This publication explores the characteristics, threats, and challenges posed by fourth-generation chemical warfare agents - Novichoks. These highly toxic agents, recently introduced to the international security landscape, represent a significant risk not only to military forces, but also to civilian populations, especially in the context of potential terrorist attacks. The study examines the molecular structure, toxicity, and physiological effects of Novichoks, underscoring their resistance to conventional decontamination methods and their rapid, severe impact on human health. Through the case studies, including the poisoning incidents involving Sergei Skripal, Alexei Navalny, and other high-profile cases, this publication illustrates the real-world implications of these agents in acts of targeted violence. It also discusses the international regulatory measures established by organizations such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and highlights EU and NATO policies aimed at preventing the proliferation and use of Novichoks and similar agents.

Organophosphorus chemical warfare agents such as sarin (GB), soman (GD), and cyclosarin (GF) rank among the most toxic substances known, making trace-level detection critical for public and military safety. In this study, we compared the sensitivity of two analytical techniques for determining these nerve agents: gas chromatography with flame-photometric detection (GC-FPD) and gas chromatography coupled to inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (GC-ICP-MS). Diluted samples of sarin, soman, and cyclosarin were prepared under controlled laboratory conditions and then analyzed by both methods. Limits of detection, calibration linearity, and selectivity of the two approaches were evaluated. It was shown that GC-ICP-MS enabled detection of sarin, soman, and cyclosarin at ≈0.12–0.14 ng/mL (LOD), whereas GC-FPD achieved LODs of ≈0.36–0.43 ng/mL. The obtained results confirm that GC-ICP-MS exhibits significantly higher sensitivity than GC-FPD in the analysis of the chemical warfare agents under study. This advantage indicates strong application potential of GC-ICP-MS as a technique for ultra-sensitive detection of trace amounts of chemical warfare agents (CWAs) in environmental samples and in confirmatory testing for compliance with the CWC, while simultaneously employing GC-FPD for rapid preliminary monitoring.

Celem pracy jest ocena mechanizmów odpowiedzialności oraz przesłanek legalności celowego użycia śmiercionośnej siły wobec osób podejrzewanych o terroryzm z perspektywy prawa i praktyki policyjnej. Artykuł opiera się na analizie polskich i unijnych regulacji prawnych, a także międzynarodowych standardów ochrony prawa do życia. Przedstawiono w nim model kontroli ex ante i ex post oraz wybrane studia przypadków dotyczące użycia śmiercionośnej siły w działaniach antyterrorystycznych. Przyjęta hipoteza badawcza zakłada, że sięgnięcie po takie środki przez służby państwowe może być uzasadnione wyłącznie w wyjątkowych, ściśle określonych sytuacjach bezpośredniego zagrożenia życia. Z kolei skuteczna rozliczalność tych działań wymaga zarówno kontroli ex ante na etapie podejmowania decyzji operacyjnych, jak i kontroli ex post, obejmującej dokumentowanie przebiegu akcji, nadzór instytucjonalny oraz możliwość prowadzenia postępowań wyjaśniających. W tekście podkreślono znaczenie zasady proporcjonalności oraz policyjnego modelu ochrony porządku publicznego w warunkach zagrożenia terrorystycznego. Wnioski z badań wskazują, że przepisy, procedury decyzyjne, obowiązki dokumentacyjne oraz mechanizmy nadzoru nad operacjami skutkującymi śmiercią osoby podejrzanej o terroryzm muszą być precyzyjnie określone i podlegać wnikliwej weryfikacji.

