In addition to its economic potential and environmental significance, remanufacturing shows strategic importance in competition. Product recovery, a fundamental part of the remanufacturing system, should be aligned with the competition between supply chains. Moreover, the power structure of the supply chain influences interactive decisions. In this study, we investigate how supply chain competition and power structure influence product recovery strategies. We model the problem in two competing supply chains, where the manufacturers sell products through the respective retailers. Either manufacturer can choose between two product recovery strategies: collecting the used products for remanufacturing directly (that is, direct recovery) or assigning the task of product recovery to the retailer (indirect recovery). In addition, we conduct full-blown exploration of the impact of power structures, including Stackelberg-Manufacturer as the leader, Stackelberg-Retailer as the leader, and vertical Nash. The results reveal the joint inter- and intra-channel implications of the product recovery strategies.
29 May 2025 in International Journal of Production Economics
With increasing urbanization and the demand for efficient, flexible transportation solutions, demand-responsive transportation services (DTRS) has emerged as a viable alternative to traditional public transit. However, determining the optimal fleet size to balance the investment and operational revenue remains a significant challenge for service providers. In this article, we address the optimization of fleet size in point-to-point shared demand DRTS, which widely operates within many cities. To capture the uncertain passenger demands in the future when planning the fleet size currently, we model this problem with a framework of two-stage stochastic programming with recourse. Fleet sizing decisions are made in the first stage before the uncertain demands are revealed. After the uncertainty is revealed, the second stage involves making additional decisions to maximize operational revenue. The objective is to optimize the total revenue of the first-stage decisions and the expected revenue of the recourse actions. To solve this practical problem, we resort to the Model Predictive Control method (MPC) and propose a network decomposition approach that first converts the transportation network to a nodal tree structure and then develops a Nodal Tree Recourse with Dependent Arc Capacities (NTRDAC) algorithm to obtain the exact value of the expected recourse functions. In the experiments, NTRDAC is able to produce results within seconds for transportation networks with over 30 nodes. In contrast, a commercial solver is only capable of solving networks with up to five nodes. The stability tests show that NTRDAC remains robust as the problem size varies. Lastly, the value of the stochastic solution (VSS) was evaluated, and the results indicate that it consistently outperforms the expected value solutions. Numerical experiments show that the performance of the NTRDAC algorithm is quite encouraging and fit for large-scale practical problems.
Salespeople, as the core executors of product distribution, form a classical principal–agent relationship with the firm. A substantial body of academic research has focused on how firms can develop optimal sales incentive contracts in various scenarios to achieve precise and effective motivation of their salespeople. However, in sales management practice, firms face a tradeoff between management precision and control costs. Therefore, instead of tailoring contracts for each individual, they tend to adopt standardized incentive contracts for the broader range of salespeople. This practice has called the effectiveness of standardized incentive schemes into question. These questions have received limited attention in prior research, yet they hold significant theoretical and practical relevance for optimizing sales incentive mechanisms and improving managerial effectiveness. This study underscores the critical role of salesperson heterogeneity in shaping the effectiveness of standardized incentive contracts. By constructing game-theoretical models of standardized sales incentive contracts in two scenarios and analyzing how heterogeneous salespeople respond to these contracts, the study finds that heterogeneity weakens the incentive effectiveness of standardized contracts. To address this challenge, we propose two practical evaluation methods to help firms assess and adjust both the degree of salesperson heterogeneity and the actual effectiveness of standardized incentive contracts.