The embodied cognition hypothesis suggests that motor and premotor areas are automatically and necessarily involved in understanding action language, as word conceptual representations are embodied. This transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study explores the role of the left primary motor cortex in action-verb processing. TMS-induced motor-evoked potentials from right-hand muscles were recorded as a measure of M1 activity, while participants were asked either to judge explicitly whether a verb was action-related (semantic task) or to decide on the number of syllables in a verb (syllabic task). TMS was applied in three different experiments at 170, 350 and 500 ms post-stimulus during both tasks to identify when the enhancement of M1 activity occurred during word processing. The delays between stimulus onset and magnetic stimulation were consistent with electrophysiological studies, suggesting that word recognition can be differentiated into early (within 200 ms) and late (within 400 ms) lexical-semantic stages, and post-conceptual stages. Reaction times and accuracy were recorded to measure the extent to which the participants' linguistic performance was affected by the interference of TMS with M1 activity. No enhancement of M1 activity specific for action verbs was found at 170 and 350 ms post-stimulus, when lexical-semantic processes are presumed to occur (Experiments 1–2). When TMS was applied at 500 ms post-stimulus (Experiment 3), processing action verbs, compared with non-action verbs, increased the M1-activity in the semantic task and decreased it in the syllabic task. This effect was specific for hand-action verbs and was not observed for action-verbs related to other body parts. Neither accuracy nor RTs were affected by TMS. These findings suggest that the lexical-semantic processing of action verbs does not automatically activate the M1. This area seems to be rather involved in post-conceptual processing that follows the retrieval of motor representations, its activity being modulated (facilitated or inhibited), in a top-down manner, by the specific demand of the task.

Neuropsychological studies indicate that, after brain damage, the ability to imitate meaningful or meaningless actions can be selectively impaired. However, the neural bases supporting the imitation of these two types of action are still poorly understood. Using PET, we investigated in 10 healthy individuals the neural mechanisms of imitating novel, meaningless actions and familiar, meaningful actions. Data were analyzed using SPM99. During imitation, a significant positive correlation (p < .05, corrected) of regional cerebral blood flow with the amount of meaningful actions was observed in the left inferior temporal gyrus only. In contrast, a significant positive correlation (p < .05, corrected) with the amount of meaningless movements was observed in the right parieto-occipital junction. The direct categorical comparison of imitating meaningful (100%) relative to meaningless (100%) actions showed differential increases in neural activity (p < .001, uncorrected) in the left inferior temporal gyrus, the left parahippocampal gyrus, and the left angular gyrus. The reverse categorical comparison of imitating meaningless (100%) relative to meaningful (100%) actions revealed differential increases in neural activity (p < .001, uncorrected) in the superior parietal cortex bilaterally, in the right parieto-occipital junction, in the right occipital-temporal junction (MT, V5), and in the left superior temporal gyrus. Increased neural activity common to imitation of meaningless and meaningful actions compared to action observation was observed in a network of areas known to be involved in imitation of actions including the primary sensorimotor cortex, the supplementary motor area, and the ventral premotor cortex. These results are compatible with the two-route model of action imitation which suggests that there are at least two mechanisms involved in imitation of actions: a direct mechanism transforming a novel action into a motor output, and a semantic mechanism, on the basis of stored memories, that allows reproductions of known actions. Our results indicate that, in addition to shared neural processes, the direct and the semantic mechanisms that underlie action imitation also draw upon differential neural mechanisms. The direct mechanism underlying imitation of meaningless actions differentially involves visuospatial transformation processes as evidenced by activation of areas belonging to the dorsal stream. In contrast, imitation of meaningful actions differentially involves semantic processing as evidenced by activation of areas belonging to the ventral stream.

The aim of this study was to bring to the surface the strategic use of imitative processes in the context of a 2-route model: (a) direct imitation, used in reproducing new, meaningless actions, and (b) imitation based on stored semantic knowledge of familiar meaningful actions. Three experiments were carried out with healthy participants who reproduced meaningful and meaningless actions within an established time limit. The study investigated 3 factors that could potentially affect the selection of processes used for imitation: (a) the composition of the experimental list (blocked or mixed presentation), (b) the presence-absence of instructions (Experiments 1 and 2), and (c) the relative proportions of the stimuli (Experiment 3). Overall, the results suggest that each of these factors influences the selection of imitative strategies in healthy individuals with temporarily reduced capacities, as happens in the case of brain-damaged patients.

Despite the essential role of food in our lives, we have little understanding of the way our knowledge about food is organized in the brain. At birth, huma