Lu Dong

Dr. Lu Dong

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2019 in Games and Economic Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LDLu Dong
Lu Dong
RFRod Falvey
Rod Falvey
Shravan LuckrazShravan Luckraz
Shravan Luckraz

21 June 2017 in Theory and Decision
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LDLu Dong
Lu Dong
MMMaria Montero
Maria Montero
APAlex Possajennikov
Alex Possajennikov
We investigate the limits of communication and leadership in avoiding coordination failure in minimum effort games. Our environment is challenging, with low benefits of coordination relative to the effort cost. We consider two leader types: cheap-talk leader-communicators who suggest an effort level, and first-mover leaders who lead by example. Both types of leadership have some ability to increase effort in groups with no history, but are insufficient in groups with a history of low effort. Using the strategy method for followers’ responses, we attribute the persistence of coordination failure to the presence of followers who do not follow the leader.

6 September 2018 in Games
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LDLu Dong
Lu Dong
LHLingbo Huang
Lingbo Huang
We experimentally study how people resolve a tension between favoritism and fairness when allocating a profit in a team production setting. Past research shows that people tend to favor their ingroup at the cost of an outgroup when allocating a given amount of money. However, when the money to be allocated depends on joint production, we find that most players allocate proportionally according to others’ relative contributions, irrespective of their social identity affiliations. We discuss the implications of our findings on how distributive norms could shape team cooperation.

20 March 2026 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
EMEugene Malthouse
Eugene Malthouse
CPCharlie Pilgrim
Charlie Pilgrim
DSDaniel Sgroi
Daniel Sgroi
MAMichela Accerenzi
Michela Accerenzi
AAAntonio Alfonso
Antonio Alfonso
THThomas Trenholm Hills
Thomas Trenholm Hills
Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved in these problems are generally considered to have two options: contribute toward public solutions such as global warming mitigation or free ride. However, many collective action problems today involve a third option of investing in a “private solution” such as local adaptation. The availability of this third option can lead to a private solution trap whereby private solutions are adopted, collectively optimal public solutions are not provided, and existing inequalities are exacerbated. We investigated the private solution trap with a collective action game featuring private and public solutions, wealth inequality determined by luck or merit, and participants from 34 countries. We found that the joint existence of private solutions and wealth inequality had a consistent effect across countries: Participants given a higher endowment adopted private solutions almost twice as often as those given a lower endowment, regardless of whether it was determined by luck or merit, and contributed proportionally less toward public solutions. Wealth inequality increased in every country and those given lower endowments were often left unprotected as public solutions were not provided. Across countries, cultural values of hierarchy and harmony were associated with preferences for private and public solutions, respectively. We also identified two universal pathways toward public solution provision: early contributions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the private solution trap, its cultural underpinnings, and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.

30 September 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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Preprint
Open access
HCHuan Cai
Huan Cai
LDLu Dong
Lu Dong
JXJian Xie
Jian Xie
This paper examines gender disparities in parenting in the digital domain, using a novel dataset that records the gender composition of users across more than 6,000 app-level observations in China. Two patterns stand out. First, parenting apps are strongly feminized: women account for nearly two-thirds of both users and usage time, compared with fewer than half among non-parenting apps on average. Second, the female share is highest in cities where women enjoy greater income and educational attainment, and lowest in areas marked by more entrenched gender inequality. The women most engaged in digital caregiving are therefore those best positioned to transcend traditional roles. Mechanism analysis suggests that this is not driven by broader digital fluency among affluent women, but rather reflects their intentional choice of intensive parenting practices.

12 January 2026 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LDLu Dong
Lu Dong
LHLingbo Huang
Lingbo Huang