Sandhya Dhawan

Sandhya Dhawan

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Sandhya Dhawan

Mahidol Oxford Tropical Research Medicine Unit, Faculty of Tropical Medicine, Mahidol University, Bangkok, Thailand

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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12 December 2023 in The Lancet Microbe
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Stuart D BlacksellStuart D Blacksell
Stuart D Blacksell
SDSandhya Dhawan
Sandhya Dhawan
MKMarina Kusumoto
Marina Kusumoto
KLKhanh K Le
Khanh K Le
KSKatharina Summermatter
Katharina Summermatter
KHKeith Hamilton
Keith Hamilton
Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) and accidental pathogen escape from laboratory settings (APELS) are major concerns for the community. A risk-based approach for pathogen research management within a standard biosafety management framework is recommended but is challenging due to reasons such as inconsistency in risk tolerance and perception. Here, we performed a scoping review using publicly available, peer-reviewed journal and media reports of LAIs and instances of APELS between 2000 and 2021. We identified LAIs in 309 individuals in 94 reports for 51 pathogens. Eight fatalities (2·6% of all LAIs) were caused by infection with Neisseria meningitidis (n=3, 37·5%), Yersinia pestis (n=2, 25%), Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium (S Typhimurium; n=1, 12·5%), or Ebola virus (n=1, 12·5%) or were due to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (n=1, 12·5%). The top five LAI pathogens were S Typhimurium (n=154, 49·8%), Salmonella enteritidis (n=21, 6·8%), vaccinia virus (n=13, 4·2%), Brucella spp (n=12, 3·9%), and Brucella melitensis (n=11, 3·6%). 16 APELS were reported, including those for Bacillus anthracis, SARS-CoV, and poliovirus (n=3 each, 18·8%); Brucella spp and foot and mouth disease virus (n=2 each, 12·5%); and variola virus, Burkholderia pseudomallei, and influenza virus H5N1 (n=1 each, 6·3%). Continual improvement in LAI and APELS management via their root cause analysis and thorough investigation of such incidents is essential to prevent future occurrences. The results are biased due to the reliance on publicly available information, which emphasises the need for formalised global LAIs and APELS reporting to better understand the frequency of and circumstances surrounding these incidents.

2 July 2025 in The Lancet Microbe
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SDSandhya Dhawan
Sandhya Dhawan
AMAtalay G Muluneh
Atalay G Muluneh
Wirichada PanngumWirichada Panngum
Wirichada Panngum
RMRaina MacIntyre
Raina MacIntyre
KSKatharina Summermatter
Katharina Summermatter
Stuart D BlacksellStuart D Blacksell
Stuart D Blacksell
Laboratory-acquired infections and accidental pathogen escapes from laboratory settings pose biosafety risks, affecting laboratory personnel, the scientific community, the general public, animal populations, and the environment. This systematic review compares reports of laboratory-acquired infections and accidental pathogen escapes from laboratory settings in research and clinical laboratories between 2000 and 2024, identifying key risk factors. A total of 250 reports documenting 712 human cases of laboratory-acquired infections were analysed. Research laboratories reported 276 infections and eight fatalities, whereas clinical laboratories accounted for 227 infections and five deaths. Needlestick injuries and ineffective use of personal protective equipment or containment measures were major risk factors in both settings. Research laboratories frequently reported inadequate decontamination techniques, whereas improper sample handling techniques often occurred in clinical laboratories. Given that most causes of laboratory-acquired infections are unknown or under-reported, these data can inform coordinated efforts to strengthen biosafety oversight, incident reporting, and risk management to reduce biosafety lapses and ensure long-term laboratory operations.

