Trust is a prominent concern with the continued expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT). As new devices enter the market, device security must be a design pillar. In order to trust these devices, they must be identifiable and authenticated before they begin transmitting possible sensitive information, and given the vast number of IoT devices in the future, it may prove difficult to properly trust and authenticate these authorized devices on networks with current methods. Machine learning neural networks have the ability to uniquely identify transmitters based on their physical waveform characteristics which could be used to identify and authenticate IoT nodes in large networks with little impact to latency, providing an extra layer of security and trust. This paper presents the groundwork for performing neural network-based specific emitter identification (SEI) on resource constrained IoT devices using only raw in-phase and quadrature (IQ) streams, with protocols to secure IoT networks. As proof of concept, an existing neural network-based SEI algorithm is executed on both a resource-rich and a more resource-constrained device with low latency, demonstrating the feasibility of using such algorithms on IoT devices now and in the future.
Integration of industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) into critical infrastructures (CIs) is aiming to improve efficiency in many crucial areas. The positive benefits of IIoT are increasing the demand for devices, but without proper security design foundations, CIs may be open to many different attack vectors. This lack of IIoT device security standards is a major concern. Due to the nature of these infrastructures and impact of compromises, CI device security is an utmost concern and must be focused on during all phases of development and manufacturing as opposed to the addition of security after functional design as seen with many current IoT devices. Many of these sensors and devices have limited resources, such as low power consumption, reduced memory storage, and reduced fixed-point processing capabilities. Traditional security protocols and solutions are often not practical on these restrained devices, and there are no current standards for characterizing device security. This paper presents a candidate security level-based architecture for low power IoT-CI devices implementing modular, low power, security primitives that are shown through simulation models and embedded software implementation to create a robustly layered defense-in-depth IoT architecture. This candidate architecture will help provide a foundation for future CI-IoT device security standardization.
The Internet of Things (IoT) is growing at a rapid pace. With everyday applications and services becoming wirelessly networked, security still is a major concern. Many of these sensors and devices have limitations, such as low power consumption, reduced memory storage, and reduced fixed point processing capabilities. Therefore, it is imperative that high-performance security primitives are used to maximize the lifetime of these devices while minimally impacting memory storage and timing requirements. Previous work presented a residue number system (RNS)-based pseudorandom number generator (PRNG)-based key derivation function (KDF) (PKDF) that showed good initial energy-efficient performance for the IoT devices. This paper provides additional analysis on the PRNG-based security and draws a comparison to a current industry-standard KDF. Subsequently, embedded software implementations were performed on an MSP430 and MSP432 and compared with the transport layer security (TLS) 1.3 hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) key derivation function (HKDF); these results demonstrate substantial computational savings for the PKDF approach, while both pass the NIST randomness quality tests. Finally, hardware translation for the PKDF is evaluated through the Mathworks' HDL Coder toolchain and mapping for throughput and die area approximation on an Intel ® Arria 10 FPGA.
The rapid growth of Internet-connected devices integrating into our everyday lives has no end in sight. As more devices and sensor networks are manufactured, security tends to be a low priority. However, the security of these devices is critical, and many current research topics are looking at the composition of simpler techniques to increase overall security in these low-power commercial devices. Transmission security (TRANSEC) methods are one option for physical-layer security and are a critical area of research with the increasing reliance on the Internet of Things (IoT); most such devices use standard low-power Time-division multiple access (TDMA) or frequency-division multiple access (FDMA) protocols susceptible to reverse engineering. This paper provides a hardware validation of previously proposed techniques for the intentional injection of noise into the phase mapping process of a spread spectrum signal used within a receiver-assigned code division multiple access (RA-CDMA) framework, which decreases an eavesdropper’s ability to directly observe the true phase and reverse engineer the associated PRNG output or key and thus the spreading sequence, even at high SNRs. This technique trades a conscious reduction in signal correlation processing for enhanced obfuscation, with a slight hardware resource utilization increase of less than 2% of Adaptive Logic Modules (ALMs), solidifying this work as a low-power technique. This paper presents the candidate method, quantifies the expected performance impact, and incorporates a hardware-based validation on field-programmable gate array (FPGA) platforms using arbitrary-phase phase-shift keying (PSK)-based spread spectrum signals.