As an essential component of the internet of things, the internet of vehicles (IoV) holds broad application prospects in areas such as safe driving, intelligent transportation, and service reservations. Due to the security and privacy requirements, anonymous authentication schemes are widely used in IoV. However, traditional certificate‐based anonymous authentication schemes suffer from several drawbacks such as poor scalability and high management costs of certificates. Furthermore, centralized authentication architectures are susceptible to a single point of failure. To this end, we propose a blockchain‐based certificateless anonymous cross‐domain authentication (BCACA) scheme for IoV. In this scheme, we adapt a network model with multiple domain managers (DMs) based on blockchain, in which DMs establish distributed trust within the network and act as miners to upload vehicle registration and authentication transactions to the blockchain, assisting in cross‐domain authentication. Based on this framework, a certificateless signature scheme is designed, which supports authentication across different domains without the need for complex certificate exchange mechanisms. In addition, this scheme provides an identity revocation mechanism encompassing both intradomain and cross‐domain scenarios to ensure the security and reliability of the IoV. Security proofs demonstrate that the scheme is provably secure under the random oracle model and exhibits strong resistance against known attacks. Performance analysis indicates that the proposed scheme has lower computational overhead and transmission delay compared to other relevant schemes.

The Internet of Vehicles (IoVs) uses vehicles as the main carrier to communicate with other entities, promoting efficient transmission and sharing of traffic data. Using real identities for communication may leak private data, so pseudonyms are commonly used as identity credentials. However, existing anonymous authentication schemes have limitations, including large vehicle storage demands, information redundancy, time-dependent pseudonym updates, and public–private key updates coupled with pseudonym changes. To address these issues, we propose a certificateless strong anonymous privacy protection authentication scheme that allows vehicles to autonomously generate and dynamically update pseudonyms. Additionally, the trusted authority transmits each entity’s partial private key via a session key, eliminating reliance on secure channels during transmission. Based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, the scheme’s existential unforgeability is proven in the random oracle model. Performance analysis shows that it outperforms existing schemes in computational cost and communication overhead, with the total computational cost reduced by 70.29–91.18% and communication overhead reduced by 27.75–82.55%, making it more suitable for privacy-sensitive and delay-critical IoV environments.