2 January 2026 in Epidemiology and Infection
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SDSandhya Dhawan
Sandhya Dhawan
WPWirichada Pan-Ngum
Wirichada Pan-Ngum
CMChandini Raina MacIntyre
Chandini Raina MacIntyre
Stuart D BlacksellStuart D Blacksell
Stuart D Blacksell
Accidental escapes of pathogens from laboratories continue to cause outbreaks in the community today, posing significant risks to the general public, animal communities and the environment. These incidents, as well as the uncertainties surrounding the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, highlight the need to consider unnatural origins as part of emerging outbreak surveillance and detection. Identifying recurring patterns and distinctive factors of laboratory-associated disease outbreaks can aid in successfully preventing and mitigating these occurrences. Seventy incidents of laboratory-associated leaks that led to outbreaks in the wider public have been reported (Supplementary Appendix S1). Seven renowned cases that have been comprehensively studied were selected for review: (i) 1955 Polio vaccine incident in western USA, (ii) 1977 H1N1 influenza virus re-emergence in China and the Soviet Union, (iii) 1979 Anthrax release in Sverdlovsk, Soviet Union, (iv) 1995 Venezuelan equine encephalitis epidemics in Venezuela and Colombia, (v) 2003–4 SARS-CoV-1 escapes from Singapore, Taiwan and China, (vi) 2007 Foot-and-Mouth disease virus outbreak in Pirbright, England and (vii) 2019 Brucella leak in Lanzhou, China. These outbreaks were selected because data on their geographical spread, genetics, phylogeny, epidemiological factors (including attack rates, infectious dose, time, location and season of spread) and governmental and institutional responses to the incidents had been previously analysed and published. Thematic analysis of these lines of evidence revealed seven recurring insights described in historically confirmed laboratory-associated outbreaks: unusual strain characteristics, peculiar clinical manifestations or affected demographics, unusual geographical features, atypical epidemiological patterns, delayed government action and communication to the public, misinformation and disinformation spread to the public and biosafety concerns/incidents predating the event. The outbreaks exhibited between 13 and 19 retrospectively identified indicators. These indicators were used to develop preliminary risk criteria intended to support structured, hypothesis-generating assessment of outbreaks, rather than to establish origin.

10 April 2024 in PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SDSandhya Dhawan
Sandhya Dhawan
SDSabine Dittrich
Sabine Dittrich
SASonia Arafah
Sonia Arafah
SOStefano Ongarello
Stefano Ongarello
AMAurelian Mace
Aurelian Mace
Stuart D BlacksellStuart D Blacksell
Stuart D Blacksell
Background: Fever is the most frequent symptom in patients seeking care in South and Southeast Asia. The introduction of rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) for malaria continues to drive patient management and care. Malaria-negative cases are commonly treated with antibiotics without confirmation of bacteraemia. Conventional laboratory tests for differential diagnosis require skilled staff and appropriate access to healthcare facilities. In addition, introducing single-disease RDTs instead of conventional laboratory tests remains costly. To overcome some of the delivery challenges of multiple separate tests, a multiplexed RDT with the capacity to diagnose a diverse range of tropical fevers would be a cost-effective solution. In this study, a multiplex lateral flow immunoassay (DPP Fever Panel II Assay) that can detect serum immunoglobulin M (IgM) and specific microbial antigens of common fever agents in Asia (Orientia tsutsugamushi,Rickettsia typhi,Leptospira spp.,Burkholderia pseudomallei, Dengue virus, Chikungunya virus, and Zika virus), was evaluated.Methodology/Principal findings: Whole blood (WB) and serum samples from 300 patients with undefined febrile illness (UFI) recruited in Vientiane, Laos PDR were tested using the DPP Fever Panel II, which consists of an Antibody panel and Antigen panel. To compare reader performance, results were recorded using two DPP readers, DPP Micro Reader (Micro Reader 1) and DPP Micro Reader Next Generation (Micro Reader 2). WB and serum samples were run on the same fever panel and read on both micro readers in order to compare results. ROC analysis and equal variance analysis were performed to inform the diagnostic validity of the test compared against the respective reference standards of each fever agent (S1 Table). Overall better AUC values were observed in whole blood results. No significant difference in AUC performance was observed when comparing whole blood and serum sample testing, except for when testing forR.typhiIgM (p = 0.04),LeptospiraIgM (p = 0.02), and Dengue IgG (p = 0.03). Linear regression depicted R2values had ~70% agreement across WB and serum samples, except when testing for leptospirosis and Zika, where the R2values were 0.37 and 0.47, respectively. No significant difference was observed between the performance of Micro Reader 1 and Micro Reader 2, except when testing for the following pathogens: Zika IgM, Zika IgG, andB pseudomalleiCPS Ag.Conclusions/Significance: These results demonstrate that the diagnostic accuracy of the DPP Fever Panel II is comparable to that of commonly used RDTs. The optimal cut-off would depend on the use of the test and the desired sensitivity and specificity. Further studies are required to authenticate the use of these cut-offs in other endemic regions. This multiplex RDT offers diagnostic benefits in areas with limited access to healthcare and has the potential to improve field testing capacities. This could improve tropical fever management and reduce the public health burden in endemic low-resource areas.

