Sebastian Zillien

Sebastian Zillien

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Sebastian Zillien

Ulm University, Ulm, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 February 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SZSebastian Zillien
Sebastian Zillien
Steffen WendzelSteffen Wendzel
Steffen Wendzel
Network covert channels are applied for the secret exfiltration of confidential data, the stealthy operation of malware, and legitimate purposes, such as censorship circumvention. In recent decades, some major detection methods for network covert channels have been developed. In this paper, we investigate two highly cited detection methods for covert timing channels, namely $\epsilon$ -similarity and compressibility score from Cabuk et al. (jointly cited by 930 papers and applied by thousands of researchers). We additionally analyze two recent ML-based detection methods: GAS (2022) and SnapCatch (2021). While all these detection methods must be considered valuable for the analysis of typical covert timing channels, we show that these methods are not reliable when a covert channel's behavior is slightly modified. In particular, we demonstrate that when confronted with a simple covert channel that we call $\epsilon$ - $\kappa$ libur, all detection methods can be circumvented or their performance can be significantly reduced although the covert channel still provides a high bitrate. In comparison to previous timing channels that circumvent these methods, $\epsilon$ - $\kappa$ libur is much simpler and eliminates the need of altering previously recorded traffic. Moreover, we propose an enhanced $\epsilon$ -similarity that can detect the classical covert timing channel as well as $\epsilon$ - $\kappa$ libur.

6 June 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Steffen WendzelSteffen Wendzel
Steffen Wendzel
TSTobias Schmidbauer
Tobias Schmidbauer
SZSebastian Zillien
Sebastian Zillien
JKJörg Keller
Jörg Keller
Covert channels are stealthy communication channels that enable manifold adversary and legitimate scenarios, ranging from malware communications to the exchange of confidential information by journalists and censorship circumvention. We introduce a new class of covert channels that we call history covert channels . We further present a new paradigm: covert channel amplification . All covert channels described until now need to craft seemingly legitimate flows or need to modify third-party flows, mimicking unsuspicious behavior. In contrast, history covert channels can communicate by pointing to unaltered legitimate traffic created by regular network nodes. Only a negligible fraction of the covert communication process requires the transfer of covert information by the covert channel's sender . This information can be sent through different protocols/channels. Our approach allows an amplification of the covert channel's message size, i.e., minimizing the fraction of actually transferred secret data by a covert channel's sender in relation to the overall secret data being exchanged. Further, we extend the current taxonomy for covert channels to show how history channels can be categorized. We describe multiple scenarios in which history covert channels can be realized, analyze the characteristics of these channels, and show how their configuration can be optimized.

6 May 2025 in ACM Computing Surveys
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Steffen WendzelSteffen Wendzel
Steffen Wendzel
LCLuca Caviglione
Luca Caviglione
WMWojciech Mazurczyk
Wojciech Mazurczyk
Aleksandra MilevaAleksandra Mileva
Aleksandra Mileva
JDJana Dittmann
Jana Dittmann
SZSebastian Zillien
Sebastian Zillien
A unified understanding of terms is essential for every scientific discipline: steganography is no exception. Being divided into several domains (e.g., network and text steganography), it is crucial to provide a unified terminology as well as a taxonomy that is not limited to few applications or areas. A prime attempt toward a unified understanding of terms was conducted in 2015 with the introduction of a pattern-based taxonomy for network steganography. In 2021, the first work toward a pattern-based taxonomy for all domains of steganography was proposed. However, this initial attempt still faced several shortcomings, e.g., remaining inconsistencies and a lack of patterns for several steganography domains. As the consortium who published the previous studies on steganography patterns, we present the first comprehensive pattern-based taxonomy tailored to fit all known domains of steganography, including smaller and emerging areas, such as filesystem, IoT/CPS, and AI/ML steganography. To make our contribution more effective and promote the use of the taxonomy to advance research, we also provide a unified description method joint with a thorough tutorial on its utilization.

14 July 2021 in Acta Oncologica
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Helge Egil Seime PettersenHelge Egil Seime Pettersen
Helge Egil Seime Pettersen
MAMax Aehle
Max Aehle
JAJohan Alme
Johan Alme
GBGergely Gábor Barnaföldi
Gergely Gábor Barnaföldi
VBVyacheslav Borshchov
Vyacheslav Borshchov
DRDieter Röhrich
Dieter Röhrich
Proton computed tomography (pCT) and radiography (pRad) are proposed modalities for improved treatment plan accuracy and in situ treatment validation in proton therapy. The pCT system of the Bergen...

30 October 2025 in Computers & Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Steffen WendzelSteffen Wendzel
Steffen Wendzel
SVSimon Volpert
Simon Volpert
SZSebastian Zillien
Sebastian Zillien
JLJulia Lenz
Julia Lenz
PRPhilip Rünz
Philip Rünz
LCLuca Caviglione
Luca Caviglione

1 July 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SZSebastian Zillien
Sebastian Zillien
TSTobias Schmidbauer
Tobias Schmidbauer
MKMario Kubek
Mario Kubek
JKJörg Keller
Jörg Keller
Steffen WendzelSteffen Wendzel
Steffen Wendzel
An ongoing challenge in censorship circumvention is optimizing the stealthiness of communications, enabled by covert channels. Recently, a new variant called history covert channels has been proposed. Instead of modifying or mimicking legitimate data, such channels solely point to observed data matching secret information. This approach reduces the amount of secret data a sender explicitly must transfer and thus limits detectability. However, the only published history channel is only suitable for special scenarios due to severe limitations in terms of bandwidth. We propose a significant performance enhancement of history covert channels that allows their use in real-world scenarios through utilizing the content of online social media and online archives. Our approach, which we call OPPRESSION (Open-knowledge Compression), takes advantage of the massive amounts of textual data on the Internet that can be referenced by short pointer messages. Broadly, OPPRESSION can be considered a novel encoding strategy for censorship circumvention. We further present and evaluate our open source proof-of-concept implementation of OPPRESSION that can transfer secret data by pointing to popular online media, such as Twitter (now "X"), news websites, Wikipedia entries, and online books. The pointer itself is transmitted through existing censorship circumvention systems. Our approach minimizes the amount of traffic to be concealed in comparison to existing works, even in comparison to compression.