Amisha Srivastava

Amisha Srivastava

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Amisha Srivastava

University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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26 April 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ASAmisha Srivastava
Amisha Srivastava
SDSanjay Das
Sanjay Das
NCNavnil Choudhury
Navnil Choudhury
RPRafail Psiakis
Rafail Psiakis
PSPedro Henrique Silva
Pedro Henrique Silva
KBKanad Basu
Kanad Basu
Power side-channel (PSC) attacks exploit the dynamic power consumption of cryptographic operations to leak sensitive information about encryption hardware. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a PSC analysis to assess the susceptibility of cryptographic systems and mitigate potential risks. Existing PSC analysis primarily focuses on postsilicon implementations, which are inflexible in addressing design flaws, leading to costly and time-consuming postfabrication design re-spins. Hence, presilicon PSC analysis is required for the early detection of vulnerabilities to improve design robustness. In this article, we introduce SCAR, a novel presilicon PSC analysis framework based on graph neural networks (GNNs). SCAR converts register-transfer level (RTL) designs of encryption hardware into control-data flow graphs (CDFGs) and use that to detect the design modules susceptible to side-channel leakage. Furthermore, we incorporate a deep-learning-based explainer in SCAR to generate quantifiable and human-accessible explanations of our detection and localization decisions. We have also developed a fortification component as a part of SCAR that uses large-language models (LLMs) to automatically generate and insert additional design code at the localized zone to shore up the side-channel leakage. When evaluated on popular encryption algorithms like advanced encryption standard (AES), RSA, and PRESENT, and postquantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms like Saber and CRYSTALS-Kyber, SCAR, achieves up to 94.49% localization accuracy, 100% precision, and 90.48% recall. Additionally, through explainability analysis, SCAR reduces features for GNN model training by 57% while maintaining comparable accuracy. We believe that SCAR will transform the security-critical hardware design cycle, resulting in faster design closure at a reduced design cost.

23 June 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
XMXingyu Meng
Xingyu Meng
ASAmisha Srivastava
Amisha Srivastava
AAAyush Arunachalam
Ayush Arunachalam
ARAvik Ray
Avik Ray
PSPedro Henrique Silva
Pedro Henrique Silva
KBKanad Basu
Kanad Basu
The efficiency of validating complex System-on-Chips (SoCs) is contingent on the quality of the security properties provided. Generating security properties with traditional approaches often requires expert intervention and is limited to a few IPs, thereby resulting in a time-consuming and non-robust process. To address this issue, we, for the first time, propose a novel and automated Natural Language Processing (NLP)-based Security Property Generator (NSPG). Specifically, our approach utilizes hardware documentation in order to propose the first hardware security-specific language model, HS-BERT, for extracting security properties dedicated to hardware design. It is capable of phasing a significant amount of hardware specification, and the generated security properties can be easily converted into hardware assertions, thereby reducing the manual effort required for hardware verification. NSPG is trained using sentences from several SoC documentations and achieves up to 88% accuracy for property classification, outperforming ChatGPT. When assessed on five untrained OpenTitan hardware IP documents, NSPG aided in identifying eight security vulnerabilities in the buggy OpenTitan SoC presented in Hack@DAC 2022.

12 June 2026 in ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AMAnand Menon
Anand Menon
SMSamit Miftah
Samit Miftah
SKShamik Kundu
Shamik Kundu
SKSouvik Kundu
Souvik Kundu
ASAmisha Srivastava
Amisha Srivastava
KBKanad Basu
Kanad Basu
Hardware verification is crucial in modern SoC design, consuming around 70% of development time. SystemVerilog assertions ensure correct functionality. However, existing industrial practices rely on manual efforts for assertion generation, which becomes increasingly untenable as hardware systems become complex. Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) can automate this process. However, proprietary SOTA models like GPT-4o often generate inaccurate assertions and require expensive licenses, while smaller open-source LLMs need fine-tuning to manage HDL code complexities. To address these issues, we introduce VERT, an open-source dataset designed to enhance SystemVerilog assertion generation using LLMs. VERT enables researchers in academia and industry to fine-tune open-source models, outperforming larger proprietary ones in both accuracy and efficiency while ensuring data privacy through local fine-tuning and eliminating costly licenses. The dataset is curated by systematically augmenting variables from open-source HDL repositories to generate synthetic code snippets paired with corresponding assertions. Experimental results demonstrate that fine-tuned models like Deepseek Coder 6.7B and Llama 3.1 8B outperform GPT-4o, achieving up to 96.88% improvement over base models and 24.14% over GPT-4o on platforms including OpenTitan, CVA6, OpenPiton, and Pulpissimo. VERT is available at https://github.com/AnandMenon12/VERT .

17 October 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SMSamit Shahnawaz Miftah
Samit Shahnawaz Miftah
ASAmisha Srivastava
Amisha Srivastava
HKHyunmin Kim
Hyunmin Kim
SWShiyi Wei
Shiyi Wei
KBKanad Basu
Kanad Basu

12 June 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SMSamit Shahnawaz Miftah
Samit Shahnawaz Miftah
ASAmisha Srivastava
Amisha Srivastava
HKHyunmin Kim
Hyunmin Kim
KBKanad Basu
Kanad Basu

20 February 2026 in IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ASAmisha Srivastava
Amisha Srivastava
SMSamit S. Miftah
Samit S. Miftah
HKHyunmin Kim
Hyunmin Kim
DPDebjit Pal
Debjit Pal
KBKanad Basu
Kanad Basu
Power side-channel (PSC) attacks exploit power consumption patterns to extract sensitive information, posing risks to cryptographic operations crucial for secure systems. Traditional countermeasures, such as masking, face challenges like complex synthesis integration, high area overhead, and vulnerability to optimization removal during logic synthesis. To address these issues, we introduce proposed side-channel aware synthesis (PoSyn), a novel logic synthesis framework designed to enhance cryptographic hardware’s resistance against PSC attacks. Our approach focuses on the optimal bipartite mapping of vulnerable register transfer level (RTL) components to standard cells from the technology library to minimize PSC leakage. By employing a cost function that integrates key characteristics from the RTL design and the standard cell library, we strategically modify the mapping criteria during the conversion of RTL designs into standard cell netlists without altering the design functionality. Furthermore, PoSyn is theoretically shown to minimize mutual information leakage, further reinforcing its security against PSC vulnerabilities. PoSyn is evaluated on a variety of cryptographic hardware, including AES, RSA, PRESENT, and postquantum cryptography algorithms like Saber and CRYSTALS-Kyber across 65-, 45-, and 15-nm nodes. Our experimental results demonstrate a significant reduction of success rates for differential power analysis (DPA) and correlation power analysis (CPA) attacks, as low as 3% and 6%, respectively. Furthermore, test vector leakage assessment (TVLA) confirms that the synthesized netlists exhibit negligible leakage. Moreover, compared to traditional countermeasures such as masking and shuffling, PoSyn achieves notably lowers the success rates, achieving a reduction by up to 72%, while simultaneously enhancing area efficiency by as much as $3.79\times $ . These results highlight the effectiveness of PoSyn in securing cryptographic hardware with minimal impact on area and performance.