25 May 2026 in Journal of Infection
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SDSandhya Dhawan
Sandhya Dhawan
PLPoh Lian Lim
Poh Lian Lim
Wirichada PanngumWirichada Panngum
Wirichada Panngum
RMRaina MacIntyre
Raina MacIntyre
Stuart D BlacksellStuart D Blacksell
Stuart D Blacksell
To identify biological, operational, and contextual risk factors associated with fatal and outbreak outcomes following accidental laboratory-associated incidents worldwide. We analysed 1126 laboratory-associated incidents reported globally between 1900 and 2025, including laboratory-acquired infections, personnel exposures, and accidental pathogen releases. Fatality and laboratory-associated outbreak (≥5 cases) were modelled separately. Multivariate logistic regression, classification and regression tree, and random forest models assessed associations across pathogen, personnel, procedural, facility, and regional variables. Performance was evaluated using stratified 5-fold cross-validation. Eighty-one fatalities (7.2%) and 148 outbreaks (13.1%) were identified. Fatal outcomes were strongly associated with pathogen risk group and class, particularly prions (OR 189.9) and RG4 pathogens (OR 32.4). Inadequate inactivation and leaks in wastewater or aerosols contributed to both outcomes. Personnel type was influential: microbiologists and technicians were more often associated with fatalities, whereas clinicians, researchers, students, and routine laboratory workers were more often associated with outbreaks. Higher containment facilities were protective in regression models. Random forest showed the strongest discrimination (AUCs of 0.814 for death and 0.799 for outbreak). Mortality is primarily driven by pathogen virulence, whereas outbreaks reflect operational and contextual factors. Risk assessment frameworks should address severity and transmission as distinct but complementary domains.

9 March 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
SDSandhya Dhawan
Sandhya Dhawan
PLPoh Lian Lim
Poh Lian Lim
WPWirichada Pan-Ngum
Wirichada Pan-Ngum
RMRaina MacIntyre
Raina MacIntyre
Stuart D BlacksellStuart D Blacksell
Stuart D Blacksell
Background: Accidental laboratory-associated pathogen incidents continue to cause fatalities and, at times, secondary transmission. The determinants of individual mortality and laboratory-associated outbreaks may differ. We aimed to identify biological, operational, and contextual risk factors associated with fatal and outbreak outcomes following accidental laboratory incidents worldwide.Methods: We analysed 1,126 laboratory-associated incidents reported globally between 1900 and 2025, including laboratory-acquired infections, personnel exposures, and accidental pathogen releases. Two outcomes were modelled separately: fatality and laboratory-associated outbreak (≥5 cases). Multivariate logistic regression, classification and regression tree, and random forest models assessed associations across pathogen, personnel, procedural, facility, and regional variables. Performance was evaluated using stratified 5-fold cross-validation.Findings: Eighty-one fatalities (7.2%) and 148 outbreaks (13.1%) were identified. Fatal outcomes were strongly associated with pathogen risk group and class, particularly prions (OR 189.9) and RG4 pathogens (OR 32.4). Inadequate inactivation and wastewater or aerosol leaks contributed to both outcomes. Personnel type was influential: microbiologists and technicians were more associated with fatalities, whereas clinicians, researchers, students, and routine laboratory workers were linked to outbreaks. Higher containment facilities were protective in regression models, though operational and contextual factors remained important. Random forest showed the strongest discrimination (AUC 0.814 for death; 0.799 for outbreak).Interpretation: Mortality is primarily driven by pathogen virulence, whereas outbreaks reflect operational and contextual factors. Risk assessment frameworks should address severity and transmission as distinct but complementary domains.