We consider difference and differential Stackelberg game theoretic models with several followers of opinion control in marketing networks. It is assumed that in the stage of analysis of the network its opinion leaders have already been found and are the only objects of control. The leading player determines the marketing budgets of the followers by resource allocation. In the basic version of the models both the leader and the followers maximize the summary opinions of the network agents. In the second version the leader has a target value of the summary opinion. In all four models we have found the Stackelberg equilibrium and the respective payoffs of the players analytically. It is shown that the hierarchical control system is ideally compatible in all cases.
The problems of social networks analysis and calculation of the resulting opinions of network agents are considered. Algorithms for identifying strong subgroups and satellites as well as for calculating some quantitative characteristics of a network are implemented by the R programming language and tested on model examples. A new algorithm for calculating the resulting opinions of agents is developed by the R toolkit and tested on model examples. It is important that control actions that exert impact to the opinions should be applied exclusively to the members of strong subgroups (opinion leaders of a target audience), since they fully determine the stable resulting opinions of all network members. This approach allows saving control resources without significantly affecting its efficiency. Much attention is paid to the original models of optimal control (single subject) and conflict control (several competing subjects) under the assumption that the members of strong subgroups (opinion leaders) are already identified at the previous stage of network analysis. Models of optimal opinion control on networks are constructed and investigated by computer simulations using the author’s method of qualitatively representative scenarios. Differential game-based models of opinion control on networks with budget constraints in the form of equalities and inequalities are constructed and analytically investigated. All used notions, approaches and results of this paper are interpreted in terms of marketing problems.
Coopetition means that in economic interactions, both competition and cooperation are presented in the same time. We built and investigated analytically and numerically game theoretic models of coopetition in normal form and in the form of characteristic function. The basic model in normal form reflects competition between firms in Cournot oligopoly and their cooperation in mutually profitable activities such as marketing, R&D, and environmental protection. Each firm divides its resource between competition and cooperation. In the model in normal form we study Nash and Stackelberg settings and compare the results. In cooperative setting we consider Neumann–Morgenstern, Petrosyan–Zaccour, and Gromova–Petrosyan versions of characteristic functions and calculate the respective Shapley values. The payoffs in all cases are compared, and the respective conclusions about the relative efficiency of different ways of organization for separate agents and the whole society are made.
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria and cooperative solutions for dynamic game-theoretic Cournot oligopoly models in normal form with inhomogeneous agents are found analytically. Cooperative game-theoretic Cournot oligopoly models of three persons in the form of the von Neumann–Morgenstern and Gromova–Petrosyan characteristic functions are studied, including the calculation of the Shapley vector. A comparative analysis of the payoffs of agents, according to the solutions obtained, is carried out for games in normal form and in the form of a characteristic function.
Stochastic parameters are introduced into a model of network games with production and knowledge externalities. The model was formulated by V. Matveenko and A. Korolev and generalizes Romer’s two-period model. The agents’ productivities have both deterministic and Wiener components. The research represents the dynamics of a single agent and the dynamics in a triangle that occurs in the process of combining the agents. Explicit expressions for the dynamics of a single agent and dyad agents are obtained in the form of Brownian random processes. Solutions of stochastic equations and systems are analyzed qualitatively.