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We investigate to what degree employee representatives contribute to the board’s monitoring of earnings quality. We argue that employee representatives have incentives to prevent earnings manipulations motivated by negotiation considerations. Furthermore, they seek risk reducing policies, have a long-term interest in their firm and possess firm-specific knowledge, which in turn can result in improved earnings quality. Employee representation also increases the diversity on the board, which can enhance the board of directors’ internal communication and monitoring. Using a sample of firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (2006–2014), we find lower abnormal accruals as well as less excessive R&D cuts in firms with employee representation, controlling for alternative model specifications and potential sample selection bias. Moreover, we find less income-decreasing abnormal accruals in firms with employee representatives during the 2010-2011 collective bargaining period. This study also reveals that earnings quality varies with the characteristics of employee representatives. Our findings contribute to the literature on boards’ monitoring and financial reporting quality, as it examines a less noticed aspect of board diversity, i.e. employee representation.
Conny Overland; Niuosha Samani. The Sheep Watching the Shepherd: Employee Representation on the Board and Earnings Quality. European Accounting Review 2021, 1 -38.
AMA StyleConny Overland, Niuosha Samani. The Sheep Watching the Shepherd: Employee Representation on the Board and Earnings Quality. European Accounting Review. 2021; ():1-38.
Chicago/Turabian StyleConny Overland; Niuosha Samani. 2021. "The Sheep Watching the Shepherd: Employee Representation on the Board and Earnings Quality." European Accounting Review , no. : 1-38.
The European building stock was renewed at a rapid pace during the period 1950–1975. In many European countries, the building stock from this time needs to be renovated, and there are opportunities to introduce energy efficiency measures in the renovation process. Information availability and increasingly available analysis tools make it possible to assess the impact of policy and regulation. This article describes methods developed for analyzing investments in renovation and energy performance based on building ownership and inhabitant socio-economic information developed for Swedish authorities, to be used for the Swedish national renovations strategy in 2019. This was done by analyzing measured energy usage and renovation investments made during the last 30 years, coupled with building specific official information of buildings and resident area characteristics, for multi-family dwellings in Gothenburg (N = 6319). The statistical analyses show that more costly renovations lead to decreasing energy usage for heating, but buildings that have been renovated during the last decades have a higher energy usage when accounting for current heating system, ownership, and resident socio-economic background. It is appropriate to include an affordability aspect in larger renovation projects since economically disadvantaged groups are over-represented in buildings with poorer energy performance.
Mikael Mangold; Magnus Österbring; Conny Overland; Tim Johansson; Holger Wallbaum. Building Ownership, Renovation Investments, and Energy Performance—A Study of Multi-Family Dwellings in Gothenburg. Sustainability 2018, 10, 1684 .
AMA StyleMikael Mangold, Magnus Österbring, Conny Overland, Tim Johansson, Holger Wallbaum. Building Ownership, Renovation Investments, and Energy Performance—A Study of Multi-Family Dwellings in Gothenburg. Sustainability. 2018; 10 (5):1684.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMikael Mangold; Magnus Österbring; Conny Overland; Tim Johansson; Holger Wallbaum. 2018. "Building Ownership, Renovation Investments, and Energy Performance—A Study of Multi-Family Dwellings in Gothenburg." Sustainability 10, no. 5: 1684.
Research shows that the bid announcement return (BAR) of the acquiring firm is lower for cross-border than domestic acquisition announcements. The current lack of economically based explanations for this effect, labeled the cross-border effect by Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), motivates our study. We use unique hand-collected corporate governance data to study how the relationships between acquiring and target firms prior to a bid announcement affect the cross-border effect. Our tests show that non-operating associations between the acquiring and target firms, in the form of board participation and toeholds, have a positive effect on the BAR. The cross-border effect disappears when we control for board participation and toeholds. Thus, we suggest that the cross-border effect is at least partly a consequence of information asymmetries and the adverse selection problem that they generate.
Mattias Hamberg; Conny Overland; Björn Lantz. Board participation, toeholds and the cross-border effect. International Business Review 2013, 22, 868 -882.
AMA StyleMattias Hamberg, Conny Overland, Björn Lantz. Board participation, toeholds and the cross-border effect. International Business Review. 2013; 22 (5):868-882.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMattias Hamberg; Conny Overland; Björn Lantz. 2013. "Board participation, toeholds and the cross-border effect." International Business Review 22, no. 5: 868-882.