This paper focuses on a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a seller and a buyer. Considering the case where the buyer faces uncertain demand and yield, the paper investigates the buyback contract for the supply chain and studies how the yield uncertainty and the relative bargaining power affect the performance of buyback contract. The results suggest that when the seller's bargaining power is relatively high and can control the uncertain yield, the buyback contract is sufficient to coordinate the supply chain. Conversely, when the seller's bargaining power is relatively low or cannot guarantee yield stability, the buyback contract does not work. To coordinate such a supply chain, a combined contract named Buy-Back-Revenue-Sharing contract is proposed. Furthermore, this paper presents the optimal orders to maximize the profits of the buyer and the whole supply chain and it finds that if the seller cannot control the yield, the buyer will place fewer orders and both parties will gain lower profit with supply chain coordination.

In response to environmental protection policies issued by the United Nations Environment Program, battery electric vehicles (BEVs) have been developed. This paper studies the short- and long-term repeated game behaviours of two parallel supply chains involving duopoly vehicle manufacturers producing BEVs and fuel vehicles (FVs). Taking consumers’ low-carbon preference and government subsidy scheme into account, optimal decisions and comparative analyses under the three game strategies of non-cooperative game and cooperative game and cost-sharing contract under supply chain coordination have been conducted. In the short-term game supply chain, three game models (non-cooperative, cooperative and cost-sharing contract) are formulated and three optimal decisions are compared. In the long-term repeated game supply chain, the dynamic behaviours of two parallel supply chains under non-cooperative game are analysed. We uncovered that the prices of BEVs are more dependent on the reduction of carbon emissions and government subsidy than FVs. In addition to supply chain coordination, consumers’ low-carbon preference also improves the total profits of the three game models. Furthermore, the adjustment speed of the eco-friendly level of BEVs has the most significant impact on the vehicle market.

Energy management in the construction supply chain is considered an important instrument to reduce the environmental impacts of the construction industry. Sustainable construction through energy conservation is not well accepted in developing countries. Very few studies considered energy-efficient supply chain (EESC), but such studies are scarce in developing countries. Therefore, it is necessary to explore factors contributing to success in the adoption of EESC practices in construction projects. This study aims to analyze critical success factors (CSFs) for EESC in the construction sector of Pakistan. By integrating the Delphi method, ISM, and MICMAC, this study introduced a novel framework to analyze CSFs for EESC. Initially, CSFs were searched from previous literature and screened out with the Delphi method. Later, CSFs were analyzed and classified through ISM and MICMAC. Results show that top-management support, international pressure for EESC, and environmental policy pressure are the most important factors that contribute to the success of EESC adoption. Further, Risk identification and management, awareness of EESC, sustainable Strategic planning, research and development activities, competitive advantage, green manufacturing, and supplier management are the least important factors regarding EESC adoption in the construction industry of Pakistan. These results will contribute by supporting managers to take necessary measures for the effective progress of EESC adoption. Further, it would be useful for governments and policymakers to implement environmentally friendly practices in the construction sector.