Amidst severe ecological challenges and resource constraints, realizing the value of ecological products—such as timber, non-timber forest products, and ecosystem services like carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation—has emerged as an innovative approach within the realm of paying for ecosystem services. This study examines 35 cases of ecological product value realization in China, using a comprehensive analytical framework encompassing policy support, market participation, and resource endowment utilization. Utilizing a qualitative comparative analysis method (cs-QCA), the study explores the driving mechanisms behind ecological product value realization. These findings indicate that policy guidance and planning are indispensable for realizing ecological product value. Additional factors, such as fiscal and financial support, leadership from pioneering enterprises, product innovation and promotion, and the utilization of both natural and human resources, play varying roles across different grouping paths to varying degrees. The study uncovers the following three typical driving mechanisms: government-led; government–market hybrid; and integrated type. The study reveals that each region should choose an appropriate path based on its unique conditions. This research significantly enhances the theoretical understanding of ecological product value realization and provides a scientific foundation for policy formulation and practical applications.

State-owned forest farms are key players in managing forestry resources worldwide, playing a pivotal role in advancing the development of the non-timber forest product industry. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving “government–state-owned forest farms–farmer households” to delve into how state-owned forest farms collaborate with governments and farmer households to propel the growth of the non-timber forest product industry. Additionally, it explores the interactive relationships among multiple stakeholders and their asymptotic stability. The findings reveal that (1) under certain conditions, the game model can achieve four stable equilibrium strategies: (0,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,1,1), and (1,1,1). (2) Key factors influencing the tripartite game include the political performance and administrative costs of local governments involved in the industry’s development, assessment performance and reduced management and protection expenses of state-owned forest farms, and sales revenue and planting costs of farmers’ under-forest products. (3) The market development costs shared by state-owned forest farms and government subsidies for under-forest planting should be within a reasonable range. This ensures effective promotion of farmers’ participation in under-forest planting while maintaining the willingness of state-owned forest farms and governments to actively engage. These findings provide concrete guidelines that policymakers can use to spur sustainable growth in the NTFP sector.