Human beings live in a world full of risks, from minor risks such as colds and fevers to major crises such as economic crises and hurricanes. How to cope with these risks is a constant topic in the evolution of humankind. The impact of various characteristics of risk on the risk-resistance outcomes has been well studied, including the probability, intensity and spread of risks. However, as an additional dimension independent of the above main characteristics, risk-resistance solutions that are appropriate to the risk have not received sufficient attention. We abstract this characteristic as the relative cost-effectiveness between collective solution and individual solution in resisting a risk and name it communality. Taking communality and intensity as the two main characteristics of risk, we propose a risk-resistance model and explore the critical impact of risk communality on the outcomes of risk resistance. Using numerical analysis, we map the state transition of the population on a two-dimensional surface consisting of communality and intensity. Simulation experiments validate the results from numerical analysis and reveal four regions in this surface, each of which corresponds to a governance structure endogenous to the population. The complex impact of population-endogenous governance structures on the risk-resistance outcomes reflects the real-world challenges of risk governance. This article suggests that social governors need to implement different logics in the face of risks with different communalities.
28 August 2026 in International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making
The fact that data can be privately possessed yet contain the attributes of public goods leads to the “Arrow’s Information Paradox” in data trading. If left unchecked, supply-side deception about data quality and demand-side data leakage can seriously undermine the trust between suppliers and demanders. Inspired by the ideas of reputation and punishment, this paper combines a risk compensation mechanism, which is widely available in the financial sector, with data trading. Specifically, we propose a data trading model with risk compensation and study the evolutionary dynamics of the population using evolutionary game theory. We define as the demander’s compensation share that the supplier has to bear for data quality cheating and as the supplier’s compensation share that the demander has to bear for data leakage. Through numerical solution and simulation, we analyze the evolutionary stable states of the population and find that the risk compensation mechanism in some data trading scenarios can limit the supply side from cheating on data quality or the demand side from leaking data. The results show that and act asymmetrically, with being able to affect both supply-side and demand-side strategies, while affects only the demand-side strategy. This work reveals chaos and asymmetry in data trading with risk compensation, and the proposed model and replication dynamic equations may have implications for future research.