We examine financial reporting and firm operations, focusing specifically on the roles of ‘enterprise risk management’ (ERM), within which a holistic approach is taken to the conceptualization and management of all types of risk. We measure ERM implementation based on information obtained from 2004–2014 financial reports on 648 firms. We find that ERM implementation is associated with higher reporting quality and reduced volatility in future firm performance in terms of both operating cash flows and stock returns. Our difference-in-differences analyses indicate that these associations were strengthened by the introduction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) final rule in 2010, requiring increased and improved disclosure related to risk oversight. Our findings, which we attribute to the incremental effects of ERM and enhanced risk disclosure over time, point to the substantial advantages of ERM and the importance of related disclosure, which should prove to be of interest to firms as well as policymakers.

Applying a well-known argument of Karl Menger to an insurance version of the St. Petersburg Paradox (in which the decision maker is confronted with losses, rather than gains), one can assert that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are necessarily concave upward and bounded below as decision-maker wealth tends to negative infinity. However, this argument is subject to two potential criticisms: (1) infinite-mean losses do not exist in the real world; and (2) the St. Petersburg Paradox derives its force from empirical observation (i. e., that actual decision makers would not agree to an arbitrarily large insurance bid price to transfer an infinite-mean loss), and thus does not impart logical necessity. In the present article, these two criticisms are addressed in turn. We first show that, although infinite-mean insurance losses technically do not exist, they do provide a reasonable model for certain large (i. e., excess and reinsurance) property-liability indemnities. We then employ the Two-Envelope Paradox to demonstrate the logical necessity of concave-upward, lower-bounded utility for arbitrarily small (i. e., negative) values of wealth. Finally, we note that recognizing the bounded, sigmoid nature of utility functions challenges certain fundamental understandings in the economics of insurance demand, and can lead to vastly different conclusions regarding the bid price for insurance.

In this article, we propose a model consisting of an insurance distribution channel compensation scheme, paying special attention to the insurer’s choice of distribution system in both single-period and multi-period settings. We find that the risk factor is the key element in both the insurer’s choice of distribution channel and the distribution channel compensation scheme. The advantage of having an independent underwriter is mainly manifested in lines of business that are more risky. Our analysis suggests that a profit-sharing contingent-commission scheme serves as a risk-sharing mechanism and is especially effective with risky business lines.