The development of new venture enterprise is the result of joint efforts of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists who collaborate based on complementary resources. In this paper, we analyze a venture capital incentive contracting model in which a venture capitalist interacts with an entrepreneur who is risk neutral and fairness concerned, offering him an equity contract. We solve the venture capitalist’s maximization problem in the presence of double-sided moral hazard. Our results show that fairness concerns change the structure of the optimal contract. More importantly, we show that the solution to the contract regarding the optimal share given to the entrepreneur is nonlinear and is a fixed point between 0 and 1. Further, we simulate the model under the assumption that venture project’s revenue is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function and obtain the following results. (1) When the two efforts are complementary, the venture capitalist’s effort does not monotonically decrease in the share allocated to the entrepreneur, while the entrepreneur’s effort does not monotonically increase in his share. (2) Relative to the benchmark case where the entrepreneur is fairness neutral, the optimal equity share allocated to the fair-minded entrepreneur is larger than 1/2, and as the degree of efforts complementarity increases, the optimal equity share tends to 60%. In this scenario, for a given efforts substitution parameter, the fair-minded entrepreneur provides a higher effort level than the venture capitalist.
21 August 2021 in Mathematics and Financial Economics
Establishing a scientific ecological compensation mechanism for air pollution is crucial for air protection. This study models the ecological compensation mechanism of the Stackelberg differential game between the local regulator and an enterprise with a competitor by introducing the air quality index and the social welfare benefits of the local regulator. Using the Pontryagin maximum principle, this study obtains dynamic strategies for the local regulator and the enterprise while maximizing the benefits. The evolution of the shadow price is analyzed with the inverse differential equation method. Then, the effects of the shadow price on the optimal dynamic strategies are analyzed using numerical simulation, together with the effects of the introduction of social welfare benefits on the efforts of the local regulator to protect the air environment. The conclusions show that introducing social welfare benefits as an ecological compensation criterion for air pollution promotes air protection by the local regulator.
19 March 2025 in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
In this paper, we established a continuous-time agency model in which an ambiguity-averse venture capitalist (VC) employs an ambiguity-neutral entrepreneur (EN) to manage an innovative project. We analyzed the connection between ambiguity sharing and incentives under double moral hazard. Applying a stochastic dynamic programming approach, we solved the VC’s maximization problem and obtained the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation under a special form of the value function. We showed that the optimal pay-performance sensitivity was a fixed point of a nonlinear equation. The model ambiguity on the probability measure induced a tradeoff between ambiguity sharing and the incentive compensation that improved the EN’s pay-performance sensitivity level. Besides, we simulated the model and showed that when two efforts were complementary, the VC’s effort did not monotonically decrease with respect to the pay-performance sensitivity, while the EN’s effort did not monotonically increase in the pay-performance sensitivity level. More importantly, we found that as efforts tended to be more complementary, the optimal pay-performance sensitivity tended to approach those that maximized the efforts exerted by the EN and the VC.