Using multiple, individual encryption schemes is a well-established method to increase the overall security of encrypted data. These so-called multiple encryption or hybrid schemes have regained traction in the context of public-key cryptography due to the rise of quantum computers, since it allows the combination of well-known classical encryption schemes with novel post-quantum schemes. In this paper, we conduct a survey of the state-of-the-art public-key multiple encryption (M-PKE) schemes. For the first time, we describe the most relevant M-PKE schemes in detail and discuss their security in a unified model, which allows better comparison between the schemes. Hence, we compare the security, efficiency, and complexity of the schemes and offer recommendations for usage based on common use cases. Our survey emphasizes the importance of being deliberate when combining encryption schemes, as small nuances can easily break security.
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) is a cryptographic primitive that extends public key encryption by allowing ciphertexts to be re-encrypted from one user to another without revealing information about the underlying plaintext. This makes it an essential privacy-enhancing technology, as only the intended recipient is able to decrypt sensitive personal information. Previous PRE schemes were commonly based on symmetric bilinear pairings. However, these have been found to be slower and less secure than the more modern asymmetric pairings. To address this, we propose two new PRE scheme variants, based on the unidirectional symmetric pairing-based scheme by Weng et al. and adapted to utilize asymmetric pairings. We employ a known automated black-box reduction technique to transform the base scheme to the asymmetric setting, identify its shortcomings, and subsequently present an alternative manual transformation that fixes these flaws. The adapted schemes retain the properties of the base scheme and are therefore CCA-secure in the adaptive corruption model without the use of random oracles, while being faster, practical, and more secure overall than the base scheme.
Ultra-Wideband (UWB) technology re-emerges as a groundbreaking ranging technology with its precise micro-location capabilities and robustness. This paper highlights the security dimensions of UWB technology, focusing in particular on the intricacies of device fingerprinting for authentication, examined through the lens of state-of-the-art deep learning techniques. Furthermore, we explore various potential enhancements to the UWB standard that could realize a sovereign UWB data network. We argue that UWB data communication holds significant potential in healthcare and ultra-secure environments, where the use of the common unlicensed 2.4 GHz band-centric wireless technology is limited or prohibited. A sovereign UWB network could serve as an alternative, providing secure localization and short-range data communication in such environments.
In the context of digital certification systems, the demand for privacy-preserving authentication is increasingly vital, particularly for critical applications that involve sensitive personal data. Traditional digital signatures provide a robust means of implementing such systems. However, they raise significant privacy concerns due to their public verifiability, which allows verifiers to prove the authenticity of the received sensitive data to third parties. Universal designated verifier signature (UDVS) schemes address these privacy risks by offering non-transferability, ensuring that only the specified verifier can confirm the validity of the designated verifier signature (DVS). However, despite their advantages, existing UDVS models exhibit vulnerabilities that may allow tracking of the user’s authentications among cooperating verifiers and enable third parties to be convinced of the authenticity of sensitive user data by retrieving DVSs from different, non-cooperating verifiers. This paper presents a strategy to achieve strong non-transferability, which effectively addresses these vulnerabilities, by being the first to extend the concept of randomizability to UDVS schemes and their security properties. Our findings demonstrate that a randomizable UDVS scheme can serve as a solid foundation for constructing strong non-transferable UDVS schemes. Finally, we propose an efficient, strong, non-transferable UDVS scheme as an instantiation of our strategy, utilizing state-of-the-art Type 3 pairings, significantly improving upon previous constructions.
6 October 2025 in IACR Communications in Cryptology
Combiners for cryptographic schemes are a common way to increase security using redundancy. The security notions for public key encryption (PKE) combiners can be extended beyond the standard IND-CCA security to achieve even stronger security notions. In the indistinguishability under adaptive strong multiple chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-sMCCA) security notion, the adversary has additional oracle access to the underlying cipher components of the combiner. Recently, combiners have received more attention because of the possibility of combining classical and post-quantum (PQ) cryptography. This allows for the use of novel PQ algorithms while still having the security guarantees of the classical algorithms. In order to examine the security against quantum adversaries, the quantum random oracle model (QROM) has become the most relevant security model. However, there are no PKE combiners that achieve IND-sMCCA security in the QROM, even though this security notion describes much better the current state where classical, PQ, and combined schemes are deployed at the same time. In this paper, we close this gap by providing a new PKE combiner that is IND-sMCCA secure in the QROM. Our construction is more efficient and lean than the existing PKE combiners, considering the primitives used and the ciphertext size. We accomplish this by applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transformation to a PKE combiner of Asmuth and Blakley. To achieve IND-sMCCA security for the combiner, the PKE components must be OW-CCA secure. However, when using weaker (OW-CPA secure) PKE components, we still achieve standard IND-CCA security for the combiner. The security reductions are given in the ROM and the QROM, achieving bounds of different tightness.