Yueting Chai

Yueting Chai

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Yueting Chai

Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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13 September 2022 in Entropy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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JQJun Qian
Jun Qian
XSXiao Sun
Xiao Sun
TZTongda Zhang
Tongda Zhang
YCYueting Chai
Yueting Chai
Game theory provides a powerful means to study human cooperation and better understand cooperation-facilitating mechanisms in general. In classical game-theoretic models, an increase in group cooperation constantly increases people’s gains, implying that individual gains are a continuously varying function of the cooperation rate. However, this is inconsistent with the increasing number of risk-resistant scenarios in reality. A risk-resistant scenario means once a group does not successfully resist the risk, all individuals lose their resources, such as a community coping with COVID-19 and a village resisting a flood. In other words, individuals’ gains are segmented about the collaboration rate. This paper builds a risk-resistant model to explore whether punishment still promotes collaboration when people resist risk. The results show that central and peer punishments can both encourage collaboration but with different characteristics under different risk-resistant scenarios. Specifically, central punishment constrains the collaboration motivated by peer punishment regardless of risk, while peer punishment limits the collaboration induced by central punishment only when the risk is high. Our findings provide insights into the balance between peer punishment from public autonomy and central punishment from central governance, and the proposed model paves the way for the development of richer risk-resistant models.

15 November 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XSXiao Sun
Xiao Sun
JQJun Qian
Jun Qian
YYYanlin Ying
Yanlin Ying
YCYueting Chai
Yueting Chai
YLYi Liu
Yi Liu
Human beings live in a world full of risks, from minor risks such as colds and fevers to major crises such as economic crises and hurricanes. How to cope with these risks is a constant topic in the evolution of humankind. The impact of various characteristics of risk on the risk-resistance outcomes has been well studied, including the probability, intensity and spread of risks. However, as an additional dimension independent of the above main characteristics, risk-resistance solutions that are appropriate to the risk have not received sufficient attention. We abstract this characteristic as the relative cost-effectiveness between collective solution and individual solution in resisting a risk and name it communality. Taking communality and intensity as the two main characteristics of risk, we propose a risk-resistance model and explore the critical impact of risk communality on the outcomes of risk resistance. Using numerical analysis, we map the state transition of the population on a two-dimensional surface consisting of communality and intensity. Simulation experiments validate the results from numerical analysis and reveal four regions in this surface, each of which corresponds to a governance structure endogenous to the population. The complex impact of population-endogenous governance structures on the risk-resistance outcomes reflects the real-world challenges of risk governance. This article suggests that social governors need to implement different logics in the face of risks with different communalities.

24 February 2025 in Mathematics
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Journal Article
Open access
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JQJun Qian
Jun Qian
XSXiao Sun
Xiao Sun
YCYueting Chai
Yueting Chai
XXXiao Xue
Xiao Xue
The fact that data can be privately possessed yet contain the attributes of public goods leads to the “Arrow’s Information Paradox” in data trading. If left unchecked, supply-side deception about data quality and demand-side data leakage can seriously undermine the trust between suppliers and demanders. Inspired by the ideas of reputation and punishment, this paper combines a risk compensation mechanism, which is widely available in the financial sector, with data trading. Specifically, we propose a data trading model with risk compensation and study the evolutionary dynamics of the population using evolutionary game theory. We define λ as the demander’s compensation share that the supplier has to bear for data quality cheating and η as the supplier’s compensation share that the demander has to bear for data leakage. Through numerical solution and simulation, we analyze the evolutionary stable states of the population and find that the risk compensation mechanism in some data trading scenarios can limit the supply side from cheating on data quality or the demand side from leaking data. The results show that λ and η act asymmetrically, with λ being able to affect both supply-side and demand-side strategies, while η affects only the demand-side strategy. This work reveals chaos and asymmetry in data trading with risk compensation, and the proposed model and replication dynamic equations may have implications for future research.

23 February 2023 in The European Physical Journal B
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JQJun Qian
Jun Qian
TZTongda Zhang
Tongda Zhang
XSXiao Sun
Xiao Sun
YCYueting Chai
Yueting Chai

1 January 2014 in International Journal of Machine Learning and Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TZTongda Zhang
Tongda Zhang
XSXiao Sun
Xiao Sun
YCYueting Chai
Yueting Chai
HAHamid Aghajan
Hamid Aghajan