Katharina Summermatter

Dr. Katharina Summermatter

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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12 December 2023 in The Lancet Microbe
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Stuart D BlacksellStuart D Blacksell
Stuart D Blacksell
SDSandhya Dhawan
Sandhya Dhawan
MKMarina Kusumoto
Marina Kusumoto
KLKhanh K Le
Khanh K Le
KSKatharina Summermatter
Katharina Summermatter
KHKeith Hamilton
Keith Hamilton
Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) and accidental pathogen escape from laboratory settings (APELS) are major concerns for the community. A risk-based approach for pathogen research management within a standard biosafety management framework is recommended but is challenging due to reasons such as inconsistency in risk tolerance and perception. Here, we performed a scoping review using publicly available, peer-reviewed journal and media reports of LAIs and instances of APELS between 2000 and 2021. We identified LAIs in 309 individuals in 94 reports for 51 pathogens. Eight fatalities (2·6% of all LAIs) were caused by infection with Neisseria meningitidis (n=3, 37·5%), Yersinia pestis (n=2, 25%), Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium (S Typhimurium; n=1, 12·5%), or Ebola virus (n=1, 12·5%) or were due to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (n=1, 12·5%). The top five LAI pathogens were S Typhimurium (n=154, 49·8%), Salmonella enteritidis (n=21, 6·8%), vaccinia virus (n=13, 4·2%), Brucella spp (n=12, 3·9%), and Brucella melitensis (n=11, 3·6%). 16 APELS were reported, including those for Bacillus anthracis, SARS-CoV, and poliovirus (n=3 each, 18·8%); Brucella spp and foot and mouth disease virus (n=2 each, 12·5%); and variola virus, Burkholderia pseudomallei, and influenza virus H5N1 (n=1 each, 6·3%). Continual improvement in LAI and APELS management via their root cause analysis and thorough investigation of such incidents is essential to prevent future occurrences. The results are biased due to the reliance on publicly available information, which emphasises the need for formalised global LAIs and APELS reporting to better understand the frequency of and circumstances surrounding these incidents.

15 May 2023 in Applied Biosafety
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Stuart D BlacksellStuart D Blacksell
Stuart D Blacksell
SDSandhya Dhawan
Sandhya Dhawan
MKMarina Kusumoto
Marina Kusumoto
KLKim Khanh Le
Kim Khanh Le
KSKatharina Summermatter
Katharina Summermatter
KHKeith Hamilton
Keith Hamilton
Introduction: Lack of evidence-based information regarding potential biological risks can result in inappropriate or excessive biosafety and biosecurity risk-reduction strategies. This can cause unnecessary damage and loss to the physical facilities, physical and psychological well-being of laboratory staff, and community trust. A technical working group from the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), World Health Organization (WHO), and Chatham House collaborated on the Biosafety Research Roadmap (BRM) project. The goal of the BRM is the sustainable implementation of evidence-based biorisk management of laboratory activities, particularly in low-resource settings, and the identification of gaps in the current biosafety and biosecurity knowledge base. Methods: A literature search was conducted for the basis of laboratory design and practices for four selected high-priority subgroups of pathogenic agents. Potential gaps in biosafety were focused on five main sections, including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Categories representing miscellaneous, respiratory, bioterrorism/zoonotic, and viral hemorrhagic fever pathogens were created within each group were selected for review. Results: Information sheets on the pathogens were developed. Critical gaps in the evidence base for safe sustainable biorisk management were identified. Conclusion: The gap analysis identified areas of applied biosafety research required to support the safety, and the sustainability, of global research programs. Improving the data available for biorisk management decisions for research with high-priority pathogens will contribute significantly to the improvement and development of appropriate and necessary biosafety, biocontainment and biosecurity strategies for each agent.

2 July 2025 in The Lancet Microbe
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SDSandhya Dhawan
Sandhya Dhawan
AMAtalay G Muluneh
Atalay G Muluneh
Wirichada PanngumWirichada Panngum
Wirichada Panngum
RMRaina MacIntyre
Raina MacIntyre
KSKatharina Summermatter
Katharina Summermatter
Stuart D BlacksellStuart D Blacksell
Stuart D Blacksell
Laboratory-acquired infections and accidental pathogen escapes from laboratory settings pose biosafety risks, affecting laboratory personnel, the scientific community, the general public, animal populations, and the environment. This systematic review compares reports of laboratory-acquired infections and accidental pathogen escapes from laboratory settings in research and clinical laboratories between 2000 and 2024, identifying key risk factors. A total of 250 reports documenting 712 human cases of laboratory-acquired infections were analysed. Research laboratories reported 276 infections and eight fatalities, whereas clinical laboratories accounted for 227 infections and five deaths. Needlestick injuries and ineffective use of personal protective equipment or containment measures were major risk factors in both settings. Research laboratories frequently reported inadequate decontamination techniques, whereas improper sample handling techniques often occurred in clinical laboratories. Given that most causes of laboratory-acquired infections are unknown or under-reported, these data can inform coordinated efforts to strengthen biosafety oversight, incident reporting, and risk management to reduce biosafety lapses and ensure long-term laboratory operations.

