Francesco Ferazza

Dr. Francesco Ferazza

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 January 2025 in Journal of Cybersecurity
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
FFFrancesco Ferazza
Francesco Ferazza
KMKonstantinos Mersinas
Konstantinos Mersinas
This paper examines the strategic logic of cyber attacks on maritime and naval assets, positioning them as key elements of modern hybrid warfare. During periods of intense state-on-state competition, nations increasingly use non-kinetic cyber operations in contested maritime spaces to disrupt, coerce, and project power. Through a qualitative, theory-developing case study analysis of high-profile incidents, this study identifies the strategic purpose behind these campaigns. We argue that such operations are not simply tactical disruptions but are calculated components of gray zone strategy. By applying contemporary cyber conflict theory, including the concept of “persistent engagement,” this paper demonstrates how maritime cyber operations serve as instruments for ongoing intelligence contests, signaling, and shaping the strategic environment below the threshold of armed conflict.

6 September 2024 in Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CMCosimo Melella
Cosimo Melella
FFFrancesco Ferazza
Francesco Ferazza
KMKonstantinos Mersinas
Konstantinos Mersinas
Our ongoing, descriptive study explores the intricacies of Offensive Cyber Operations (OCOs), particularly in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that began in 2022. This conflict has underscored an escalation in Russian cyber capabilities. Despite OCOs playing a role, academic research indicates a relatively limited ‘spillover effect’. Our study aims to investigate this limited spillover, focusing on the lack of collaboration among Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups associated with Russian intelligence agencies: GRU, SVR, and FSB. By analysing the operational and technical integration among these agencies, we seek to identify factors influencing cooperation. Preliminary findings suggest that internal competition and historical disparities may have hindered effective coordination in cyber operations. We posit that this lack of coordination could potentially reduce cyberattack effectiveness and increase detection likelihood. Importantly, we recognise that behavioural aspects, such as the principal-agent problem, may contribute to the barriers preventing collaboration and coordination. These behavioural factors, alongside institutional rivalries, likely play a significant role in shaping the competitive dynamics among Russian intelligence agencies. As our research progresses, we aim to explore the implications of this internal rivalry on the development of technical infrastructure for Russia-affiliated APT groups. We anticipate that our findings illuminate the reasons behind the apparent reduced effectiveness of cyberattacks in this scenario. This exploration of competitive dynamics, historical nuances, and behavioural factors within Russian intelligence agencies is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the broader cyber operations landscape. We present this paper as a work in progress, aiming to contribute to the ongoing discourse in this field.

13 April 2026 in International Journal of Information Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
FFFrancesco Ferazza
Francesco Ferazza
CMCosimo Melella
Cosimo Melella
KMKonstantinos Mersinas
Konstantinos Mersinas
RLRicardo Lugo
Ricardo Lugo
RORain Ottis
Rain Ottis
The operational effectiveness of Security Operation Centres (SOCs) is increasingly hindered as analysts are overwhelmed with low-signal alerts from heterogeneous detection systems, leading to cognitive fatigue and impairing the ability to detect complex, multi-stage intrusions like Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). To overcome the limitations of heuristic-based aggregation and the brittleness of supervised models in data-scarce environments, we present a fully unsupervised framework for the automated generation of high-level, MITRE ATT&CK-enriched meta-alerts. Our pipeline systematically integrates Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) to reconstruct coherent event sequences from noisy telemetry, Large Language Models (LLMs) for contextual summarization, and an advanced semantic clustering module based on transformer embeddings to group alerts with high contextual fidelity. The core of our contribution is a novel hybrid mapping engine that synergistically fuses a symbolic cybersecurity ontology with a BERT-based semantic classifier, demonstrably overcoming the individual weaknesses of each approach. We present a rigorous empirical evaluation using large-scale datasets from the NATO CCDCOE Crossed Swords exercise (XS), intentionally retaining their inherent noise and heterogeneity to validate the real-world applicability of our framework. Our results demonstrate that the framework achieves a significant reduction in alert triage volume while ensuring that no critical threats are dropped. Notably, our hybrid mapping engine achieves an F1-score of 87%, outperforming non-hybrid baselines. This work provides a validated blueprint for moving from reactive alert triage to proactive, context-aware threat investigation in modern SOCs.

30 June 2025 in Research Square
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
FFFrancesco Ferazza
Francesco Ferazza
KMKonstantinos Mersinas
Konstantinos Mersinas
The widespread use of Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) in maritime operations has significantly enhanced navigation safety and vessel tracking capabilities. However, AIS's inherent reliance on unsecured, publicly accessible communication channels presents substantial cybersecurity risks, including vulnerabilities to interception, spoofing, and data manipulation. This paper introduces SAFE, a novel cybersecurity threat modeling framework explicitly developed to address AIS-specific threats. SAFE systematically identifies, categorizes, and evaluates potential cybersecurity threats, enabling maritime stakeholders to prioritize vulnerabilities and apply targeted mitigation strategies effectively. By adopting SAFE, maritime organizations can substantially enhance the resilience and security of AIS-equipped vessels and shore-based maritime infrastructures.

24 November 2025 in Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
FFFrancesco Ferazza
Francesco Ferazza
KMKonstantinos Mersinas
Konstantinos Mersinas
This study examines the challenges of securing DevOps environments through a unique combination of technical framework analysis and behavioural science insights. This is a conceptual analysis based on qualitative review and coding of publicly available DevSecOps frameworks. By analysing frameworks from organisations, such as Open Web Application Security Project, Cloud Security Alliance, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the US Department of Defense, while applying behavioural economics and decision theory, the research investigates how cognitive biases affect security decision-making in DevSecOps and evaluates existing frameworks’ gaps. The analysis reveals a significant lack of mature, comprehensive, and regularly updated DevSecOps frameworks, with existing guidelines often lacking clarity, usability, or consideration of human factors. The study identifies key cognitive biases impacting security decisions and demonstrates how these are exacerbated by the absence of robust frameworks. While the research is limited by DevSecOps’ evolving nature and ongoing framework development, this limitation itself reflects the field’s nascent state and highlights opportunities to observe security practice evolution under uncertainty. Future research could empirically test how framework improvements impact decision-making in real-world DevSecOps environments.

19 February 2026 in International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
FFFrancesco Ferazza
Francesco Ferazza
KMKonstantinos Mersinas
Konstantinos Mersinas
This paper analyzes state-sponsored cyber operations by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) against the global maritime sector from 2015–2025. It moves beyond isolated technical analysis to frame these campaigns as a coherent strategic logic. Using a structured, focused comparison of three PRC-linked intrusion sets—Volt Typhoon, APT40, and Mustang Panda—this analysis assesses their operational characteristics against prominent cyber strategy theories, including capability-intensity barriers, the intelligence-contest logic, and persistent engagement. The findings demonstrate a consistent pattern of behavior across all three cases: operations are capability-intensive, espionage-forward, and prioritize secrecy over overt signaling. This contrasts with other state actors who have used disruptive signaling in the maritime domain. We argue this pattern is explained by Smeets’ capability-scarcity logic: high-capability maritime accesses are too costly to expend on peacetime signaling. This behavior aligns with PRC doctrinal concepts of "informationized warfare" which prize system-mapping and pre-positioning. The paper concludes by reframing this activity not as "cyberwar" but as a form of "new naval warfare"—a persistent, below-threshold competition for control over the core components of seapower.