In the publicly available literature, there are no studies on the selection of training techniques tobest prepare the members of law enforcement and rescue teams arriving as the first respondersto the correct diagnosis of the CBRNE threat, despite the impact of the largest possible numberof external conditions, hereinafter referred to as factors. Among first responders, the key role isplayed by officers of the Fire Service and Health Service. On the other hand, the analysed factorsmay be both irrelevant to the correct recognition of CBRNE threats and may make it difficult oreven impossible to properly assess the situation at the initial stage of the rescue operation.The research problem undertaken in this article is to investigate the extent to which the detailof the exercise scenarios, made through the selection of the aforementioned factors, allowsa comprehensive description of the conditions prevailing at the time when rescuers are assessingwhether a situation has arisen as a result of the use of CBRNE material(s). The analysis focuses onexercise scenarios assuming that first responders have a limited amount of technical means at theirdisposal to detect CBRNE threats, and that at least one of the following factors occurs:– the existing situation does not clearly indicate a terrorist attack with the use of hazardousmaterial/materials from the CBRN group, or their accidental release;– the used CBRN material does not have immediate effects in the environment and neitherprocedures for its detection nor procedures to be followed in the event of its identificationhave been developed;– an explosive was used in combination with CBRN material(s) with the characteristicsdescribed above.The research method consisted in proposing 3 levels of detailing any issue included in the scenarioof exercise related to the initial stage of the rescue operation, i.e. the stage of arrival of the firstFire Brigade, Police patrol or Medical Rescue Team at the scene. The adopted levels of detail in thedescription of a given issue are modules, variables and factors. Modules and variables are levelsthat describe selected factors in increasing detail. There can be an unlimited number of variables ineach module. On the other hand, an unlimited number of factors can be assigned to each variable.Modules and variables make it easier to manage the entire set of factors. The result of the work is the indication of 23 modules, 48 variables and 225 factors. In 11 modules, variables and/orfactors were not indicated. The modules taken into considerations are as follows: ‒ Hazardousmaterial used, e.g. chemical substance, explosive material; ‒ Improvised explosive device (IED),e.g. pipe bomb, car bomb,;‒ Carrier, e.g. letter, suitcase, rail vehicle; ‒ Time, e.g. season of a year,day of a week; ‒ Weather conditions, e.g. temperature, presence and kind of wind; ‒ Location,e.g. airspace, river, city; ‒ Available detection techniques; ‒ Communications systems; ‒ Artificialintelligence and decision supporting systems; ‒ Security teams, e.g. state services, other formations’‒ Emergency Service Teams; ‒ Teams of specialist services; ‒ Cooperation of agencies; ‒ Media andsocial difficulties; ‒ Communication difficulties, e.g. roadblock, accident; ‒ Sources of electricalenergy; ‒ Animals; ‒ Witnesses, e.g. availability of a witness, interactions with witnesses; ‒ Numberand type of victims, e.g. interactions with victims, age of victims; ‒ Behaviour of victims; ‒ Numberand type of perpetrators, e.g. nationality of the perpetrators, motivation of the perpetrators; and‒ Behaviour of spectators. For each of the above factors, the point of view of the multiplicity effectwas taken into account, i.e. whether a given factor occurred individually and only at one point intime, or whether it appeared several times in a given scenario.

The Baltic Sea is an environmentally sensitive semi-enclosed marine basin characterized by intensive maritime activity, expanding offshore infrastructure, and the presence of nuclear-related facilities. These conditions increase the importance of environmental radiological surveillance capable of supporting the early detection of transboundary contamination events. This study assesses the potential application of offshore wind farm infrastructure as a platform for autonomous radiation monitoring within an expanded regional surveillance network. The study combined a review of regional radiological hazards, assessment of existing monitoring infrastructure, analysis of environmental radiation data from the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP), and analysis of representative meteorological conditions from 2023–2024 using European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) data. The results indicate that radiological monitoring in the Baltic region is concentrated predominantly in terrestrial and coastal areas, leaving offshore regions with limited surveillance coverage. Representative atmospheric conditions indicate that airborne contaminants originating near the Gulf of Finland could potentially reach the southern Baltic coast within approximately 24 h under favourable wind conditions. Assessment of offshore infrastructure suggests that offshore wind farms could serve as platforms for autonomous radiation monitoring because they provide existing power supply, communication infrastructure, distributed offshore locations, and maintenance accessibility. Integration of offshore monitoring with terrestrial surveillance networks could improve spatial coverage and strengthen regional early-warning capability. The proposed framework provides a basis for future atmospheric dispersion modelling and optimization of offshore radiological monitoring networks.