In the context of global e-commerce platform supply chains dominated by Alibaba and Amazon, power reconfiguration among tripartite stakeholders (platforms, manufacturers, and retailers) remains a critical yet underexplored issue in supply chain contract design. To analyze the strategic interactions between platforms, manufacturers, and retailers, as well as how platforms select the contract format within a tripartite supply chain, this study proposes a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework incorporating participation constraints to compare fixed-fee and revenue-sharing contracts. The results demonstrate that revenue-sharing contracts significantly enhance supply chain efficiency by aligning incentives across members, leading to improved pricing and sales outcomes. However, this coordination benefit comes with reduced platform dominance, as revenue-sharing inherently redistributes power toward upstream and downstream partners. The analysis reveals a nuanced contract selection framework: given the revenue sharing rate, as the additional value increases, the optimal contract shifts from the mode RR to the mode RF, and ultimately to the mode FF. Notably, manufacturers and retailers exhibit a consistent preference for revenue-sharing contracts due to their favorable profit alignment properties, regardless of the platform’s value proposition. These findings may contribute to platform operations theory by (1) proposing a dynamic participation framework for contract analysis, (2) exploring value-based thresholds for contract transitions, and (3) examining the power-balancing effects of alternative contract formats. This study offers actionable insights for platform operators seeking to balance control and cooperation in their supply chain relationships, while providing manufacturers and retailers with strategic guidance for contract negotiations in platform-mediated markets. These findings are especially relevant for large e-commerce platforms and their partners managing the complexities of contemporary digital supply chains.
As environmental degradation intensifies, governments increasingly subsidize green manufacturing to promote sustainability. This study develops a game-theoretic model of two competing supply chains, comprising original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and both traditional and green contract manufacturers (CMs), to investigate the impacts of subsidies on green manufacturing adoption. Specifically, we construct a four-stage dynamic game model to examine the interactions among OEMs, CMs, and the government. The main findings are as follows: First, the government subsidy affects OEMs’ adoption decisions only if the production cost of green manufacturing or competition intensity is sufficiently high or if the market sensitivity to green products is relatively low. Second, the optimal subsidy level depends jointly on the production cost of green manufacturing, competition intensity, and market greenness sensitivity: when the production cost of green manufacturing is low (high), the subsidy should rise (fall) with market greenness sensitivity but fall (rise) with competition intensity. Third, while intensified competition reduces OEMs’ profits and overall supply chain performance, its impact on CMs and consumers depends on the production cost of green manufacturing; in contrast, greater consumer sensitivity to green products yields an all–win outcome for all stakeholders. These results yield important managerial implications. For policymakers, when the production costs of green manufacturing are relatively low, green subsidies should be scaled back as market competition intensifies. For manufacturers, it is critical to carefully evaluate the production costs of green manufacturing and the level of government subsidies and to strategically pursue first-mover advantages in advancing sustainable operations, thereby fostering an all-win outcome for stakeholders.
As sustainability becomes a vital concern for consumers, liquor firms are increasingly integrating sustainable culture into their brand promotion campaigns. This study examines two liquor firms’ competitive and cooperative promotion strategies of a sustainability culture via a game theoretical model. The analytical results are obtained as follows: (1) The correlation coefficient between sustainability culture and liquor products negatively affects the promotion level of sustainability culture under the cooperative promotion strategy, whereas its impact is non-monotonic under the competitive promotion strategy. (2) Under the cooperative promotion strategy, the initial disparity in sustainability cultures always positively affects the promotion level of the common sustainability culture. However, under the competitive promotion strategy, its impact is the opposite for a liquor firm with a weak sustainability culture and a liquor firm with a strong sustainability culture. (3) The necessary conditions for adopting a cooperative strategy for promoting a common sustainability culture are that the initial disparity in sustainability cultures between the two liquor firms is in a moderate range. Therefore, for managers in the liquor industry, careful assessment of the initial disparity in sustainability cultures is essential when formulating cooperative or competitive strategies. It is also crucial to recognize the nuanced role played by the correlation between sustainability culture and liquor products. Moreover, these findings offer a robust theoretical foundation for future research into the influence of sustainability culture on liquor supply chain ecosystems.