods for steganography techniques is a challenging but important task. For instance, researchers might want to explain how malware applies a certain steganography technique or categorize a novel hiding approach. Consequently, this paper aims to provide an introduction to the concept of descriptive methods for steganography. The paper is organized in the form of a tutorial, with the main goal of explaining how existing descriptions and taxonomy objects can be combined to achieve a detailed categorization and description of hiding methods. To show how this can effectively help the research community, the paper also contains various real-world examples.
Reversible network covert channels restore the original carrier object before forwarding it to the overt receiver, drawing them a security threat hard to detect. Some of these covert channels utilize computational intensive operations, such as the calculation of cryptographic hashes. This paper proposes utilizing shape analysis of packet runtime distributions to detect such computational intensive covert channels. To this end, we simulated the latency of covert channel-modified traffic by adding mock hash-reconstruction delays to runtimes of legitimate ping traffic. After qualitatively observing the changes in the empirical probability distribution between modified and natural traffic, we investigated machine learning algorithms for their ability to detect such covert channels. Our results show that a decision tree-based AdaBoost classifier and a CNN using the investigated statistical measures as input vector are able to classify sets of 50 ping measurements with high accuracy. Our approach is superior over previous work on the detection of computational intensive covert channels as it requires smaller sampling window sizes, achieves significantly higher detection rates, and thus draws detection more reliable with fewer preparation.
The proliferation of digital carriers that can be exploited to conceal arbitrary data has greatly increased the number of techniques for implementing network steganography. As a result, the literature overlaps greatly in terms of concepts and terminology. Moreover, from a cybersecurity viewpoint, the same hiding mechanism may be perceived differently, making harder the development of a unique defensive strategy or the definition of practices to mitigate risks arising from the use of steganography. To mitigate these drawbacks, several researchers introduced approaches that aid in the unified description of steganography methods and network covert channels. Understanding and combining all descriptive methods for steganography techniques is a challenging but important task. For instance, researchers might want to explain how malware applies a certain steganography technique or categorize a novel hiding approach. Consequently, this paper aims to provide an introduction to the concept of descriptive methods for steganography. The paper is organized in the form of a tutorial, with the main goal of explaining how existing descriptions and taxonomy objects can be combined to achieve a detailed categorization and description of hiding methods. To show how this can effectively help the research community, the paper also contains various real-world examples.