Xiaoming Wang

Dr. Xiaoming Wang


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

2Years (2025-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 November 2025 in Symmetry
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
XWXiaoming Wang
Xiaoming Wang
MLMengxi Lei
Mengxi Lei
DWDiyuan Wang
Diyuan Wang
JCJunyi Cao
Junyi Cao
With the advent of the digital age, platform ecosystems have emerged as a crucial organizational form. Focusing on innovation-oriented platforms where collaborative innovation is paramount, this study developed a two-stage principal–agent model to examine how a platform enterprise’s value preference parameter governs collaborative outcomes. Our framework demonstrates that this parameter systematically regulates the endogenous portfolio of incentives and supervision, determining governance effectiveness and value co-creation outcomes in platform ecosystems. Further analysis revealed that as the platform enterprise deepens its understanding of an embedded enterprise’s capabilities, its governance mode spontaneously transitions from supervision-intensive to incentive-intensive, establishing a self-reinforcing cycle of value creation. These findings provide a principled basis for designing dynamic governance mechanisms and advance the platform governance literature by establishing the central role of the platform enterprise’s value preference parameter in coordinating endogenous governance instruments.

YQYao Qiu
Yao Qiu
XWXiaoming Wang
Xiaoming Wang
YMYongkai Ma
Yongkai Ma
HLHongyi Li
Hongyi Li
In the context of global e-commerce platform supply chains dominated by Alibaba and Amazon, power reconfiguration among tripartite stakeholders (platforms, manufacturers, and retailers) remains a critical yet underexplored issue in supply chain contract design. To analyze the strategic interactions between platforms, manufacturers, and retailers, as well as how platforms select the contract format within a tripartite supply chain, this study proposes a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework incorporating participation constraints to compare fixed-fee and revenue-sharing contracts. The results demonstrate that revenue-sharing contracts significantly enhance supply chain efficiency by aligning incentives across members, leading to improved pricing and sales outcomes. However, this coordination benefit comes with reduced platform dominance, as revenue-sharing inherently redistributes power toward upstream and downstream partners. The analysis reveals a nuanced contract selection framework: given the revenue sharing rate, as the additional value increases, the optimal contract shifts from the mode RR to the mode RF, and ultimately to the mode FF. Notably, manufacturers and retailers exhibit a consistent preference for revenue-sharing contracts due to their favorable profit alignment properties, regardless of the platform’s value proposition. These findings may contribute to platform operations theory by (1) proposing a dynamic participation framework for contract analysis, (2) exploring value-based thresholds for contract transitions, and (3) examining the power-balancing effects of alternative contract formats. This study offers actionable insights for platform operators seeking to balance control and cooperation in their supply chain relationships, while providing manufacturers and retailers with strategic guidance for contract negotiations in platform-mediated markets. These findings are especially relevant for large e-commerce platforms and their partners managing the complexities of contemporary digital supply chains.