Hyunmin Kim

Dr. Hyunmin Kim

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 October 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SMSamit Shahnawaz Miftah
Samit Shahnawaz Miftah
ASAmisha Srivastava
Amisha Srivastava
HKHyunmin Kim
Hyunmin Kim
SWShiyi Wei
Shiyi Wei
KBKanad Basu
Kanad Basu

12 June 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SMSamit Shahnawaz Miftah
Samit Shahnawaz Miftah
ASAmisha Srivastava
Amisha Srivastava
HKHyunmin Kim
Hyunmin Kim
KBKanad Basu
Kanad Basu

17 April 2026 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
HKHyunmin Kim
Hyunmin Kim
The proliferation of connected embedded systems across critical infrastructure, automotive, medical, and industrial domains has made trust chain architecture a fundamental design requirement. A trust chain establishes cryptographically verifiable integrity from an immutable hardware root of trust through boot stages to runtime execution, ensuring only authenticated software operates on the platform. This survey presents a comprehensive analysis of trust chain architectures for secure embedded systems, synthesizing nearly 100 publications spanning 2004–2025. We propose a hierarchical taxonomy across five dimensions: Hardware Root of Trust mechanisms (TPM 2.0, ARM TrustZone, Intel SGX/TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, ARM CCA, RISC-V PMP); Secure Boot Chain implementations (verified, measured, and authenticated boot); Trusted Execution Environment architectures (OP-TEE, commercial TEEs, confidential computing, RISC-V solutions); TEE applications (secure storage, cryptographic services, confidential AI, biometrics, payments); and Remote Attestation protocols (TPM-based, lightweight IoT, zero-knowledge, post-quantum variants). Through comparative evaluation of 45+ implementations across 15 platforms, we assess solutions based on security guarantees, performance overhead, memory footprint, and certification status. Published benchmarks indicate TEE context switching overhead ranges from approximately 0.4μs (seL4 IPC) to 85μs (full TA invocation), secure boot adds approximately 57ms–600ms to boot time depending on platform, and trust chain components require 32–512KB additional flash memory. We provide critical analysis of 2024–2025 vulnerabilities affecting UEFI Secure Boot (CVE-2024-7344, CVE-2025-3052), AMD SEV-SNP (RMPocalypse), and Intel TDX, demonstrating ongoing security challenges in production systems. We identify critical research gaps: absence of end-to-end formal verification; persistent TEE interface vulnerabilities; attestation scalability limitations; insufficient side-channel protections in VM-level confidential computing; and urgent post-quantum migration needs following NIST’s 2024–2025 standardization. Seven priority research directions are proposed, including compositional verification frameworks, side-channel resistant TEE design, scalable swarm attestation, zero-knowledge attestation verification, and quantum-resistant trust establishment with emerging PQC hardware support.

20 February 2026 in IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ASAmisha Srivastava
Amisha Srivastava
SMSamit S. Miftah
Samit S. Miftah
HKHyunmin Kim
Hyunmin Kim
DPDebjit Pal
Debjit Pal
KBKanad Basu
Kanad Basu
Power side-channel (PSC) attacks exploit power consumption patterns to extract sensitive information, posing risks to cryptographic operations crucial for secure systems. Traditional countermeasures, such as masking, face challenges like complex synthesis integration, high area overhead, and vulnerability to optimization removal during logic synthesis. To address these issues, we introduce proposed side-channel aware synthesis (PoSyn), a novel logic synthesis framework designed to enhance cryptographic hardware’s resistance against PSC attacks. Our approach focuses on the optimal bipartite mapping of vulnerable register transfer level (RTL) components to standard cells from the technology library to minimize PSC leakage. By employing a cost function that integrates key characteristics from the RTL design and the standard cell library, we strategically modify the mapping criteria during the conversion of RTL designs into standard cell netlists without altering the design functionality. Furthermore, PoSyn is theoretically shown to minimize mutual information leakage, further reinforcing its security against PSC vulnerabilities. PoSyn is evaluated on a variety of cryptographic hardware, including AES, RSA, PRESENT, and postquantum cryptography algorithms like Saber and CRYSTALS-Kyber across 65-, 45-, and 15-nm nodes. Our experimental results demonstrate a significant reduction of success rates for differential power analysis (DPA) and correlation power analysis (CPA) attacks, as low as 3% and 6%, respectively. Furthermore, test vector leakage assessment (TVLA) confirms that the synthesized netlists exhibit negligible leakage. Moreover, compared to traditional countermeasures such as masking and shuffling, PoSyn achieves notably lowers the success rates, achieving a reduction by up to 72%, while simultaneously enhancing area efficiency by as much as $3.79\times $ . These results highlight the effectiveness of PoSyn in securing cryptographic hardware with minimal impact on area and performance.

4 August 2025 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HKHyunmin Kim
Hyunmin Kim
ZKZAHID BASHA SHAIK KADU
ZAHID BASHA SHAIK KADU
KHKyusuk Han
Kyusuk Han
The exponential growth of autonomous systems demands robust security mechanisms that can operate within the extreme constraints of real-time embedded environments. This paper introduces SMART DShot, a groundbreaking machine learning-enhanced framework that transforms the security landscape of unmanned aerial vehicle motor control systems through seamless integration of adaptive timing correction and real-time anomaly detection within Digital Shot (DShot) communication protocols. Our approach addresses critical vulnerabilities in Electronic Speed Controller (ESC) interfaces by deploying four synergistic algorithms—Kalman Filter Timing Correction (KFTC), Recursive Least Squares Timing Correction (RLSTC), Fuzzy Logic Timing Correction (FLTC), and Hybrid Adaptive Timing Correction (HATC)—each optimized for specific error characteristics and attack scenarios. Through comprehensive evaluation encompassing 32,000 Monte Carlo test iterations (500 per scenario × 16 scenarios × 4 algorithms) across 16 distinct operational scenarios and PolarFire SoC Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) implementation, we demonstrate exceptional performance with 88.3% attack detection rate, only 2.3% false positive incidence, and substantial vulnerability mitigation reducing Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severity from High (7.3) to Low (3.1). Hardware validation on PolarFire SoC confirms practical viability with minimal resource overhead (2.16% Look-Up Table utilization, 16.57 mW per channel) and deterministic sub-10 microsecond execution latency. The Hybrid Adaptive Timing Correction algorithm achieves 31.01% success rate (95% CI: [30.2%, 31.8%]), representing a 26.5% improvement over baseline approaches through intelligent meta-learning-based algorithm selection. Statistical validation using Analysis of Variance confirms significant performance differences (F(3,1996) = 30.30, p < 0.001) with large effect sizes (Cohen’s d up to 4.57), where 64.6% of algorithm comparisons showed large practical significance. SMART DShot establishes a paradigmatic shift from reactive to proactive embedded security, demonstrating that sophisticated artificial intelligence can operate effectively within microsecond-scale real-time constraints while providing comprehensive protection against timing manipulation, de-synchronization, burst interference, replay attacks, coordinated multi-channel attacks, and firmware-level compromises. This work provides essential foundations for trustworthy autonomous systems across critical domains including aerospace, automotive, industrial automation, and cyber–physical infrastructure. These results conclusively demonstrate that ML-enhanced motor control systems can achieve both superior security (88.3% attack detection rate with 2.3% false positives) and operational performance (31.01% timing correction success rate, 26.5% improvement over baseline) simultaneously, establishing SMART DShot as a practical, deployable solution for next-generation autonomous systems.