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Due to the rapid popularisation and development of electronic products, recycling e-waste has become an issue which cannot be ignored. To facilitate the effective management of the recycling of e-waste, this paper constructed a tripartite Itô stochastic evolutionary game model to perform analysis of the complex game interaction between national government, local government and recyclers. Due to uncertainty in the external environment, Gaussian white noise was introduced into replicator dynamic equations, the random Taylor expansion was applied to solve the numerical approximations, certain critical values were determined so the system exhibited chaotic behaviour and numerical simulation was used to describe the dynamic evolution of tripartite. The results showed that the following: (1) The optimal evolutionary stability strategy indicated that national government should adopt positive supervision, local government should enforce environmental regulations and recyclers should choose qualified disassembly. This behavioural strategy would significantly improve the quality of e-waste recycling. (2) Enforcing environmental regulations is dependent on a subsidy-penalty coordination mechanism, whereby the subsidy is increased for qualified recyclers and there are default penalties for collusion. (3) Local government should cover more of the cost of environmental governance in order to avoid excessive costs which can decrease national government enthusiasm for positive supervision. Avoiding low costs could lead to free-riding behaviour from local government and collusion between local government and recyclers. (4) The uncertainty of the external environment impacts the decision-making of the tripartite participants. The stability of the equilibrium solution is related to the Gaussian white noise intensity and this can cause the equilibrium strategy to deviate from its original trajectory. This study will provide constructive suggestions for dual governments which will enable them to better formulate and implement environmental regulations while encouraging recyclers to participate in qualified disassembly more actively.
Xinmin Liu; Kangkang Lin; Lei Wang. Stochastic evolutionary game analysis of e-waste recycling in environmental regulation from the perspective of dual governance system. Journal of Cleaner Production 2021, 319, 128685 .
AMA StyleXinmin Liu, Kangkang Lin, Lei Wang. Stochastic evolutionary game analysis of e-waste recycling in environmental regulation from the perspective of dual governance system. Journal of Cleaner Production. 2021; 319 ():128685.
Chicago/Turabian StyleXinmin Liu; Kangkang Lin; Lei Wang. 2021. "Stochastic evolutionary game analysis of e-waste recycling in environmental regulation from the perspective of dual governance system." Journal of Cleaner Production 319, no. : 128685.
Focusing on the problem of CEO incentive and supervision, this paper constructs a three-party stochastic evolutionary game model of the CEO, compensation committee and audit committee, and analyzes the boundary conditions of the stability based on stochastic replicator dynamics equations. In addition, it carries out the numerical approximations with Taylor expansion and \(It{\hat{o}}\)-type stochastic differential equation, and further analyzes the influence of key variables on the direction and convergence rate of game players' strategy choice. The results show that: (1) The probability that the CEO takes self-interested behavior falls faster and the probability that audit committee adopts supervisory strategy rises faster when the self-interested behavior of the CEO gets larger. (2) The audit committee has a fast convergence rate, and arrives earlier in the neighborhood of the stochastically stable state where the incentive coefficient adopted by the compensation committee is larger. (3) The increase in supervision intensity increases the convergence rate of the CEO, but decreases the convergence rate of the compensation committee. (4) According to a comparative analysis of noise intensity, the influence of random interference on the decision-making of the audit committee is more volatile.
Xinmin Liu; Kangkang Lin; Lei Wang; Hongkun Zhang. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis Between Special Committees and CEO: Incentive and Supervision. Dynamic Games and Applications 2020, 1 -18.
AMA StyleXinmin Liu, Kangkang Lin, Lei Wang, Hongkun Zhang. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis Between Special Committees and CEO: Incentive and Supervision. Dynamic Games and Applications. 2020; ():1-18.
Chicago/Turabian StyleXinmin Liu; Kangkang Lin; Lei Wang; Hongkun Zhang. 2020. "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis Between Special Committees and CEO: Incentive and Supervision." Dynamic Games and Applications , no. : 1-18.
The process of CEO incentive and supervision, in which the special committee plays an important role, has always been a hard problem to solve in modern corporate governance. Considering the conflicts of interest between the compensation committee, audit committee, and the CEO, this paper constructed a game model of incentive and supervision within the board of directors and analysed the strategic choices of all three and the influencing mechanisms in different contexts. The results show that there is no totally stable strategy point in the system and that there are different strategy choices in different situations; the CEO’s strategy choice is influenced by both the compensation committee and the audit committee, the incentive strategy of the compensation committee will promote the CEO’s self-interested behaviour, and the supervision strategy of the audit committee is inhibitive. The function of the special committee is dependent on its initial intention and the intensity of action. In the situation of excessive incentive by the compensation committee, the strategy choice of audit committee has periodicity, and the CEO and audit committee have periodic discretionary choice game. This study provides insight into the internal governance of the board of directors, particularly special committees, which create the incentive and supervisory contracts.
Chuanbo Zhang; Kangkang Lin; Lei Wang. Incentive and Supervisory Contract between Special Committees and CEO Based on the Evolutionary Game Model. Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2020, 2020, 1 -17.
AMA StyleChuanbo Zhang, Kangkang Lin, Lei Wang. Incentive and Supervisory Contract between Special Committees and CEO Based on the Evolutionary Game Model. Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 2020; 2020 ():1-17.
Chicago/Turabian StyleChuanbo Zhang; Kangkang Lin; Lei Wang. 2020. "Incentive and Supervisory Contract between Special Committees and CEO Based on the Evolutionary Game Model." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2020, no. : 1-17.
In service to sustainable development, consumers have begun to prefer green products for their special environmental characteristics, and many enterprises are introducing new products to improve their competitiveness, but this tactic may not work if customers are strategic, as they might choose to defer purchasing decisions while prices are high and wait for lower prices in the future. Considering the differences in purchase behavior, we divided customers into two groups—strategic customers and myopic customers. Furthermore, we distinguished three types of strategic customers according to their different preferences to analyze the optimal pricing and greenness strategies in sustainable supply chain in strategic customer scenarios. Our results led to the following conclusions. (1) Strategic customers’ individual preferences can affect optimum equilibrium and that a higher purchase price threshold can stimulate the manufacturer to improve greenness and set a higher price, while a higher greenness purchase threshold and purchase value threshold will force manufacturer to set a lower price. (2) We observed that strategic customers can increase demand and vender profit. As the number of strategic customers increases, selling price and greenness will experience downward trends in a price threshold scenario but upward trends in greenness threshold and value threshold scenarios. (3) A firm can take measures to mitigate the effects of strategic customers by adjusting price and greenness dynamically according to price and greenness sensitivity, which can play a leading role in actively influencing strategic customer behavior.
Xinmin Liu; Kangkang Lin; Lei Wang; Lili Ding. Pricing Decisions for a Sustainable Supply Chain in the Presence of Potential Strategic Customers. Sustainability 2020, 12, 1655 .
AMA StyleXinmin Liu, Kangkang Lin, Lei Wang, Lili Ding. Pricing Decisions for a Sustainable Supply Chain in the Presence of Potential Strategic Customers. Sustainability. 2020; 12 (4):1655.
Chicago/Turabian StyleXinmin Liu; Kangkang Lin; Lei Wang; Lili Ding. 2020. "Pricing Decisions for a Sustainable Supply Chain in the Presence of Potential Strategic Customers." Sustainability 12, no. 4: 1655.