Jing Ge

Dr. Jing Ge


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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9 July 2026 in Nonprofit Policy Forum
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
YZYingjie Zhao
Yingjie Zhao
JGJing Ge
Jing Ge
With an increasingly polycentric humanitarian system, the growing visibility of Chinese humanitarian NGOs in Africa is often reduced to narratives of “aid export” or “soft power”. This study argues instead that their engagement is best understood as a development-prioritizing modality of crisis intervention: it embeds emergency assistance within longer-horizon agendas of capacity building, livelihood restoration, and the provision of foundational public goods, thereby redrawing the practical boundary of the humanitarian–development nexus and sustaining operational legitimacy through boundary work between host-state sovereignty claims and international norms. Methodologically, the study combines (1) continent-wide mapping of project distribution and sectoral profiles (2010–2021), (2) a systematic review of Chinese- and English-language scholarship (2015–2024), and (3) process-tracing evidence from CFPA’s “Brighter Future” intervention in the Palabek refugee settlement in northern Uganda, drawing on survey and interview materials. The findings show pronounced regional clustering and pathway dependence on existing aid and diplomatic infrastructures. At the micro level, a layered and sequenced bundle of cash transfers, agricultural support, and income-generation components can, under specific conditions, advance both livelihood improvements and refugee–host community integration, yet faces structural bottlenecks stemming from implementation delays, input quality, and weak market linkages. The study concludes by deriving implications for debates on localization, the politics of normative universality, and reform trajectories in multilateral humanitarian governance.

19 September 2014
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
YZYing Zhu
Ying Zhu
HLHong Lan
Hong Lan
David NessDavid Ness
David Ness
Ke XingKe Xing
Ke Xing
KSKris Schneider
Kris Schneider
JGJing Ge
Jing Ge

7 April 2026 in Routledge Open Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JGJing Ge
Jing Ge
The intensifying technological competition between the United States and China is redefining the global power dynamics in the realm of international politics. This competition spans critical domains, including artificial intelligence, semiconductor manufacturing, quantum computing, nanotechnology, and biomedical engineering. Both nations seek to secure a first-mover advantage in these strategic sectors driven by geopolitical and economic motives. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated global digital transformation, further amplifying the significance of technological supremacy in shaping geopolitics (O'Toole et al., 2020). The Russia-Ukraine conflict underscored the transformative impact of advanced technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and artificial intelligence on modern warfare, raising pertinent questions regarding the trajectory of technological innovation and its implications for global patterns. To explore this complex landscape, this study aims to address several key research questions. First, it examines the nature and scope of the current technological rivalry between the US and China. Second, it will apply the Power Transition Theory (PTT) to assess whether escalating dissatisfaction in this technology competition could potentially lead to broader geopolitical confrontation, including the prospect of war. Additionally, the study analyzes the role of technology alliances formed by the US and partnerships pursued by China in managing or exacerbating this rivalry. Third, it investigates whether differing national standardization systems adopted by these states pose obstacles to global tech integration and cooperation. Finally, the study explores the concept of technological decoupling, assessing whether a fundamental separation of technological ecosystems between the US and China is underway. This research seeks to deepen our understanding of how technological competition is reshaping the international order, impacting not only economic and military power but also the cultural, ideological, and diplomatic dimensions of global influence. By examining the interplay between technology and geopolitical rivalry, this study contributes to elucidating the future trajectory of US-China relations and their implications for broader international stability and security.

6 July 2026 in Routledge Open Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JGJing Ge
Jing Ge
The intensifying technological rivalry between the U.S. and China has become one of the central arenas through which contemporary power politics is being reorganized. In the existing literature, this rivalry is often viewed either as a broad contest for technological supremacy or as an early stage of full decoupling. However, this paper advances a more specific claim: the rivalry is producing selective, security-driven fragmentation of technological ecosystems rather than either imminent war or complete technological separation. The argument is developed through a qualitative structured comparison of three issue areas: advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and technical standardization. The selected cases link technological capability to national security, market power, institutional rule-making, and the distribution of international influence. The paper examines Power Transition Theory (PTT) by showing that sector-specific technological leadership cannot be mechanically translated into aggregate national power parity. China’s advances in selected technological domains increase U.S. threat perceptions and intensify the politics of restriction, but they do not by themselves establish the comprehensive parity that PTT identifies as especially dangerous. At the same time, U.S. controls on semiconductors, outbound investment, and sensitive technologies do not amount to full decoupling because both economies remain embedded in dense networks of trade, production, talent, standards, and capital. Therefore, the paper identifies a middle condition: strategic fragmentation. This condition combines continued interdependence in less sensitive areas with tighter controls in domains viewed as militarily, infrastructurally, or politically consequential. The contribution of the paper is to specify the mechanisms through which technology competition reshapes power dynamics, such as weaponized interdependence, alliance coordination, standards competition, and the conversion of technological asymmetries into political leverage. The paper concludes that a contested and uneven order in which states preserve interdependence where it is profitable while fragmenting systems where vulnerability is regarded as strategically unacceptable.