Wenjie Xiong

Wenjie Xiong

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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4 August 2016
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
WXWenjie Xiong
Wenjie Xiong
ASAndré Schaller
André Schaller
Nikolaos Athanasios AnagnostopoulosNikolaos Athanasios Anagnostopoulos
Nikolaos Athanasios Anagnostopoulos
MSMuhammad Umair Saleem
Muhammad Umair Saleem
SGSebastian Gabmeyer
Sebastian Gabmeyer
JSJakub Szefer
Jakub Szefer

6 April 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ASAndré Schaller
André Schaller
WXWenjie Xiong
Wenjie Xiong
Nikolaos Athanasios AnagnostopoulosNikolaos Athanasios Anagnostopoulos
Nikolaos Athanasios Anagnostopoulos
MSMuhammad Umair Saleem
Muhammad Umair Saleem
SGSebastian Gabmeyer
Sebastian Gabmeyer
JSJakub Szefer
Jakub Szefer
A Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) is a unique and stable physical characteristic of a piece of hardware, which emerges due to variations in the hardware fabrication processes. Prior works have demonstrated that PUFs are a promising cryptographic primitive that can enable secure key storage, hardware-based device authentication and identification. So far, most PUF constructions have required an addition of new hardware or an FPGA implementation for their operation. Recently, intrinsic PUFs, which can be found in commodity devices, have been investigated. Unfortunately, most of them suffer from the drawback that they can only be accessed at boot time. This paper focuses on a new class of run-time accessible, decay-based, intrinsic DRAM PUFs in commercial off-the-shelf systems, which requires no additional hardware or FPGAs. In order to enable secure key storage using DRAM PUFs, this work presents a new Helper Data System (HDS) specifically tailored to the properties of the decay process inherent to DRAM cells. The decay-based DRAM PUF and the new HDS are evaluated on commodity off-the-shelf devices to demonstrate their practicality. Furthermore, a novel lightweight protocol is presented that allows for mutual authentication.

20 November 2019 in Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
SDShuwen Deng
Shuwen Deng
WXWenjie Xiong
Wenjie Xiong
JSJakub Szefer
Jakub Szefer

16 February 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Computers
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WXWenjie Xiong
Wenjie Xiong
SKStefan Katzenbeisser
Stefan Katzenbeisser
JSJakub Szefer
Jakub Szefer
The Least-Recently Used (LRU) cache replacement policy and its variants are widely deployed in modern processors. This article shows in detail that the LRU states of caches can be used to leak information: any access to a cache by a sender will modify the LRU state, and the receiver is able to observe this through a timing measurement. This article presents LRU timing-based channels both when the sender and the receiver have access to shared memory, e.g., shared library, and when they are separate processes without shared memory. In addition, the new LRU timing-based channels are demonstrated on both Intel and AMD processors in scenarios where the sender and the receiver are sharing the cache in both hyper-threaded setting and time-sliced setting. The transmission rates of the LRU channels can be up to 600 Kbps per cache set in the hyper-threaded setting. Different from the majority of existing cache channels which require the sender to trigger cache misses, the new LRU channels work with the sender only having cache hits, making the channel faster and stealthier. This article further discusses the effectiveness of the new LRU channels against a number of secure cache designs. Especially, the LRU channels are demonstrated to work against two representative secure caches, Partition-Locked (PL) cache and Random Fill (RF) cache, in the gem5 simulator, showing possible vulnerabilities in the secure cache designs in which the security of the replacement state is not protected properly.

30 June 2018 in Cryptography
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Nikolaos Athanasios AnagnostopoulosNikolaos Athanasios Anagnostopoulos
Nikolaos Athanasios Anagnostopoulos
Tolga ArulTolga Arul
Tolga Arul
YFYufan Fan
Yufan Fan
CHChristian Hatzfeld
Christian Hatzfeld
ASAndré Schaller
André Schaller
SKStefan Katzenbeisser
Stefan Katzenbeisser
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) based on the retention times of the cells of a Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) can be utilised for the implementation of cost-efficient and lightweight cryptographic protocols. However, as recent work has demonstrated, the times needed in order to generate their responses may prohibit their widespread usage. To address this issue, the Row Hammer PUF has been proposed by Schaller et al., which leverages the row hammer effect in DRAM modules to reduce the retention times of their cells and, therefore, significantly speed up the generation times for the responses of PUFs based on these retention times. In this work, we extend the work of Schaller et al. by presenting a run-time accessible implementation of this PUF and by further reducing the time required for the generation of its responses. Additionally, we also provide a more thorough investigation of the effects of temperature variations on the Row Hammer PUF and briefly discuss potential statistical relationships between the cells used to implement it. As our results prove, the Row Hammer PUF could potentially provide an adequate level of security for Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) devices, if its dependency on temperature is mitigated, and, may therefore, be commercially adopted in the near future.

17 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MLMaximilian Lam
Maximilian Lam
JJJeff Johnson
Jeff Johnson
WXWenjie Xiong
Wenjie Xiong
KMKiwan Maeng
Kiwan Maeng
UGUdit Gupta
Udit Gupta
ESEdward Suh
Edward Suh
On-device machine learning (ML) inference can enable the use of private user data on user devices without revealing them to remote servers. However, a pure on-device solution to private ML inference is impractical for many applications that rely on embedding tables that are too large to be stored on-device. In particular, recommendation models typically use multiple embedding tables each on the order of 1--10 GBs of data, making them impractical to store on-device. To overcome this barrier, we propose the use of private information retrieval (PIR) to efficiently and privately retrieve embeddings from servers without sharing any private information. As off-the-shelf PIR algorithms are usually too computationally intensive to directly use for latency-sensitive inference tasks, we 1) propose novel GPU-based acceleration of PIR, and 2) co-design PIR with the downstream ML application to obtain further speedup. Our GPU acceleration strategy improves system throughput by more than 20× over an optimized CPU PIR implementation, and our PIR-ML co-design provides an over 5× additional throughput improvement at fixed model quality. Together, for various on-device ML applications such as recommendation and language modeling, our system on a single V100 GPU can serve up to 100,000 queries per second---a > 100× throughput improvement over a CPU-based baseline---while maintaining model accuracy.