Maryam Esmaeilian

Ms. Maryam Esmaeilian


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
20 December 2023 in Microprocessors and Microsystems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MEMaryam Esmaeilian
Maryam Esmaeilian
HBHakem Beitollahi
Hakem Beitollahi

19 March 2025 in Sensors
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MEMaryam Esmaeilian
Maryam Esmaeilian
Vincent BeroulleVincent Beroulle
Vincent Beroulle
DHDavid Hely
David Hely
Embedded systems can be targeted by fault injection attacks (FIAs), which enable attackers to alter the system specified behavior, potentially gaining access to confidential information or causing unintended outcomes, among other effects. Although numerous security sensors and attack detectors have been proposed in the literature to detect different sources of FIAs, it is crucial to ensure that these mechanisms themselves have not been tampered. Hence, the integrity of these detectors is critical in maintaining the security of embedded systems. This study focuses on evaluating the robustness of delay-based digital detectors against a new type of FIA called power-off temperature attack (POTA). POTA occurs when the chip power is turned off, rendering the detectors inactive and allowing the attackers to bypass them. After a POTA, the circuit or its detectors may not function properly when the power is restored, potentially allowing other attacks to go undetected if the detectors are less sensitive. This study implements two attack detectors on Xilinx Artix-7 FPGAs and investigates the impact of heating cycles on theses detectors’ characteristics when the FPGA is in different states, including power-off, power-on, and inactive modes (such as clock-freezing mode). Our experiments reveal that heating cycles in power-off or inactive modes can alter the FPGA component delays and reduce the accuracy of its detectors, which highlights the vulnerability of these systems to POTA and potential risks to embedded system security.

3 July 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MEMaryam Esmaeilian
Maryam Esmaeilian
ADAghiles Douadi
Aghiles Douadi
ZKzahra kazemi
zahra kazemi
Vincent BeroulleVincent Beroulle
Vincent Beroulle
AMAmir-Pasha Mirbaha
Amir-Pasha Mirbaha
GNGiorgio Di Natale
Giorgio Di Natale
Embedded systems are vulnerable to significant security threats from Fault Injection Attacks (FIAs), which allow attackers to gain access to confidential information. While various attack detectors have been proposed in the literature to detect different types of FIAs, these detectors themselves are susceptible to such attacks and can be compromised. Hence, the robustness of these detectors is critical in maintaining the security of embedded systems. The focus of this study is to evaluate the robustness of digital circuits and delay-based digital detectors against a new type of FIA called Power-Off Attack (POA). POA occurs when the power to the chip is turned off, and the detectors are not active. Following a POA attack, the circuit or its detectors may not function properly when the power is turned back on, which can allow other attacks to be applied without being detected if the detectors are less sensitive. This study implements two detectors on Xilinx Artix-7 FPGAs and examines the impact of heating cycles on detector characteristics when the FPGA is in various states, including power-off, power-on, and inactive states (such as clock-freezing mode). Our experiments reveal that heating cycles in power-off mode can alter the FPGA component delays and the accuracy of its detectors, which highlights the vulnerability of these systems to POA and potential issues for embedded system security.