Benjamin Zengin

Mr. Benjamin Zengin

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
4 December 2024 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
BZBenjamin Zengin
Benjamin Zengin
PDPaulin Deupmann
Paulin Deupmann
NBNicolas Buchmann
Nicolas Buchmann
MMMarian Margraf
Marian Margraf
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) is a cryptographic primitive that extends public key encryption by allowing ciphertexts to be re-encrypted from one user to another without revealing information about the underlying plaintext. This makes it an essential privacy-enhancing technology, as only the intended recipient is able to decrypt sensitive personal information. Previous PRE schemes were commonly based on symmetric bilinear pairings. However, these have been found to be slower and less secure than the more modern asymmetric pairings. To address this, we propose two new PRE scheme variants, based on the unidirectional symmetric pairing-based scheme by Weng et al. and adapted to utilize asymmetric pairings. We employ a known automated black-box reduction technique to transform the base scheme to the asymmetric setting, identify its shortcomings, and subsequently present an alternative manual transformation that fixes these flaws. The adapted schemes retain the properties of the base scheme and are therefore CCA-secure in the adaptive corruption model without the use of random oracles, while being faster, practical, and more secure overall than the base scheme.

18 February 2026 in Cryptography
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MBMagdalena Bertram
Magdalena Bertram
BZBenjamin Zengin
Benjamin Zengin
NBNicolas Buchmann
Nicolas Buchmann
MMMarian Margraf
Marian Margraf
In the context of digital certification systems, the demand for privacy-preserving authentication is increasingly vital, particularly for critical applications that involve sensitive personal data. Traditional digital signatures provide a robust means of implementing such systems. However, they raise significant privacy concerns due to their public verifiability, which allows verifiers to prove the authenticity of the received sensitive data to third parties. Universal designated verifier signature (UDVS) schemes address these privacy risks by offering non-transferability, ensuring that only the specified verifier can confirm the validity of the designated verifier signature (DVS). However, despite their advantages, existing UDVS models exhibit vulnerabilities that may allow tracking of the user’s authentications among cooperating verifiers and enable third parties to be convinced of the authenticity of sensitive user data by retrieving DVSs from different, non-cooperating verifiers. This paper presents a strategy to achieve strong non-transferability, which effectively addresses these vulnerabilities, by being the first to extend the concept of randomizability to UDVS schemes and their security properties. Our findings demonstrate that a randomizable UDVS scheme can serve as a solid foundation for constructing strong non-transferable UDVS schemes. Finally, we propose an efficient, strong, non-transferable UDVS scheme as an instantiation of our strategy, utilizing state-of-the-art Type 3 pairings, significantly improving upon previous constructions.