1 December 2020 in Applied Biosafety
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
DKDaniel Kümin
Daniel Kümin
MAMonika Gsell Albert
Monika Gsell Albert
BWBenjamin Weber
Benjamin Weber
KSKatharina Summermatter
Katharina Summermatter
When working with pathogens in laboratories, animal or production facilities, and even hospitals, the potential need for room fumigation for decontamination purposes must be taken into consideration. Questions regarding the choice of fumigant, technical aspects of the room, its ventilation, the fumigation system to be used, and other issues will arise and will have to be addressed. This article is based on literature searches and was compiled using the authors’ long-time personal experience in room and filter fumigation using various fumigation systems. The article can be used as a guide to establish an effective fumigation system in a laboratory or an animal facility setting and may be adapted for use in hospitals. Different systems for hydrogen peroxide fumigation on the market are presented. Also, technical aspects are discussed. Hydrogen peroxide is used in various forms for fumigation of rooms, equipment, and filters. Regardless of the individual limitations of these forms, hydrogen peroxide is a versatile fumigation method. However, it is important to consider numerous technical requirements when planning to implement hydrogen peroxide fumigation at an institution. Subsequent to the present overview of different fumigation systems based on hydrogen peroxide on the market and their technical requirements, part 2 will focus on validation and verification of hydrogen peroxide fumigation while considering the entire fumigation process. The two parts together will serve users as a guide to establishing hydrogen peroxide fumigations at their facilities.

15 May 2023 in Applied Biosafety
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Stuart D BlacksellStuart D Blacksell
Stuart D Blacksell
SDSandhya Dhawan
Sandhya Dhawan
MKMarina Kusumoto
Marina Kusumoto
KLKim Khanh Le
Kim Khanh Le
KSKatharina Summermatter
Katharina Summermatter
KHKeith Hamilton
Keith Hamilton
Introduction: Brucella melitensis and Bacillus anthracis are zoonoses transmitted from animals and animal products. Scientific information is provided in this article to support biosafety precautions necessary to protect laboratory workers and individuals who are potentially exposed to these pathogens in the workplace or other settings, and gaps in information are also reported. There is a lack of information on the appropriate effective concentration for many chemical disinfectants for this agent. Controversies related to B. anthracis include infectious dose for skin and gastrointestinal infections, proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) during the slaughter of infected animals, and handling of contaminated materials. B. melitensis is reported to have the highest number of laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) to date in laboratory workers. Methods: A literature search was conducted to identify potential gaps in biosafety and focused on five main sections including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, LAIs, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Results: Scientific literature currently lacks information on the effective concentration of many chemical disinfectants for this agent and in the variety of matrices where it may be found. Controversies related to B. anthracis include infectious dose for skin and gastrointestinal infections, proper use of PPE during the slaughter of infected animals, and handling contaminated materials. Discussion: Clarified vulnerabilities based on specific scientific evidence will contribute to the prevention of unwanted and unpredictable infections, improving the biosafety processes and procedures for laboratory staff and other professionals such as veterinarians, individuals associated with the agricultural industry, and those working with susceptible wildlife species.

15 May 2023 in Applied Biosafety
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Stuart D BlacksellStuart D Blacksell
Stuart D Blacksell
SDSandhya Dhawan
Sandhya Dhawan
MKMarina Kusumoto
Marina Kusumoto
KLKim Khanh Le
Kim Khanh Le
KSKatharina Summermatter
Katharina Summermatter
KHKeith Hamilton
Keith Hamilton
Introduction: Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF) virus and Lassa virus (LASV) are zoonotic agents regarded as high-consequence pathogens due to their high case fatality rates. CCHF virus is a vector-borne disease and is transmitted by tick bites. Lassa virus is spread via aerosolization of dried rat urine, ingesting infected rats, and direct contact with or consuming food and water contaminated with rat excreta. Methods: The scientific literature for biosafety practices has been reviewed for both these two agents to assess the evidence base and biosafety-related knowledge gaps. The review focused on five main areas, including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Results: There is a lack of data on the safe collection and handling procedures for tick specimens and the infectious dose from an infective tick bite for CCHF investigations. In addition, there are gaps in knowledge about gastrointestinal and contact infectious doses for Lassa virus, sample handling and transport procedures outside of infectious disease areas, and the contribution of asymptomatic carriers in viral circulation. Conclusion: Due to the additional laboratory hazards posed by these two agents, the authors recommend developing protocols that work effectively and safely in highly specialized laboratories in non-endemic regions and a laboratory with limited resources in endemic areas.