Fei He

Dr. Fei He

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 September 2019 in Annals of Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
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FHFei He
Fei He
JZJun Zhuang
Jun Zhuang
NRNageswara S. V. Rao
Nageswara S. V. Rao

3 May 2018 in Sensors
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Journal Article
Open access
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NRNageswara Rao
Nageswara Rao
CMChris Ma
Chris Ma
Kjell HauskenKjell Hausken
Kjell Hausken
FHFei He
Fei He
DYDavid Yau
David Yau
Jun ZhuangJun Zhuang
Jun Zhuang
We consider infrastructures consisting of a network of systems, each composed of discrete components. The network provides the vital connectivity between the systems and hence plays a critical, asymmetric role in the infrastructure operations. The individual components of the systems can be attacked by cyber and physical means and can be appropriately reinforced to withstand these attacks. We formulate the problem of ensuring the infrastructure performance as a game between an attacker and a provider, who choose the numbers of the components of the systems and network to attack and reinforce, respectively. The costs and benefits of attacks and reinforcements are characterized using the sum-form, product-form and composite utility functions, each composed of a survival probability term and a component cost term. We present a two-level characterization of the correlations within the infrastructure: (i) the aggregate failure correlation function specifies the infrastructure failure probability given the failure of an individual system or network, and (ii) the survival probabilities of the systems and network satisfy first-order differential conditions that capture the component-level correlations using multiplier functions. We derive Nash equilibrium conditions that provide expressions for individual system survival probabilities and also the expected infrastructure capacity specified by the total number of operational components. We apply these results to derive and analyze defense strategies for distributed cloud computing infrastructures using cyber-physical models.

1 August 2013
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
FHFei He
Fei He
Jun ZhuangJun Zhuang
Jun Zhuang
NRNageswara Rao
Nageswara Rao
YMYu Tak Ma
Yu Tak Ma
DYDavid K. Y. Yau
David K. Y. Yau
We investigate the resilience of cyber physical systems by modeling the interaction between provider and attacker as a simultaneous game that incorporates cyber and physical spaces. Both the provider and attacker aim to maximize their individual utility, which is determined by a trade-off between target revenue and investment cost. The system resilience function is formulated as a power-form product of the survival probabilities of cyber and physical spaces, each with a corresponding correlation coefficient. The contest success functions based on the reinforcement and attack levels are used to estimate the survival probabilities of cyber and physical spaces. We present the provider strategies based on the Nash equilibrium of the game, and analyze the sensitivities with respect to cyber and physical correlation coefficients, target revenues and costs. The results show that these correlation coefficients affect the cyber and physical reinforcement strategies, and also provide new insights into the system resilience.

1 January 2012
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
NRNageswara Rao
Nageswara Rao
SPStephen Poole
Stephen Poole
FHFei He
Fei He
Jun ZhuangJun Zhuang
Jun Zhuang
YMYu Tak Ma
Yu Tak Ma
DYDavid K. Y. Yau
David K. Y. Yau
A cloud computing infrastructure typically consists of a number of sites that house servers and are connected to the Internet. Its operation critically depends both on cyber components, including servers and routers, and physical components, including fiber and power routes. Both types of components are subject to attacks of different kinds and frequencies, which must be accounted for the initial provisioning and subsequent operation of the infrastructure. The cyber and physical components may be individually attacked and defended, and the infrastructure is required to provide an aggregate computational capacity C. We present a game-theoretic approach for the provisioning and operation of the infrastructure under uniform cost models. We first show that the Nash Equilibrium under different formulations to be computable in polynomial time, and derive provisioning choices to ensure the capacity C with probability PS. Then, we derive conditions for reinforcing the infrastructure, and show that higher robustness levels are achieved by limiting the disclosure of information about the infrastructure.

23 July 2018 in Games
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
NRNageswara Rao
Nageswara Rao
CMChris Ma
Chris Ma
FHFei He
Fei He
DYDavid Yau
David Yau
Jun ZhuangJun Zhuang
Jun Zhuang
In certain critical infrastructures, correlations between cyber and physical components can be exploited to launch strategic attacks, so that disruptions to one component may affect others and possibly the entire infrastructure. Such correlations must be explicitly taken into account in ensuring the survival of the infrastructure. For large discrete infrastructures characterized by the number of cyber and physical components, we characterize the cyber–physical interactions at two levels: (i) the cyber–physical failure correlation function specifies the conditional survival probability of the cyber sub-infrastructure given that of the physical sub-infrastructure (both specified by their marginal probabilities), and (ii) individual survival probabilities of both sub-infrastructures are characterized by first-order differential conditions expressed in terms of their multiplier functions. We formulate an abstract problem of ensuring the survival probability of a cyber–physical infrastructure with discrete components as a game between the provider and attacker, whose utility functions are composed of infrastructure survival probability terms and cost terms, both expressed in terms of the number of components attacked and reinforced. We derive Nash equilibrium conditions and sensitivity functions that highlight the dependence of infrastructure survival probability on cost terms, correlation functions, multiplier functions, and sub-infrastructure survival probabilities. We apply these analytical results to characterize the defense postures of simplified models of metro systems, cloud computing infrastructures, and smart power grids.