Emerging evidence suggests that children may think of robots-and artificial intelligence, more generally-as having moral standing. In this paper, we trace the developmental trajectory of this belief. Over three developmental studies (combined N = 415) and one adult study (N = 156), we compared participants' judgments (Experiments 1-3) and donation choices (Experiment 4) towards a human boy, a humanoid robot, and control targets. We observed that, on the whole, children endorsed robots as having moral standing and mental life. With age, however, they tended to deny experiential mental life to robots, which aligned with diminished ascription of moral standing. Older children's judgments more closely mirrored those of adult participants, who overwhelmingly denied these attributes to robots. This sheds new light on children's moral cognitive development and their relationship to emerging technologies.
Humans may have evolved to be “hyperactive agency detectors”. Upon hearing a rustle in a pile of leaves, it would be safer to assume that an agent, like a lion, hides beneath (even if there may ultimately be nothing there). Can this evolutionary cognitive mechanism—and related mechanisms of anthropomorphism—explain some of people’s contemporary experience with using chatbots (e.g., ChatGPT, Gemini)? In this paper, we sketch how such mechanisms may engender the seemingly irresistible anthropomorphism of large language-based chatbots. We then explore the implications of this within the educational context. Specifically, we argue that people’s tendency to perceive a “mind in the machine” is a double-edged sword for educational progress: Though anthropomorphism can facilitate motivation and learning, it may also lead students to trust—and potentially over-trust—content generated by chatbots. To be sure, students do seem to recognize that LLM-generated content may, at times, be inaccurate. We argue, however, that the rise of anthropomorphism towards chatbots will only serve to further camouflage these inaccuracies. We close by considering how research can turn towards aiding students in becoming digitally literate—avoiding the pitfalls caused by perceiving agency and humanlike mental states in chatbots.
As artificial intelligence (AI) systems begin to take on social roles traditionally filled by humans, it will be crucial to understand how this affects people’s cooperative expectations. In the case of human–human dyads, different relationships are governed by different norms: For example, how two strangers—versus two friends or colleagues—should interact when faced with a similar coordination problem often differs. How will the rise of ‘social’ artificial intelligence (and ultimately, superintelligent AI) complicate people’s expectations about the cooperative norms that should govern different types of relationships, whether human–human or human–AI? Do people expect AI to adhere to the same cooperative dynamics as humans when in a given social role? Conversely, will they begin to expect humans in certain types of relationships to act more like AI? Here, we consider how people’s cooperative expectations may pull apart between human–human and human–AI relationships, detailing an empirical proposal for mapping these distinctions across relationship types. We see the data resulting from our proposal as relevant for understanding people’s relationship–specific cooperative expectations in an age of social AI, which may also forecast potential resistance towards AI systems occupying certain social roles. Finally, these data can form the basis for ethical evaluations: What relationship–specific cooperative norms we should adopt for human–AI interactions, or reinforce through responsible AI design, depends partly on empirical facts about what norms people find intuitive for such interactions (along with the costs and benefits of maintaining these). Toward the end of the paper, we discuss how these relational norms may change over time and consider the implications of this for the proposed research program.
We live in an age where robots are increasingly present in the social and moral world. Here, we explore how children and adults think about the mental lives and moral standing of robots. In Experiment 1 (N = 116), we found that children granted humans and robots with more mental life and vulnerability to harm than an anthropomorphized control (i.e., a toy bear). In Experiment 2 (N = 157), we found that, relative to children, adults ascribed less mental life and vulnerability to harm to robots. In Experiment 3 (N = 152), we modified our experiment to be within-subjects and measured beliefs concerning moral standing. Though younger children again appeared willing to assign mental capacities — particularly those related to experience (e.g., being capable of experiencing hunger) — to robots, older children and adults did so to a lesser degree. This diminished attribution of mental life tracked with diminished ratings of robot moral standing. This informs ongoing debates concerning emerging attitudes about artificial life.