For distributed detection in a wireless sensor network, sensors arrive at decisions about a specific event that are then sent to a central fusion center that makes global inference about the event. For such systems, the determination of the decision thresholds for local sensors is an essential task. In this paper, we study the distributed detection problem and evaluate the sensor thresholds by formulating and solving a multiobjective optimization problem, where the objectives are to minimize the probability of error and the total energy consumption of the network. The problem is investigated and solved for two types of fusion schemes: 1) parallel decision fusion and 2) serial decision fusion. The Pareto optimal solutions are obtained using two different multiobjective optimization techniques. The normal boundary intersection (NBI) method converts the multiobjective problem into a number of single objective-constrained subproblems, where each subproblem can be solved with appropriate optimization methods and nondominating sorting genetic algorithm-II (NSGA-II), which is a multiobjective evolutionary algorithm. In our simulations, NBI yielded better and evenly distributed Pareto optimal solutions in a shorter time as compared with NSGA-II. The simulation results show that, instead of only minimizing the probability of error, multiobjective optimization provides a number of design alternatives, which achieve significant energy savings at the cost of slightly increasing the best achievable decision error probability. The simulation results also show that the parallel fusion model achieves better error probability, but the serial fusion model is more efficient in terms of energy consumption.
We present a novel adversarial model for authentication systems that use gait patterns recorded by the inertial measurement unit (IMU) built into smartphones. The attack idea is inspired by and named after the concept of a dictionary attack on knowledge (PIN or password) based authentication systems. In particular, this work investigates whether it is possible to build a dictionary of IMUGait patterns and use it to launch an attack or find an imitator who can actively reproduce IMUGait patterns that match the target's IMUGait pattern. Nine physically and demographically diverse individuals walked at various levels of four predefined controllable and adaptable gait factors (speed, step length, step width, and thigh-lift), producing 178 unique IMUGait patterns. Each pattern attacked a wide variety of user authentication models. The deeper analysis of error rates (before and after the attack) challenges the belief that authentication systems based on IMUGait patterns are the most difficult to spoof; further research is needed on adversarial models and associated countermeasures.