On account of the recent advances in quantum computers, it becomes pressing to consider quantum-safe authentication schemes for two-way communications in neighborhood area networks of smart grid, i.e., preventing possible attacks that the quantum computers could bring to the grid. In this paper, we take a further step toward this goal by integrating the lattice based public-key encryption and key exchange techniques to provide mutual authentication between smart meters and the neighborhood gateway. Security analysis shows that our proposed scheme is secure under attacks from both quantum and conventional computers, including the recently introduced key reuse attacks. In addition, the proposed schemes can also achieve forward security, which guarantees that the secrets leaked in the current session will not result in the leakage of secrets in former sessions. Furthermore, the proposed scheme also gives prior consideration to the smart meters with limited computation capacity and puts as less burden on them as possible. Extensive performance analysis is also conducted, and the results demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed scheme, as well as the relatively low communication and storage costs.
We present the first secure multiplicative aggregation protocol as a variant of secure aggregation. In this case, a server can compute the component-wise product of the input vectors of users while handling the possible dropout of users during protocol execution. Using pairwise masks, threshold secret sharing and the secure aggregation protocol itself, our construction is correct and secure against semi-honest adversaries. We also consider secure aggregation protocols for the case in which fixed users can reuse their private keys to do aggregation many times, and we propose key reusable secure aggregation protocols. Our protocols have an overhead polynomial in the number of users. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of our proposed protocols. For multiplicative aggregation protocol, experiments varying the number of users (K) from 50 to 300 (with fixed input size KB) demonstrate that user computation scales monotonically with K and is largely insensitive to dropout rates. In contrast, server computation is highly dropout-sensitive and exhibits a steeper growth rate with respect to K. When varying the input size (10–250 KB) with a fixed K, both user and server communication overheads increase linearly, while server computation remains the primary bottleneck affected by dropouts. We compare reusable and non-reusable secure aggregation protocol over repeated interactions at KB and , showing that reusing Round 1 reduces the cumulative user computation time by about 2.5 times and reduces the cumulative server computation overhead by about 1.2 times at while leaving the server communication overhead nearly unchanged, which indicates that the overall communication overhead is dominated by the non-reused rounds.
While tremendous progress has been made towards achieving highly efficient and practical Private Set Intersection (PSI) protocols during the last decade, the development of post-quantum PSI is still far from satisfactory. Existing post-quantum PSI protocols encounter a dilemma: while those based on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) achieve low online communication, they suffer from significant online computation; conversely, protocols based on post-quantum Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) exhibit excellent online computational performance but incur substantially high online communication. To overcome this dilemma, we present a lattice-based PSI protocol that achieves optimal online performance in both communication and computation. Our solution introduces two core innovations: a robust signal comparison algorithm based on RLWE key exchange, which determines the intersection through signal consistency rather than direct shared key comparison, and an optimized Oblivious Key–Value Stores (OKVS) implementation featuring a composite key–value mapping for efficient handling of high-dimensional RLWE polynomials. We implement the protocol and conduct extensive benchmarks in both symmetric and asymmetric set-size settings. The results show that our construction achieves the lowest online overhead in both computation and communication among all tests. For example, with asymmetric set sizes , the online phase requires only s, yielding and improvements over FHE-based (CCS’21) and OPRF-based (EUROCRYPT’25) protocols, respectively. Even at , our online communication time is only 0.201 s, which is and that of FHE-based and OPRF-based PSI, respectively. Additionally, our online communication overhead is the lowest in all tests; however, this comes at the cost of heavy offline communication overhead for very large set sizes, revealing a clear trade-off between pre-computation and online efficiency. This work addresses a critical gap in post-quantum PSI by delivering a protocol that achieves balanced online communication and computational overhead, thereby enabling broader practical deployment.
In this study, we propose a novel post‐quantum private set intersection (PSI) protocol based on the ring learning with errors (RLWE) assumption. Different from existing PSI protocols based on post‐quantum oblivious pseudorandom functions (EUROCRYPT’25) and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) (CCS’21), our construction follows the Diffie–Hellman (DH)‐based PSI paradigm and uses post‐quantum key exchange to achieve PSI functionality. Our key technique is a signal matching (SigMa) mechanism, which determines whether two items match by checking the consistency of the reconciliation signals derived from their corresponding shared keys. The resulting PSI protocol completes in three rounds. In the first two rounds, the parties exchange RLWE‐based public keys associated with their items; in the third round, the sender transmits the corresponding signals. The receiver then applies SigMa to compare the received signals with its locally computed signals and thereby identify the intersection. We implement our protocol and compare it with Cong et al. (CCS’21) and Heimberger et al. (EUROCRYPT’25). Our protocol achieves the lowest online communication across all evaluated symmetric and asymmetric set‐size configurations, at the cost of additional offline communication. It also achieves the lowest online and total times among the evaluated protocols for all symmetric settings with | X | = | Y | ∈ {2 12 , 2 16 , 2 20 } and all asymmetric settings with | X | ∈ {2 12 , 2 16 , 2 20 } and | Y | ∈ {5535, 11041}. We believe that our work not only supplements existing post‐quantum PSI frameworks but also opens the opportunity for broader applications of post‐quantum PSI.