LILI DING

LILI DING


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 February 2020 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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XLXinmin Liu
Xinmin Liu
KLKangkang Lin
Kangkang Lin
LWLei Wang
Lei Wang
LILI DINGLILI DING
LILI DING
In service to sustainable development, consumers have begun to prefer green products for their special environmental characteristics, and many enterprises are introducing new products to improve their competitiveness, but this tactic may not work if customers are strategic, as they might choose to defer purchasing decisions while prices are high and wait for lower prices in the future. Considering the differences in purchase behavior, we divided customers into two groups—strategic customers and myopic customers. Furthermore, we distinguished three types of strategic customers according to their different preferences to analyze the optimal pricing and greenness strategies in sustainable supply chain in strategic customer scenarios. Our results led to the following conclusions. (1) Strategic customers’ individual preferences can affect optimum equilibrium and that a higher purchase price threshold can stimulate the manufacturer to improve greenness and set a higher price, while a higher greenness purchase threshold and purchase value threshold will force manufacturer to set a lower price. (2) We observed that strategic customers can increase demand and vender profit. As the number of strategic customers increases, selling price and greenness will experience downward trends in a price threshold scenario but upward trends in greenness threshold and value threshold scenarios. (3) A firm can take measures to mitigate the effects of strategic customers by adjusting price and greenness dynamically according to price and greenness sensitivity, which can play a leading role in actively influencing strategic customer behavior.

1 January 2022 in Waste Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XZXin Zhao
Xin Zhao
HLHeng-Shuo Liu
Heng-Shuo Liu
LILI DINGLILI DING
LILI DING

22 March 2020 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LILI DINGLILI DING
LILI DING
ZZZhongchao Zhao
Zhongchao Zhao
LWLei Wang
Lei Wang
This paper theoretically explores the impact of the incentive preferences of executives (i.e., short-term incentives and long-term incentives) on corporate social responsibility (CSR) decisions (i.e., institutional CSR and technical CSR). Further, the paper presents the mechanism through which executives influence CSR activities by the pressures from financial analysts and institutional investors supervision. Using a large sample of China-listed firms over 2007–2017, we achieve some helpful empirical results. The executives with short-term incentives tend to implement technical CSR strategy, while those with long-term incentives tend to implement institutional CSR strategy. Executives with short-term incentives, compared with those with long-term incentives, show stronger inter-temporal tradeoffs behaviors in the earnings pressure context. Furthermore, dedicated institutional investors can effectively attenuate the hypocritical behaviors of executives, and the effectiveness of governance shows a positive relationship with investors’ horizon. Our findings enrich the understanding on the relationship between the executives and CSR decisions in the earnings pressure context and further helps to perfect the institutional design in China’s listed companies.


1 July 2019 in International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XZXin Zhao
Xin Zhao
HLHui Li
Hui Li
LILI DINGLILI DING
LILI DING
MLMengxi Liu
Mengxi Liu