Cosimo Melella

Dr. Cosimo Melella

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 August 2024 in Journal of Information Security and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ADAllard Dijk
Allard Dijk
EHEmre Halisdemir
Emre Halisdemir
CMCosimo Melella
Cosimo Melella
ASAlari Schu
Alari Schu
MPMauno Pihelgas
Mauno Pihelgas
RMRoland Meier
Roland Meier

6 September 2024 in Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CMCosimo Melella
Cosimo Melella
FFFrancesco Ferazza
Francesco Ferazza
KMKonstantinos Mersinas
Konstantinos Mersinas
Our ongoing, descriptive study explores the intricacies of Offensive Cyber Operations (OCOs), particularly in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that began in 2022. This conflict has underscored an escalation in Russian cyber capabilities. Despite OCOs playing a role, academic research indicates a relatively limited ‘spillover effect’. Our study aims to investigate this limited spillover, focusing on the lack of collaboration among Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups associated with Russian intelligence agencies: GRU, SVR, and FSB. By analysing the operational and technical integration among these agencies, we seek to identify factors influencing cooperation. Preliminary findings suggest that internal competition and historical disparities may have hindered effective coordination in cyber operations. We posit that this lack of coordination could potentially reduce cyberattack effectiveness and increase detection likelihood. Importantly, we recognise that behavioural aspects, such as the principal-agent problem, may contribute to the barriers preventing collaboration and coordination. These behavioural factors, alongside institutional rivalries, likely play a significant role in shaping the competitive dynamics among Russian intelligence agencies. As our research progresses, we aim to explore the implications of this internal rivalry on the development of technical infrastructure for Russia-affiliated APT groups. We anticipate that our findings illuminate the reasons behind the apparent reduced effectiveness of cyberattacks in this scenario. This exploration of competitive dynamics, historical nuances, and behavioural factors within Russian intelligence agencies is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the broader cyber operations landscape. We present this paper as a work in progress, aiming to contribute to the ongoing discourse in this field.

1 July 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
FFFrancesco Ferazza
Francesco Ferazza
CMCosimo Melella
Cosimo Melella
KMKonstantinos Mersinas
Konstantinos Mersinas
ACAntonio Calcara
Antonio Calcara
China and Russia are arguably NATO’s main strategic competitors and potential adversaries. Since 2017, Beijing and Moscow have conducted cyber-espionage operations against NATO members, and the two countries have also reportedly displayed more coordination in the cyber domain. These concerns have become more pressing since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, where multiple sources have shown alleged evidence of Chinese and Russian cyber-operations coordination. While it is commonly accepted that China and Russia cooperate at the strategic level in the cyber domain, this article aims at better understanding whether these two nation-states are also coordinating their affiliated cyber threat groups. We investigate this, drawing on multiple open-access data and sources. Specifically, we empirically examine the activity of three Chinese groups, Mustang Panda, Scarab and Judgment Panda, to assess the presence and degree of coordination with their Russian counterparts. Our analysis shows that, as far as the examined groups are concerned, there was no coordination between Russian and Chinese campaigns, and the latter group sometimes even targeted sensitive Russian civilian and military infrastructures.

1 November 2026 in Future Internet
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CMCosimo Melella
Cosimo Melella
ATAlejandro Arenas Tovar
Alejandro Arenas Tovar
MPManuel Díaz Pastor
Manuel Díaz Pastor
FCFederico Carvajal
Federico Carvajal
aida akbarzadehaida akbarzadeh
aida akbarzadeh
Security-testing platforms that rely on public clouds create tensions with data-protection requirements and digital-sovereignty objectives, yet existing cyber range (CR) architectures rarely address regulatory compliance by design. This paper proposes a reusable, compliance-aware CR method comprising a five-step process—gap analysis, principle selection, regulatory mapping, architectural instantiation, and principle-driven validation—together with five technology-agnostic design principles: sovereignty, ephemeral data minimisation, isolation at the infrastructure boundary, infrastructure-as-code (IaC)-driven reproducibility, and continuous monitoring. The method is instantiated as a vendor-agnostic dual-cluster Kubernetes architecture on on-premise OpenStack infrastructure: a persistent Red cluster hosts the offensive tooling (Kali Linux, OWASP ZAP) and a GitLab CI/CD runner, while an ephemeral Blue cluster hosts the target application together with its security-monitoring stack and is provisioned via Ansible at the start of each audit cycle and destroyed at its conclusion, so that target data does not persist beyond the audit window. A proof-of-concept deployment with a deliberately vulnerable web application (ten seeded flaws) exercises the lifecycle end to end. Isolation holds at the OpenStack Security Group layer; the Kubernetes NetworkPolicies are specified but not enforced by the CNI used in the prototype. A mapping of the framework’s principles to specific articles of the GDPR, Cyber Resilience Act, and NIS2 Directive identifies which obligation each architectural property supports. The mapping is not a determination of compliance.