Kangkang Lin

Mr. Kangkang Lin

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 October 2021 in Journal of Cleaner Production
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XLXinmin Liu
Xinmin Liu
KLKangkang Lin
Kangkang Lin
LWLei Wang
Lei Wang

22 February 2020 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
XLXinmin Liu
Xinmin Liu
KLKangkang Lin
Kangkang Lin
LWLei Wang
Lei Wang
LILI DINGLILI DING
LILI DING
In service to sustainable development, consumers have begun to prefer green products for their special environmental characteristics, and many enterprises are introducing new products to improve their competitiveness, but this tactic may not work if customers are strategic, as they might choose to defer purchasing decisions while prices are high and wait for lower prices in the future. Considering the differences in purchase behavior, we divided customers into two groups—strategic customers and myopic customers. Furthermore, we distinguished three types of strategic customers according to their different preferences to analyze the optimal pricing and greenness strategies in sustainable supply chain in strategic customer scenarios. Our results led to the following conclusions. (1) Strategic customers’ individual preferences can affect optimum equilibrium and that a higher purchase price threshold can stimulate the manufacturer to improve greenness and set a higher price, while a higher greenness purchase threshold and purchase value threshold will force manufacturer to set a lower price. (2) We observed that strategic customers can increase demand and vender profit. As the number of strategic customers increases, selling price and greenness will experience downward trends in a price threshold scenario but upward trends in greenness threshold and value threshold scenarios. (3) A firm can take measures to mitigate the effects of strategic customers by adjusting price and greenness dynamically according to price and greenness sensitivity, which can play a leading role in actively influencing strategic customer behavior.

26 November 2020 in Dynamic Games and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
XLXinmin Liu
Xinmin Liu
KLKangkang Lin
Kangkang Lin
LWLei Wang
Lei Wang
HZHongkun Zhang
Hongkun Zhang

16 October 2020 in Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CZChuanbo Zhang
Chuanbo Zhang
KLKangkang Lin
Kangkang Lin
LWLei Wang
Lei Wang
The process of CEO incentive and supervision, in which the special committee plays an important role, has always been a hard problem to solve in modern corporate governance. Considering the conflicts of interest between the compensation committee, audit committee, and the CEO, this paper constructed a game model of incentive and supervision within the board of directors and analysed the strategic choices of all three and the influencing mechanisms in different contexts. The results show that there is no totally stable strategy point in the system and that there are different strategy choices in different situations; the CEO’s strategy choice is influenced by both the compensation committee and the audit committee, the incentive strategy of the compensation committee will promote the CEO’s self-interested behaviour, and the supervision strategy of the audit committee is inhibitive. The function of the special committee is dependent on its initial intention and the intensity of action. In the situation of excessive incentive by the compensation committee, the strategy choice of audit committee has periodicity, and the CEO and audit committee have periodic discretionary choice game. This study provides insight into the internal governance of the board of directors, particularly special committees, which create the incentive and supervisory contracts.